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PART ONE 
Background and Introduction 
1.1.	 Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), otherwise known as 
prion diseases, are rare, fatal, degenerative diseases affecting the 
central nervous system (CNS), that occur in humans and certain other 
mammals. 
1.2.	 There are several recognised TSEs, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(CJD) in humans, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and 
scrapie in sheep. These and other TSEs are summarised in Box 1. 
1.3.	 TSEs are in many ways unique, and exhibit biological properties that are 
different from those of other microbiological diseases
1,2,3
. A useful 
summary about these diseases has been published previously by the 
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC)
4
. Some of the 
important features relevant to occupational exposure are summarised 
below: 
(a)	 TSEs are caused by unconventional infectious agents currently 
thought to be infectious proteins (apparently without nucleic acid) 
known as prions which do not share the normal properties of 
viruses or bacteria. The CNS contains the highest levels of 
infectivity which is associated with accumulation of a modified host-
encoded protein, prion protein. In TSEs, prion protein undergoes a 
structural change (involving re-folding) to a conformer with an 
increased beta – sheet structure. This conformational change 
renders the abnormal prion protein more resistant to degradation, 
and is associated with infectivity. The abnormal form of prion 
protein is only found in TSEs, but the mechanism and site of its 
conversion are still uncertain. 
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(b)	 A common feature of all TSEs is the appearance of microscopic 
vacuoles in the grey matter of the CNS, giving a sponge-like 
appearance, from which the conditions derive their name. This 
change is accompanied by the accumulation of the abnormal form 
of the prion protein in the CNS. 
(c)	 The commonest form of CJD occurs as a sporadic disease, the 
cause of which is unknown, although genetic factors (particularly 
the codon 129 polymorphism in the prion protein gene (PRNP)) 
influence disease susceptibility. The familial forms of human TSEs 
(see Box 1) appear to have a solely genetic origin and are closely 
associated with mutations or insertions in the PRNP gene. Most, 
but not all, of the familial forms of human TSEs have been 
transmitted experimentally to animals. There are no known familial 
or genetic TSEs of animals, although polymorphisms in the PRNP 
gene of some species (sheep for example) may influence the 
length of the incubation period and occurrence of disease. 
(d)	 Although TSEs are not contagious, they are experimentally 
transmissible by inoculation and in some cases by oral challenge. 
Some animal TSEs, such as scrapie, are naturally transmissible to 
sheep and goats and chronic wasting disease (CWD) is naturally 
transmissible to several North American species of deer and elk, 
but how this is effected is still uncertain. Transmissible mink 
encephalopathy (TME) and BSE are feed-borne diseases. 
Transmission of TSEs to humans has occurred from both human 
and bovine sources, resulting in iatrogenic CJD and variant CJD 
respectively (see Box 1). Other animal TSEs, including scrapie, do 
not appear to cause human disease. 
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(e)	 TSE agents are not uniformly distributed in the tissues of affected 
individuals and infectivity levels vary at different stages of 
incubation. In general, during the clinical disease, CNS tissues 
(including the retina) pose the highest risk, lymphoid tissues, 
cornea and dura mater are lower risk and most body fluids and 
other tissues negligible risk (for more detail see Tables A1 and A2); 
(f)	 TSE agents exhibit an unusual resistance to conventional chemical 
and physical decontamination methods. They are not significantly 
affected by disinfectants like formalin and ethylene oxide, and 
infectivity persists after standard autoclaving (e.g. 134°C for 3  
minutes). They are also extremely resistant to high doses of 
ionising and UV irradiation and some residual activity has been 
shown to survive for long periods in the environment; 
(g)	 All TSEs are invariably progressive and fatal once clinical signs 
appear; there is currently no known effective treatment or 
prophylaxis, although this is an area of active research and clinical 
trials in humans have been established. 
(h)	 There have been no confirmed cases of transmission of TSE to 
humans as a result of occupation. If TSEs could be transmitted in 
the occupational setting this would be most likely to occur from 
exposure to infected tissues or materials by direct inoculation (e.g. 
puncture wounds, ‘sharps’ injuries or contamination of broken 
skin), by splashing of the mucous membranes or, exceptionally, by 
swallowing. 
1.3.	 The unconventional nature of the agent, together with the appearance of 
BSE in the mid-1980s and variant CJD in the mid-1990s, has led to a 
considerable amount of scientific research. This in turn means that there 
is a need for updated guidance on safe work practices in laboratories and 
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small and large laboratory animal accommodation as new information on 
these diseases continues to emerge. There is also a need to provide 
guidance for health practitioners on the risks from humans infected with 
TSE agents. 
Scope of this guidance 
1.5.	 Health and safety law sets out a series of general duties on employers, 
employees and self-employed people. There are specific regulations which 
cover work with biological agents such as those causing TSEs, notably the 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (COSHH)
5
. These 
require employers to assess the risks in all cases where there may be exposure 
to biological agents and when appropriate introduce measures to either prevent 
or adequately control exposure. COSHH applies whether there is a deliberate 
intention to work with the agent (such as in a research laboratory) or whether 
exposure is incidental to the work (such as in a hospital ward or operating 
theatre). 
1.6.	 This guidance is therefore divided into three main sections as follows: 
� Hazards and risk associated with workplace exposure to TSE 
agents (including information on health and safety law); 
� Containment and control measures for laboratory work with TSE 
agents, materials and infected animals (i.e. where there is 
deliberate intention to work with the agent or where laboratory 
workers are handling material that may contain the agent; 
� Infection control of CJD and related disorders in healthcare 
settings (i.e. where any exposure to the agent is incidental to the 
work). 
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1.7.	 The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to employers on the 
precautions to control the risk of exposure of employees and others to TSE 
agents from work activities. The guidance applies to many occupations that 
involve contact with people or animals infected with TSE agents, or potentially 
contaminated material. It should also be drawn to the attention of those 
responsible for advising others who may come into contact with TSE during the 
course of their work. Included in these groups are: 
•	 laboratory staff (including experimental animal house staff); 
•	 healthcare workers (including infection control staff; medical 
and nursing staff particularly in neurology, ophthalmology, 
neuro- or ENT-surgery, oral and maxillofacial surgery; and 
dentistry; sterile services supply staff and medical 
engineers); 
•	 staff involved in hospice and community care; 
•	 pathologists (including veterinary pathologists), pathology 
laboratory staff, post mortem technicians; 
•	 funeral, cemetery and crematorium workers; 
•	 local Consultants in Communicable Disease Control 
(CsCDC) and Health Protection Teams. 
1.8.	 Additional advice for veterinary surgeons and those involved in the 
transportation, slaughtering and processing of cattle and cattle products can be 
found in a separate Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens publication 
“BSE Background and general occupational guidance”
6
. Guidance on handling 
meat-and-bone-meal (MBM) material
7
 and an information sheet on common 
zoonoses in cattle
8
, which will be of interest to farmers and others involved in 
animal husbandry, have also been published by the Health and Safety 
Executive. Details of these publications are given in the References. 
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Box 1 Human and Animal TSEs 
The human TSEs occur in 3 groups: 
•	 Idiopathic diseases: Sporadic CJD  and sporadic fatal insomnia 
•	 Familial diseases: Familial CJD, Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS) 
and fatal familial insomnia 
•	 Acquired diseases: Human agents: Kuru and iatrogenic CJD
 
Bovine agent: Variant CJD
 
All human TSEs are very rare; the world-wide incidence of CJD is about 1 per million 
people each year. Sporadic CJD accounts for around 85% of all human TSEs; familial 
TSEs account for around 10-15% of cases and the remaining smaller numbers include 
the acquired human TSEs. In sporadic CJD the usual age of onset is late middle age 
(average age 65 years). Most patients present with rapidly progressive dementia with 
focal neurological signs including ataxia, myoclonus, visual disturbances and rigidity. 
Death usually occurs within 4-6 months of clinical onset. The clinical features of familial 
TSEs are much more variable, even within affected families. Some patients exhibit 
clinical features which resemble sporadic CJD, while in GSS most patients present with 
ataxia and other movement disorders before the onset of dementia. In sporadic and 
fatal familial insomnia, patients usually suffer from prominent sleep disturbances before 
the onset of other neurological abnormalities. 
Kuru occurred as an epidemic in the Fore-speaking people in the Eastern highlands of 
Papua New Guinea and was first reported in 1957. Its transmission was associated with 
funeral rites involving ritual contact with, preparation of, and consumption of the entire 
body (including brains) of relatives who had died of kuru. The similarity, especially of 
the neuropathology, between kuru and scrapie, a disease of sheep that had been 
shown to be transmissible some 20 years earlier, led to the subsequent successful 
experimental transmission of kuru to primates. A link was thus established between 
human contact with kuru-infected tissues, their consumption and the eventual 
development of kuru. The incidence of kuru has been markedly reduced following the 
abolition of cannibalism coupled with health education, although recent cases still arise 
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from historical exposure, indicating a maximum (to date) incubation period of around 
40 years. The shortest incubation period in kuru is reported to be about five years. 
The first case of iatrogenic transmission of CJD was identified in 1974 in a corneal 
graft recipient. Since then several hundreds of cases of iatrogenic CJD have been 
reported, most of which have occurred in recipients of human-derived pituitary 
hormones or human-derived dura mater grafts. Other rarer sources of infection include 
contaminated neurosurgical instruments and intracerebral electrodes. Incubation 
periods for iatrogenic CJD range from 1-2 years for neurosurgical routes of 
transmission to over 30 years in some pituitary hormone recipients. World Health 
Organisation guidelines on TSE’s in relation to biological and pharmaceutical products 
have been published recently
9
. 
In 1996, the National CJD Surveillance Unit in the UK
10,11 
identified a new form of CJD, 
which is now known as variant CJD. Variant CJD generally affects young adults (mean 
age at onset 28 years) with a clinical illness that lasts on average for 14 months. The 
initial features include psychiatric abnormalities and sensory abnormalities, which are 
usually followed by ataxia, myoclonus and other movement disorders and accompanied 
by dementia. At the time of writing, over 140 cases of variant CJD have been identified, 
over 90% of which have been in the UK. Considerable uncertainty exists over the likely 
future numbers of variant CJD cases in the UK; there has been a small but important 
decline in the incidence of the disease in 2002. There is a substantial body of 
evidence from multiple transmission studies to indicate that the agent responsible for 
variant CJD is biologically indistinguishable from the BSE agent, making this the only 
known human TSE which has arisen from infection from another species. 
There have been no confirmed cases of transmission of TSE by virtue of occupation. 
There have been a small number of reports of sporadic CJD in healthcare workers 
(including a neurosurgeon, retired laboratory workers and a pathologist) but their link 
with their occupation is speculative. There is no evidence at present that occupational 
exposure to BSE is a risk factor for variant CJD. 
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The animal TSEs are: 
� scrapie in sheep, goats and moufflon; 
� bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle; 
� transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in farmed mink; 
� chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk species; 
� feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE) in domestic cats and 
captive exotic felines; 
� spongiform encephalopathy in captive exotic ungulates. 
� Spongiform encephalopathy reported in primates in a French 
zoological collection. 
BSE was first confirmed in the United Kingdom in 1986. Up to December 2002 about 
183,000 native-born cattle in the UK are known to have been affected, and a total of 
over 3,000 native-born cattle in several other countries, including most countries of the 
EU. Current statistics can be found on the Defra webiste
12
. A few cases have occurred 
in these and some other countries following export of live cattle from countries with 
BSE. 
Affected animals become unsteady on their feet, lose weight and become nervous, 
hence the term ‘mad cow disease’. The BSE epidemic has been in continuous decline 
since 1992/3 in the UK as a result of successive bans on feeding ruminant-derived 
protein and subsequently mammalian-meat-and-bone-meal to ruminants. All animals 
suspected of having BSE are compulsorily slaughtered and completely destroyed. 
Ruminant or more extensive feed bans are now applied throughout the EU and in many 
other countries of the world, even those unaffected by BSE. 
Scrapie occurs in sheep, and more rarely in goats and moufflon, and has been 
recognised for more than 250 years. Affected animals often scrape themselves against 
objects to alleviate itching, become unsteady on their feet and lose condition. It is 
endemic in flocks in many countries, but there is no evidence that it can be transmitted 
to humans. 
8 
  
TME was first recognised in farmed mink in 1947 and has occurred sporadically since 
then, but there have been no reports since the 1990s. CWD in Rocky Mountain elk, 
mule deer and some other deer species is also a TSE. Originally seen only in wild-life 
facilities in the USA, CWD is now reported in free-ranging and farmed deer and elk in 
the USA and in Canada. There have been recent reports of CWD in elk exported from 
Canada to Korea. CWD has not been reported in Europe and TME has not been 
reported in the UK. TSEs have been recognised in domestic cats and captive, exotic 
felines and ungulates, most, but not all of which were born in the UK. Strain typing 
studies have indicated that at least some of these cases and perhaps  all are due to 
exposure to the BSE agent, presumably by the dietary route. These ‘mini-epidemics’ 
appear to have subsided to obscurity as a result of the various bans to protect animal 
species from feed exposure to TSE agents. 
Report of a spongiform encephalopathy in primate species in France, and a captive 
golden cat from Europe that died in Australia, did not involve any residence in the UK. 
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PART 2
Health and Safety Management of TSEs
HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION
The key requirements of the health and safety legislation, which is appropriate for
work with TSEs, are given in Table 2a below.
Table 2a
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 requires: Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR)
1999 require employers and self-employed workers to:
· employers and self-employed workers to ensure
they provide and maintain workplaces, equipment
and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably
practicable, safe to workers and the public;
· employees to take care of their own and others’
health and safety, and to co-operate with their
employer or any other person to enable them to
comply with health and safety duties;
· A guide to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act
1974 (L1) gives further information.
· identify the measures they need to take by carrying out risk
assessments;
· institute safety management systems;
· appoint persons to assist in health and safety management;
· ensure co-ordination and co-operation where two or more
employers or self-employer persons share a workplace;
· make emergency arrangements;
· provide information and relevant training for employees;
· Successful health and safety management (HSG 65) gives
further information .
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH)
Regulations 2002 provide a framework of actions designed
to control the risk from a range of hazardous substances
including biological agents. These actions include:
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000
and Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment)
Regulations 2002 require employers and self-employed workers to:
· assess the risk;
· prevent the risk by substitution if possible;
· control the risks using appropriate measures e.g.
work process, systems and engineering controls;
· control exposure at source e.g. adequate ventilation
systems and appropriate organisational measures;
· control the working environment including general
ventilation;
· maintain, examine and test control measures;
· provide suitable personal protective equipment
(PPE) when adequate control of exposure cannot be
achieved by other means;
· monitor exposure at the workplace;
· provide information, instruction and training for
workers;
· make arrangements for health surveillance of
workers where necessary;
· COSHH: a brief guide to the regulations (INDG131
rev1);
 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
(Fourth edition). The Control of Substances
Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002. Approved
Code of Practice and Guidance (L5);
· make a risk assessment for genetically modified micro-
organisms in relation to human health and environmental
protection and for genetically modified animals in relation to
human health;
· apply appropriate containment and control;
· notify the Competent Authority to the Regulations of all
premises being used for genetic modification;
· notify the Competent Authority of certain activities;
· A guide to the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained
Use) Regulations 2000, and Contained use of genetically
modified organisms (INDG86 rev2) give further information.
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 Health Surveillance under COSHH: guidance for
employers;
 The management, design and operation of
microbiological containment laboratories; and
5 steps to risk assessment (INDG163 rev1) give
further information.
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 1995 require
employers and the self-employed to:
The Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Classification, Packaging and
Labelling) Regulations 1996 require consigners to:
· report any infection reliably attributable to work
with live or dead humans or animals, exposure to
blood or fluids or any potentially infected material
derived from any of the above;
· report any accident or incident that could result in
the release of a TSE agent (or any other biological
agent categorised in Hazard Group 3 or 4). e.g.
percutaneous exposure to known infected brain
material;
· Guide to the reporting of Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 gives
further information.
· classify the biological agent or substance containing the
biological agent for transport according to the criteria laid down
in the ‘Approved Requirements’
· determine the packing group and package in accordance with
the appropriate packing instruction;
· appoint a Dangerous Goods Safety Adviser if necessary;
· Are you involved in the carriage of dangerous goods by road or
rail?;
 Approved Carriage List: Information approved for the
carriage of dangerous goods by road and rail other than
explosives and radioactive material (ACL);
 European Agreement concerning the international carriage of
dangerous goods by road (ADR);
 Approved Vehicle Requirements. Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road Regulations 1996 (AVR); and
Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of
Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID) give further information.
Health and Safety Management of TSEs
2.1  The ACDP publication ‘The management, design and operation of
microbiological containment laboratories’ provides guidance on the management of
biological agents including TSEs, in the laboratory environment.  The document sets
out the standards for Containment Level (CL) 2 and 3 microbiological laboratories
and should be read in conjunction with this guidance.
Health and Safety Law
2.2  Employers have duties under health and safety legislation to protect employees
and non-employees from risks to their health and safety arising from work activities;
non-employees include students and visitors.
2.3  A summary of the principal legal requirements relevant to work with TSEs is
given in Table 2a.
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection.  
published:  2 June 20033
2.4  Biological agents, as defined in the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
(COSHH) Regulations, include the agents that cause transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSEs).  COSHH applies both to deliberate work with TSEs (e.g. in
a laboratory) and to incidental exposure, as may occur in, for example, health care
workers, farm workers and abattoir workers.  COSHH outlines the requirements that
apply for work with biological agents.  General duties, which are relevant to all
hazardous substances, including biological agents and chemicals, can be found in the
main Regulations.  Additional requirements relating to just biological agents are
outlined in Schedule 3 of COSHH.
2.5  A risk assessment should be made for both these types of work.  Reducing and
controlling the risk for incidental exposure may be more reliant on safe systems of
work and the use of PPE rather than the use of containment, although preventing or
controlling exposure by this means should be considered in the first instance (as set
out in the hierarchical approach required by COSHH).  Guidance on managing and
controlling both deliberate exposure and incidental exposure for health care workers
is given in later sections of this document.  Guidance on incidental exposure for farm
and abattoir workers involved in the slaughter and processing of cattle can be found in
the general guidance document ‘BSE (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy):
Background and general occupational guidance’ and in the supplement ‘Guidance for
handling meat and bone meal material’.
Legal classification of biological agents
2.6  The appropriate control measures for laboratory work with biological agents are
determined largely by the Hazard Group classification of the agent. The EC
Classification of Biological Agents established a list of biological agents as part of the
Council Directive on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to
biological agents at work (2000/54/EC). Details can be found in the ACDP
publication “Categorisation of biological agents according to hazard and categories of
containment” and the 2000 supplement [currently under review].
2.7  Classification of a biological agent is based on the risk of infection to a healthy
worker using well-established criteria.  In determining the appropriate hazard
grouping of a biological agent, note is taken of the pathogenicity (disease producing
capability) of the organism to man, the hazard to workers, the potential for
transmission to the community and the seriousness of any illness that might result
after taking into account the availability of prophylaxis or effective treatment.  TSE
agents, excluding scrapie and others not linked to BSE, are classified as Hazard
Group (HG) 3 on the basis of these criteria.  Part 3 of this document on laboratory
containment and control measures provides further detail on classification of TSE
agents.
General Principles of Control
2.8  For laboratories and animal rooms the appropriate containment level is derived
from the hazard classification of the agent, or from what is suspected about the
possible presence of an agent.  COSHH requires that when working with an agent in a
particular hazard group, the containment level selected should match the hazard group
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of the agent.  TSEs should normally be worked on in CL3 because they are classified
as HG3 agents. (See paragraph  2.13 for advice about changing containment
measures).  Detailed guidance on control and containment measures in laboratories
and animal rooms is given in Part 3 of this document.
2.9  When patients infected with a TSE agent are to be accommodated, for example
on a hospital ward, the choice of controls and containment, as in other cases, should
be on the basis of risk assessment.  The level of risk should be the prime
consideration.  The controls selected should reflect the requirements outlined in
COSHH with appropriate measures selected from Part II of Schedule 3 of COSHH.
Detailed guidance on control and containment measures for TSE-infected humans is
given in Part 4 of this document.
Risk Assessment
2.10  The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) require
all employers and self-employed people to assess the risks to their employees and
others who may be affected by their work activity. More specifically COSHH requires
assessment of the risks of work with substances hazardous to health.  Where an
assessment is carried out for the purposes of COSHH, or other more specific
legislation, it does not have to be repeated for the purpose of MHSWR because the
duties laid down in COSHH go beyond those in MHSWR and the more stringent
requirements must be met.   The risk assessment required by COSHH must be
reviewed regularly and revised when conditions change, an incident occurs, a
deficiency is noted or if, for any other reason, it is suspected that the assessment is no
longer valid.  It must include a review of all working procedures. For example, a
review of procedural controls, arrangements for the safe disposal of waste, the
potential for the dispersal of infectious material in the working environment and the
contamination of equipment and apparatus.
2.11  The COSHH risk assessment for TSEs should consider:
· whether there is a deliberate intention to work with the agent, or if any exposure
would be incidental to the work;
· the hazard group of the agent (see paragraph 2.7 above);
· the origin of the agent;
· the type of tissue handled (this will give an indication of the likely level of
infectivity) (see Annex A);
· knowledge of expression of the agent in any experimental model and whether the
work is likely to result in a high titre of infectivity;
· assessment of the type of task (e.g. concentration/propagation/purification); and
· the frequency of contact with the agents or materials likely to contain them;
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· the possible routes of exposure including the potential for inoculation injury.
2.12  The local risk assessment for work involving propagation and concentration
should be authorised by senior management.
Changing Containment Measures
2.13  All TSE agents should normally be worked on in Containment Level (CL) 3
conditions because they are HG3 agents.  Scrapie, however, is not allocated to a
hazard group as there is, to date, no evidence of transmission of disease to humans.
Recent concern about BSE transmission from sheep has led to a debate on whether all
scrapie strains should be handled at CL3.  As this debate is ongoing, a precautionary
approach should be adopted in which well characterised laboratory strains of scrapie
should continue to be worked on at CL2, but extra precautions may be necessary for
handling unidentified field isolates.
2.14  In some circumstances consideration may be given to changing the containment
measures to reflect the likely exposure of workers to TSE agents in a particular
circumstance.  Any decision to change the containment conditions should only be
taken on the basis of a local risk assessment that takes into account:
· the type of work;
· the quantity of material;
· the likely infectivity to humans; and
· the procedures and equipment that will be used to propagate, concentrate
or analyse the agent.
2.15  Detailed guidance on the type of changes that could be made to the containment
level is given in Part 3.  If you are in any doubt about the basis for making changes to
the containment measures you should consult HSE.
Local Safety Policies and Codes of Practice
2.16  The local health and safety policy sets out in general terms how management
intend to develop and maintain a safe working environment.  It should reference the
ways in which the safe day-to-day working of the laboratory will be achieved and
managed.
2.17  Specific information on the arrangements for working safely day-to-day can best
be set out in local codes of practice. A guide to the main areas that should be covered
is given in Infobox 1 below.
2.18  All employees must have a clear understanding of any identifiable risks to their
health arising from work, and the actions to be taken in dealing with situations in
which exposure may occur.  Local codes of practice form part of this process of
giving information on safe working, but thorough training and instruction on their
day-to-day application is needed in order to make them work effectively.   Employers
have a responsibility to make the policy and codes freely accessible, either by putting
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them on display or by individual issue. All staff, including all newcomers and
temporary workers, must be made aware of them.
2.19  Employers have a duty to consult employees on health and safety matters.
Further information and details of additional guidance can be found in the leaflet
‘Consulting employees on health and safety: A guide to the law’ (INDG232L).
INFOBOX 1.  TOPICS TO BE COVERED IN A LOCAL CODE
· Introduction:
state the reasons for having a code;
refer to other relevant health and safety documents;
detail the arrangements for making staff aware of the nature of the TSE agent to
              which they might be exposed, the possible source of infection and the containment
              (physical and procedural) measures to be used; and
training and supervision arrangements for working in the laboratory.
· General Procedures:
specify which staff (or grade of staff) are authorised to carry out particular procedures; and
provide appropriate guidance for ancillary and maintenance staff, contractors and visitors.
· Operation of Unit
detail start up procedures, operation of safety cabinet, ventilation controls, procedures
              for operating equipment, use of personal protective equipment and cleaning procedures.
· Local Rules
these should cover the circumstances in which changed containment measures may be used, eg
automated analysis of low risk specimens.
· Waste
detail waste disposal policy and disinfection policy including cleaning of fragile laboratory
equipment, eg automated analyser, and what to do in the event of spillage.
· Staff Health
arrangements for reporting and recording incidents, including the name of the person to whom
incidents should be reported.
· Testing and Maintenance
arrangements for the maintenance and testing procedures on engineering controls to be carried
out.
· Emergency Procedures
procedures for dealing with accidents involving TSE agents including the name of the person to
whom accidents should be reported.
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List of workers exposed to TSE agents
2.20 Under certain circumstances COSHH requires employers to keep a list of
employees who are exposed to HG3 or 4 agents.  The decision to keep a list depends
on the local risk assessment. For TSE agents a list is only required where employees
deliberately work with the agent.  For example:
o those involved in laboratory research work and veterinary clinical
work with a TSE agent;
o staff performing invasive clinical procedures on patients suspected to
be suffering from CJD of any type, particularly where there is a risk of
exposure to central nervous tissue, eye tissue or other tissues known to
contain CJD infectivity (see table on infectivity of tissues in Annex
A1);
o laboratory staff handling tissue specimens from patients with CJD of
any type, in either routine or specialist neuropathology laboratories; or
o staff undertaking post-mortem examinations of patients who have died
of CJD of any type or where CJD of any type is suspected.
2.21  The routine clinical care of patients with CJD or a related disorder is unlikely to
pose a significant risk of exposure to CJD of any type and staff working with such
patients would not need to be included on such a list.
2.22  In cases of unintentional exposure, a list may be required if the risk assessment
shows that there is a significant risk.  The risk is deemed to be significant if more than
basic hygiene measures are necessary to protect staff or if the control measures listed
in COSHH are specifically applied.  The list should be kept where there is a
likelihood of exposure and not simply when there has been a known incident or
accident, although it should also include details of these.  Recording details of
incidents or accidents on this list is not the same as the requirement to report certain
diseases and accidents to HSE under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR).
2.23  The information that should be recorded includes the type of work done and,
where known, any specific exposure, accident or incident.  Because of the long
latency period of TSE agents and their serious long-term sequelae, the list must be
kept for 40 years after the last known exposure.  This list is in addition to the health
record (which is required for the purposes of health surveillance under COSHH or
MHSWR) and must be made available to any doctor appointed to carry out health
surveillance, e.g. the occupational health physician. It must also be available to any
employee who is specifically responsible for health and safety.
2.24  Each employee recorded on the list must have access to the information that
relates to him or her personally.  The list may be kept with the individual’s
occupational health record.   Data protection requirements will apply to the
information being held; see Infobox 2.
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RIDDOR
2.25 RIDDOR requires some accidents and exposures to be notified to HSE.  These
include any infection reliably attributable to work with live or dead humans or
animals, exposure to blood or body fluids or any potentially infected material derived
from any of the above.  Accidents or incidents, which result in or could result in the
release or escape of a TSE agent, must also be reported under RIDDOR as a
dangerous occurrence.
Health Surveillance
2.26  Where appropriate both MHSWR and COSHH Regulations require employees
to be under suitable health surveillance.  Under MHSWR health surveillance must be
provided, as appropriate, with regard to the risks identified by the risk assessment.
Under COSHH, health surveillance must be provided where:
· there is an identifiable disease or adverse health effect that may be related to
exposure in the workplace;
· there is a reasonable likelihood that the disease or effect may occur under the
particular conditions of work; or
· there are valid techniques for detecting indications of the disease or effect.
2.27  There are no valid techniques for detecting early indications of TSE disease at
the present time.  Health surveillance is therefore limited to setting up and
maintaining individual health records for employees likely to be exposed to TSE
agents.  However, employers must remain aware to any new techniques that become
available and adopt them as appropriate.
2.28  The health record is supplementary to the list of workers exposed to TSE agents
(see paragraph 2.23). The minimum information that should be recorded is:
INFOBOX 2: THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998
The requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 may apply to any records (computerised or
manual) kept about individuals (such as employees) in connection with health and safety
legislation, eg health surveillance records.  These requirements may include informing people
that certain information is held on them and granting them access to that information, should
they request it.  Guidance on the Act can be requested from the Office of the Data Protection
Commissioner, Wycliffe house, Water lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire SK9 5AF (Tel. 01625 545745)
or by e-mail at data@dataprotection.gov.uk. (See the website at www.dataprotection.gov.uk for
more information.)
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· personal details of the individual including full name (and maiden name for
women if appropriate), date of birth, gender, permanent address and post code,
national insurance number and the date when the present employment started;
· the type of work the employee does;
· records of accidents and incidents involving exposure to the TSE agent; and
· a historical record of jobs in the present employment which involve exposure
to infectious or potentially infectious TSE material.
2.29 Further information on health surveillance can be found in Regulation 11(3) of
the COSHH Approved Code of Practice.
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Part 3
LABORATORY CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL MEASURES
Introduction
3.1  This section gives advice on safe working practices to help prevent the transmission
of TSE agents during laboratory work with such agents or material that contains or may
contain them.  It covers:
 all experimental work with preparations derived from body fluids, including work
with abnormal purified prion proteins or tissues known or likely to contain either
human or animal TSE agents;
 all diagnostic laboratory work with preparations derived from body fluids or
tissues known or likely to contain human or animal TSE agents – this includes
work with animal tissues derived in the field for onward supply to laboratories for
investigation where appropriate, for example, tissues derived for surveillance
purposes; and
 research work with infected animals.
3.2  Guidance on work with any hosts or vectors in which TSE agents have been cloned
using genetic modification and where expression may be achieved is given in the Advisory
Committee on Genetic Modification’s Compendium of Guidance
(www.hse.gov.uk/hthdir/noframes/acgmcomp/acgmcomp.htm).
Formal classification of TSE agents
3.3  The causative agents of the following diseases are all classified as Hazard Group (HG)
3 agents as listed in the Health and Safety Commission’s Approved List of Biological
Agents (http://www.hse.gov.uk/hthdir/noframes/agent1.pdf).
 Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) including variant CJD (vCJD);
 Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Syndrome (GSS);
 Kuru;
 Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI);
 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and similar diseases, including feline
spongiform encephalopathy (FSE), spongiform encephalopathy (SE) in captive
exotic ungulates, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting
disease (CWD).  BSE experimentally transmitted to other species is also included.
3.4  The appropriate containment level for an agent is derived from the hazard grouping of
the agent.  When working with an agent (e.g. propagation or concentration) in a particular
hazard group, the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 2002
require that the containment level selected must match the hazard group of the agent as a
minimum.  Although TSE agents are formally classified as HG3 (see paragraph 3.3), the
containment measures required when working with them may not necessarily fully meet
Containment Level 3 (CL3) because of the agent’s unique features (paragraphs 3.6-3.10).
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The hazard group of the TSE agent forms the basis of a risk assessment to determine the
appropriate containment and control measures.
3.5  Based on the current Hazard Grouping of TSE agents, the recommended overall
Containment Levels are given in Table 3a below.  Work is categorised according to the
type of infectious agent and, for work with animals, the species being infected.  Work
with human TSE agents includes primary sources and any sub-passages of human derived
agents in other species.  Work with any animal TSE agent passaged in primates or in
genetically modified mice with the human PrP gene should also be considered.
Table 3a
Containment Levels recommended for work with TSE agents
Laboratory work with: Overall Laboratory
Containment Level
Animal Containment Level
Human TSE Agents
BSE and agents from animals
with related TSE  (FSE, SE in
captive, wild bovines and
felines) or any sub-passaged
agents from these in any
species
TME and CWD
3 3 – small animals
1* – large animals
Scrapie agents 2 2 - small animals
1* - large animals
* ACL1 applies to housing of animals only, additional precautions will be required when
working with such animals – see paragraphs 3.30 to 3.47
Infobox 1: Categorisation of work with scrapie
The causative agent of scrapie (and other TSE agents known not to be linked to BSE)
is not listed in the Approved List of Biological Agents because there is no evidence of
transmission of disease to humans to date.  However, as a precaution, work with well
characterised laboratory strains of scrapie should be carried out at CL2.
Recent concern about BSE transmission from sheep has led to a debate on whether all
scrapie strains should be handled at CL3.  As this debate is ongoing, a precautionary
approach should be adopted where extra precautions, above those normally required
at CL2, may be necessary for handling unidentified field isolates.
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3.6  As well as the properties of the agent affecting the containment measures used, there
may be other circumstances where consideration may be given to changing the
containment measures to reflect the likely exposure of workers to TSE agents. InfoBox 2
gives one example of a situation (processing samples from a surveillance scheme) when
this approach has been taken. However, any decision to change the containment
conditions should only be taken after performing a local risk assessment (see
COSHH ACoP and Guidance, in particular Schedule 3 and Appendix 2) that takes
into account:
 the nature of the work;
 the quantity and type of material being handled; and
 the procedures and equipment that will be used – consider the potential for
dispersal of the agent, for contamination of workers, equipment or surfaces at all
stages of the activity including handling, processing and disposal, and for
contamination during the setting up, servicing and maintenance of the equipment.
3.7  Having completed the risk assessment, local rules/standard operating procedures
should then be prepared detailing safe working practices. Specific guidance on the
situations where containment measures can be changed is given in the following sections.
 3.8  Although in many respects the requirements of a CL3 laboratory are outwardly
similar to CL2 laboratories, because of the more hazardous nature of the agents the
standards that must be achieved are higher.  The key differences between CL3 and CL2
laboratories relate to the way in which they are managed, the need for special training, and
the degree of supervision, in addition to the physical requirements of the laboratory itself.
In terms of work with TSE agents, managers should ensure that:
·  staff are competent and trained to carry out the work;
·  they have received suitable information, instruction and training about risks; and
·  there is appropriate supervision of the work in question.
3.9  Guidance on these aspects of laboratory management is given in the ‘Management,
design and operation of microbiological containment laboratories’.
3.10  It should be noted that changing some of the physical containment measures does
not imply that the work can be carried out at CL2.  But, subject to following the guidance
set out in the subsequent sections, a CL2 laboratory may be appropriate for certain types
of work (see paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28).
Infobox 2: Changing the containment level
In some circumstances the risk of a HG3 agent being present in a sample is extremely
low.
For example, the appropriate containment measure for work with tissues derived for
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surveillance purposes will depend on what is known about the incidence of infection in the
population that is being studied, and as a result the risk assessment may show that
Containment Level (CL) 2 is appropriate for work with the tissues.
For example, some of the Defra data from their current surveillance scheme indicate a low
incidence of positives for BSE:
In ‘high risk’ cattle
                                 Fallen stock (OTM)                                                Casualties (OTM)
                                    %          Actual                                                       %          Actual
2001                          0.35      86/24660                                                   0.59      231/39487
2002                          0.16     118/73055                                                  0.34      380/111633
Healthy cattle submitted to OTMS
                                                   %                                                                    Actual
2001                                         0.001                                                              1/14320
2002                                         0.008                                                              12/142887
Casualties on arrival at abattoir (2002)
                                                    %                                                                    Actual
Over 30 months old                  0.12                                                                 3/2474
24-30 months old                        0                                                                   0/961
(Matthews D, 2003, Pers. comm.)
Using these data the VLA risk assessment indicated that samples from these cattle could
be worked at initially at CL2, due to the low risk of exposure.
GENERAL APPROACH TO SAFE WORKING PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO ALL
LABORATORY WORK WITH TSE AGENTS
3.11  This general approach applies to all laboratory work whether human or animal
diagnostics and to research work.
3.12  ‘The management, design and operation of microbiological containment
laboratories’ provides guidance on the management of biological agents including TSE
agents, in the laboratory environment.  The guidance sets out the standards for CL2 and
CL3 microbiological laboratories, and it should be read in conjunction with this guidance
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which sets out the specific and/or additional requirements for work with TSE agents.  The
ACDP guidance ‘Working safely with research animals: Management of infection risks’
should also be read in conjunction with this guidance. The essential features of CL2 and
CL3, as required by COSHH, are shown in Table 3b below.
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Table 3b: Containment measures for CL2 and CL3 laboratories
Containment level
Containment measure
2 3
Air handling
The work place is to be maintained at an air pressure
negative to atmosphere
No Yes
Input and extract air to the workplace are to be filtered
using high efficiency particulate absorption (HEPA) or
equivalent
No Yes, on extract air
Security and access
Access is to be restricted to authorised people only Yes Yes
The workplace is to be separated from any other
activities in the same building
No Yes
Efficient vector control, e.g. rodents and insects
Yes, for animal
containment
Yes, for animal
containment
An observation window, or alternative, is to be present
so that occupants can be seen
No Yes
Safe storage of biological agents Yes Yes
A laboratory is to contain its own equipment No
Yes, as far as is
reasonably
practicable
Disinfection and disposal procedures
The workplace is to be sealable to permit disinfection No Yes
Specified disinfection procedures Yes Yes
Surfaces impervious to water and easy to clean Yes, for bench
Yes, for bench
and floor (and for
walls for animal
containment)
Surfaces resistant to acids, alkalis, solvents and
disinfectants
Yes, for bench
Yes, for bench
and floor (and for
walls for animal
containment)
Incinerator for disposal of animal carcasses Accessible Accessible
Protective equipment and procedures
Infected material, including any animal, is to be handled
in a safety cabinet, isolator or other suitable
containment
Yes, where
aerosol produced
Yes, where
aerosol produced
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General protective measures
3.13  General, basic protective measures should be used wherever there is a risk of
exposure to potentially infectious material, including TSE agents.  These measures are
summarised in Table 3c in the context of working with TSE agents.
Table 3c General protective measures
·  apply general good hygiene measures such as not eating, drinking, smoking or taking
medication in the laboratory
·  protect skin wounds such as cuts, abrasions, eczematous lesions with water proof
dressings
·  wear the appropriate protective clothing routinely – consider the use of disposable
gowns and wear disposable gloves for all work with TSE material
·  wear eye protection or full face visor to protect eyes and mucous membranes from
splashes with potentially infected material
·  minimise the use of sharps (needles, knives, scissors and laboratory glassware)
wherever possible
·  consider the use of suitable hand protection such as armoured glove(s) where the use of
sharp instruments is essential (see Infobox 3) e.g. in post mortem examinations or the
collection of human or animal brain/spinal cord
·  remove protective clothing and wash hands before leaving the laboratory
·  use closed systems such as sealed centrifuge buckets or where appropriate a
Microbiological Safety Cabinet (MSC) to protect against splashing of material when
mixing, centrifuging or homogenising samples
·  use plastic single-use disposable items (containers, pipettes, inoculating loops and other
such instruments); in the case of large items this could be interpreted as specified parts of
the item e.g. dedicated ultracentrifuge rotors or electron microscope grids
·  use recommended decontamination procedures – see Annex C
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Cleaning and decontamination
3.14  As many of the standard methods of decontamination cannot ensure complete
inactivation of TSE agents, the emphasis must be on the removal of the agent by thorough
cleaning, followed by an appropriate autoclaving or liquid chemical treatment.  Annex C
gives detailed guidance on cleaning, decontamination and waste disposal.
Handling emergencies
3.15  There should be plans in place in the laboratory to deal with accidents involving TSE
agents, for example dealing with spillages or first aid arrangements for inoculation injuries.
Employees must report immediately to their employer, or any of their employer’s other
employees with specific responsibility for health and safety, any accident or incident that
results in the release of a TSE agent. The training of employees working with TSEs should
prepare them for this responsibility. The training should include highlighting the readily
foreseeable incidents that could occur and the procedures for dealing with accidents,
incidents and emergencies, and the name of the person or people to whom accidents
should be reported.
3.16  Spillages should be handled according to the guidance in Annex C.   Any inoculation
injury or contamination of broken skin with TSE agents (or material that contains the
agents) should be gently encouraged to bleed, washed (not scrubbed) with warm soapy
water and covered with a waterproof dressing. Disinfectants should not be put onto cuts
or broken skin, as this could impair the body’s localised defence reaction to the injury.
3.17  An official local record should be kept of any incident or occurrence that involves
exposure to TSE agents.  Certain incidents will need to be reported to HSE under
RIDDOR (see Part 2, paragraph 2.25).
Transport of specimens
3.18  All TSE-infected specimens of human and animal origin are classed as infectious
substances for the purposes of transport.  Guidance on the transport of this material is
given in Annex D.
EXPERIMENTAL WORK WITH TSE AGENTS
3.19  As previously outlined, it may not be necessary to use all of the measures normally
required at CL3 but any decision to dispense with certain CL3 containment measures
should only be made on the basis of a local risk assessment (as described in paragraph 3.6
above). The assessment must be specific to the laboratory and the work that is being
carried out.
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3.20  Following a risk assessment, which may indicate that other risks require the use of
full CL3 (for example, if other HG3 biological agents are likely to be present – see Table
3b), the main physical containment measures that might be dispensed with for
experimental work are:
·  The need for the laboratory to be sealable to permit fumigation, as the TSE agents
are not affected by normal fumigants.  Therefore, another means of decontamination
for TSE agents, in particular in the event of a major spillage, will need to be addressed
in a local code of practice/Standard Operating Procedure.
·  It may not be necessary for the laboratory to be maintained at negative pressure.
For example, if the work only involves the handling of small volumes of liquid, the
work could be carried out within the confines of an appropriate microbiological safety
cabinet – all such devices will have HEPA filtered exhausts.  If a cabinet is used,
consideration will need to be given to the routine disinfection of surfaces and also the
action to be taken when the cabinet requires servicing.  If, however the work involves
activities that can spread contaminated material around and outside the laboratory, for
example, block cutting, local exhaust ventilation may be required to control the spread
of contaminated material.  In addition, maintaining an inward airflow may further help
to control the spread of contaminated material outside of the confines of the
laboratory.
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3.21  There may be certain experimental situations where the amount of TSE agents
present is likely to be significantly higher than levels normally encountered in naturally
occurring disease, or else the risk of exposure is increased because of certain activities,
for example when material containing TSE agents is disrupted or concentrated by
homogenisation or centrifugation.  If this is the case, such situations should be carefully
assessed and it may be necessary to work at full CL3.
DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORIES
3.22  A range of laboratory tests may be required for the clinical management of patients
with known or suspected CJD.  Similarly, veterinary diagnostic tests will be needed in
herds where BSE may be known or suspected.  Diagnostic-type tests may also be carried
out on human or animal tissues for surveillance purposes (see Infobox 2).
3.23  Again, assessment may indicate that not all the containment measures normally
required by CL3 are necessary.  As before, the main containment measures that might not
be required are the need for a sealable laboratory and the requirement for an inward
airflow.  The assessment must be specific to the laboratory that is undertaking the work,
as sample processing procedures and equipment are likely to differ between laboratories.
3.24  Brain and spinal cord samples present the greatest risk of exposure to the TSE agent
as compared to other diagnostic specimens and although certain containment measures
may be dispensed with (as in paragraph 3.20), additional protective measures will need to
be taken as follows:
 care should be taken to avoid accidental inoculation or injury, e.g. when preparing
samples for microscopy or culture;
 disposable equipment should be used wherever practicable, e.g. cell counting
chambers etc;
 any items contaminated by the specimens should be either destroyed by
incineration, autoclaved or disinfected to the required standard (see Annex C for
further details);
 any residual contamination of automated equipment should be minimised;
 any residual contamination of equipment should be dealt with before servicing;
 delicate equipment such as microscopes should be cleaned and maintained regularly
to avoid accumulation of potentially contaminated debris.
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3.25  It may be appropriate for the diagnostic analysis of all brain and neural tissue
preparations from known, suspected and at risk patients or animals to be handled in a
specialist neuropathology laboratory or centre.
Neuropathology
3.26  In addition to ensuring appropriate containment measures are taken for this type of
work (as set out in paragraphs 3.20 and 3.24), it should be remembered that, although
standard formalin is used for optimal fixation of whole brain for general histopathology
purposes,  formalin-fixed TSE tissue retain infectivity for long periods and should always
be handled with the same precautions as fresh material.  Similarly, tissue for electron
microscopy fixed in glutaraldehyde retains its infectivity.  Formalin-fixed TSE tissue can
be decontaminated with formic acid treatment (Taylor DM, Brown JM, Fernie K and
McConnell I, 1997) – see Annex C for details. (Formic acid treatment has not been shown
to be effective for non-formalin-fixed material.) Once tissue blocks are fixed and formic
acid-treated, sections can be cut on a standard microtome (preferably using a disposable
knife) and processed as usual. Debris (wax shavings) from section cutting should be
contained (see paragraph 3.20) and disposed of by incineration.  The handling of archive
material stored in fixative blocks or as mounted slides should also be subject to the same
precautions as for fresh material.
Low risk specimens
3.27  This section of the guidance considers work with ‘low’ risk specimens (see Annex
A.1 for infectivity of human tissues and Annex A.2 for animal tissues) such as CSF,
blood, urine and faeces destined for routine clinical analysis. This advice should not be
interpreted as a means of carrying out any other work with TSE agents, or any
other HG3 agents, under such conditions. In addition to dispensing with measures
outlined in paragraph 3.20 other CL3 requirements (above those needed at CL2) may be
adapted to enable work on such specimens to take place in a CL2 laboratory. When
preparing a risk assessment for work with low risk specimens the following points could
be considered.
 The need to separate the work from other activities does not necessarily mean
having a separate laboratory, although this would be the preferred solution.  Work
could be carried out at the beginning or end of a work period.
 If an observation window, or alternative to allow occupants to be seen is not
available, then there will need to be some means of checking on staff, for example
using CCTV or regular phone calls/agreed check-ins. Such measures will ensure
that adequate supervision is in place when individuals are working alone.
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 In terms of equipment used for the handling of infectious material, this should be
disposable as far as possible or else cleaned thoroughly before being autoclaved.
 The transport of infectious material also needs to be considered.  Ideally it should
be stored within the room where it is to be handled.  If this is not the case, it
should be transported in robust, properly labelled, secured containers that should
only be opened within the confines of a microbiological safety cabinet.
· Low risk specimens should be autoclaved prior to disposal by incineration; further
guidance on decontamination and disposal of waste is given in Annex C.
 If a cabinet is used at CL2 to handle material, it should be remembered that
although this means that the laboratory is under negative pressure to some extent,
given that there is likely to be increased traffic in and out of such a laboratory, this
negative pressure will not be constant and so the work should remain within the
confines of a cabinet (see also guidance in 3.28 for work with low risk samples in
autoanalysers).
Automated analysis of human clinical specimens
3.28  ‘Low’ risk samples can be analysed in a fully enclosed automated system at CL2
providing any manual processing such as decanting is carried out within a microbiological
safety cabinet.   The low risk of infectivity together with the use of a fully enclosed
system is considered sufficient to reduce any risk of exposure to the laboratory worker to
a very low level.  The assessment of these types of procedures should take into account
whether:
 the system is fully enclosed and can contain spillage;
 waste can be disposed of without risk; and
 there are suitable maintenance and emergency procedures in place.
3.29  If the above cannot be ensured, then work should take place under the general
conditions described in paragraph 3.27.
RESEARCH WORK WITH INFECTED ANIMALS
3.30  General guidance on laboratory work with infected animals is given in Working
safely with research animals: Management of infection risks. In general, live animals
infected with TSE agents do not pose a significant risk of exposure to TSE agents.
However, the nature of experimental work with such animals means that there will be
procedures/tasks that increase the risk of exposure. Work with specified risk material
(SRM) or TSE agents in live animals may require a license (The TSE (England)
Regulations 2002).
3.31  There are certain minimum containment requirements for work with animals
experimentally infected with TSE agents, as shown in Table 3a.  Small animal work
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includes work with, for example poultry, rodents, rabbits, mink, cats and dogs.  Large
animal work includes work with, for example, domestic farm animals such as sheep and
cattle.
3.32  Generally, the rationale for work with small animals requiring more stringent
containment measures than large animals is because of the increased likelihood of biting
and scratching when working with such animals.  But, as with experimental laboratory
work with TSE agents, a local assessment of work at Animal Containment Level 3 may
indicate that not all the measures normally required are necessary to control exposure i.e.
the room need not be sealable to permit fumigation.  The risk of exposure when working
with live large animals such as sheep and cattle is considered remote and Animal
Containment Level 1 is appropriate. Where experimental sheep, goats and cattle are
pregnant, guidance in paragraph 3.44 should be taken into account in planning for
parturition or caesarean section.
3.33  Having identified the appropriate containment level for the work, the local risk
assessment of the work must identify all potential exposure points to determine whether
other additional precautions are required to control exposure, in particular for work with
large animals.  Additional precautions may also be required, for example, when
concentrations of infectivity above those found naturally might be expected.
3.34  Potential points of exposure are illustrated in Figure 3.1, with further guidance given
in paragraphs 3.36 to 3.47.
3.35  Having completed the risk assessment, local rules/standard operating procedures
should then be prepared detailing safe working practices.
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Inoculation
Housing
Euthanasia
Post mortem
General 
husbandry
Taking  
specimens
Disposal
Shedding of infectious agent
Disposal of bedding 
and animal waste
Methods used
Carcasses
Effluent
Methods used
Methods used
(See general guidance on 
laboratory containment and 
control measures for 
guidance on handling of 
specimens)
Figure 3.1: points to consider in assessment 
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Restraint
3.36  For procedures such as inoculation of infectious material and taking of blood, the
need for sedation of the experimental animal should be considered to protect staff from
injury.  If the animal is not to be sedated, the animal should be appropriately restrained and
procedures should not be carried out by lone workers.  Adult cattle infected with TSE
agents can be especially unpredictable and work should only be carried out by experienced
staff.
Inoculation
3.37  The route of inoculation of infectious material should be assessed to determine
whether this would allow leakage of this material post-inoculation and if this could
contaminate bedding etc.
3.38  When infecting by injection, leakage from the injection site should be controlled and
any leakage should be soaked up with absorbent material that should be treated as clinical
waste.  Sealants could also be applied to the wounds to control contamination of bedding
etc.
3.39  Consideration should be given to whether inoculum remains exposed for any period
of time, as may be the case when using feed as the source of infection.
3.40  As there is potential for excretion of infectious material post inoculation especially
when infection is via the oral route (albeit for a limited period of time) (Dickinson AG and
Taylor DM, 1978) then faecal waste and material contaminated by waste, e.g. bedding,
should be collected and disposed of by incineration for at least 4 weeks post-inoculation.
Husbandry
3.41  Certain tasks with large animals such as foot trimming, ear tagging, and shearing of
sheep may create a risk of exposure to blood and other body fluids.  Given the potential
for transmission of infection via blood (Hunter N et al, 2002), appropriate precautions
should be taken to avoid exposure to blood and accidental puncture wounds.  For
example, wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment such as gloves which
should be cut resistant  (NB: cut resistant gloves do not offer protection from penetrating
injuries – see Infobox 3), immediate disposal of needles when administering veterinary
treatment and face protection if there is a possibility of exposure to blood under pressure
coming into contact with mucous membranes such as the eyes.
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3.42  The housing of small animals will need to balance the need for positive pressure, for
example to maintain a germ-free environment or else protect immunosuppressed animals,
against the need for inward flow of air at CL3. In such cases the use of simple engineering
controls (e.g. flexible barriers) or respiratory protective equipment (RPE) may be
necessary and should be addressed in the local risk assessment.
Infobox 3: Protective gloves
Gloves or other hand protection should be capable of giving protection from hazards, be
comfortable and fit the wearer. The choice should be made on the basis of suitability for
protection, compatibility with the work and the requirements of the user. The ability of the
gloves to resist abrasion and other industrial wear and tear should be considered and the
manufacturer’s instructions and markings for appropriate use and level of protection should
be followed. When selecting gloves for chemical protection, reference should be made to
chemical permeation and resistance data provided by manufacturers.
Gloves made from chain-mail or leather and metal or plastic arm guards offer some protection
against stabs and are used in those aspects of work where a knife is moved towards the
user's hand and forearm. Gloves knitted from special man-made fibres such as Kevlar will
provide protection against cuts and gloves manufactured from, e.g. Kevlar needlefelt, give
good puncture resistance.
See also BS EN 374:1994 (Parts 1-3) Protective gloves against chemicals and micro-
organisms, BS EN 388:1994 Protective gloves against mechanical risks and BS EN 1082-
1:1997 Protective clothing. Gloves and arm guards protecting against cuts and stabs by hand
knives. Chain mail gloves and arm guards for further information.
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Collection of specimens
3.43  The type of sample required will affect the control measures required.  Taking of
blood specimens should be carried out so as to avoid exposure to blood and accidental
puncture wounds, e.g. wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment and
immediate disposal of needles (needles should not be resheathed).  Face protection may be
necessary if there is a possibility of exposure to blood under pressure coming into contact
with mucous membranes such as the eyes and the mouth.
Parturition
3.44  As there is the possibility of maternal transmission in sheep and a risk in cattle that
cannot be discounted (Race, Jenny & Sutton, 1998; Onodera, Ikeda, Muramatsu &
Shinagua, 1993; Pattison, Hoare, Jebbet & Watson, 1972) infected animals should give
birth in a separate area and all non-viable products of parturition, e.g. placentae and any
contaminated bedding etc disposed of via incineration.  The area should be cleaned and
disinfected after use with sodium hypochlorite (20,000 ppm available chlorine) for 1 hour.
Staff attending large animals should wear appropriate protective clothing, i.e. parturition
gown, gloves, face shield/mask. Where experimental animals are intended to be exposed to
potential contaminating material at or around the time of birth, the above guidelines can be
modified provided that a risk assessment is performed and appropriate measures are taken
to control exposure.
Disposal of waste
3.45 Carcasses and other associated material, e.g. tissue samples, from all animals
experimentally infected with a TSE agent should be disposed of by incineration.  Bedding
and faecal waste (following any initial shedding phase) can be disposed of in the normal
way (e.g. by landfill burial, spreading on land or discharge to the sewer system) subject to
the requirements of DEFRA, the Environment Agency [EA] and the Local Authority. (For
further information see the duty of care under section 34 of the Environmental Protection
Act 1990 on passing clinical waste to a registered carrier for disposal – note, the EA are
still consulting on technical guidance to support this legislation.)
Post mortem examination
3.46  Before post mortem examinations are performed on animals naturally or
experimentally infected with a TSE agent, an assessment should be made of the necessity
for the procedure.
3.47  The control hierarchy set out in COSHH (see COSHH ACoP and Guidance) requires
that exposure be prevented in the first instance. The following points should be addressed
when drawing up local codes of practice. 
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a) The Containment Level of the post mortem area must be appropriate for the
agent involved. Where it is not possible to use a dedicated room, an area of the
post mortem room should be set aside.
b) The procedure should be planned so that all equipment required is readily to
hand and work should be organised so that there are no interruptions (e.g. to
answer the telephone); only essential persons should be present in the post mortem
room when carrying out procedures with infected animals.
c) At least 2 persons should be present; in addition a circulator should attend
(remaining uncontaminated) acting as an observer and co-ordinator, for example
taking care of record-keeping, and handing over sterile/clean instruments etc.
d) Consideration should be given to the subsequent disinfection of working
surfaces, for example, work with small animals may be conducted in a stainless
steel or plastic tray (enamel trays are not recommended) which should be washed
clean before being autoclaved1 or disinfected with hypochlorite (20,000 ppm
available chlorine) for 1 hour. Disposable coverings should protect other working
surfaces.
e) For large animal post mortems, consideration should be given to the means by
which blood, body fluids and tissues that may be discarded during the post
mortem examination will be collected and disposed of safely.
f) Single-use disposable items should be used wherever practicable (alternatively
a set(s) of dedicated instruments may be used) and appropriate protective clothing,
including gloves, gowns, footwear, masks and visors or safety spectacles, should
be worn.  For large animal post mortems, heavy duty or waterproof clothing
should be used.  All items of reusable clothing should be rinsed clean in the post
mortem suite before being autoclaved1.  For items that would not withstand
repeated autoclaving such as rubberised boots, these should be washed clean then
disinfected using hypochlorite (20,000 ppm available chlorine).  All disposable
clothing should be autoclaved before being disposed of by incineration.
g) Carcases should be double bagged and placed in sealable bins prior to disposal
by incineration.  Small animal carcasses should be autoclaved prior to incineration.
(1 although autoclaving will not completely remove the TSE agent it will reduce the level of
infectivity and also eliminate any other infectious agents that may be present on
contaminated surfaces or clothing.)
Use of specified risk material (SRM) in research
3.48 Those carrying out non-TSE research work should be aware certain animal tissues
are designated SRM and subject to The TSE (England) Regulations 2002. If this is the
case the material (e.g. bovine eyes from UK cattle over 6 months old) should not be
15/12/2003
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection
19
sourced from cattle slaughtered under the purchase scheme introduced under EC
Regulation 716/96 or at the request of the Secretary of State to prevent BSE, to reduce the
risk of exposure to TSE agents. If SRM is used for non-TSE research purposes it should
not be allowed to come into contact with other non-SRM; particularly it must be kept in
premises free from food, feedingstuffs, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, medical products,
their starting materials or intermediate products. A licence may be required from the
Secretary of State to conduct research with SRM. COSHH requires a minimum of CL2 in
laboratories that do not intentionally work with biological agents but handle materials in
respect of which there exist uncertainties about the presence of Hazard Group 2, 3 or 4
biological agents.  Even if there is a negligible risk from BSE in such material, it may
contain other zoonotic agents, hence CL2 would be appropriate.
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PART 4 
INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF CJD and VARIANT CJD 
IN HEALTHCARE AND COMMUNITY SETTINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of advice  
 
Part 4 provides advice on safe working practices with the aim of preventing 
the transmission of CJD and other human prion diseases in hospital and 
community healthcare settings 
 
Note: Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)  
 
i) VPSPr is a recently described human prion disease, which appears to be a 
rare sporadic disorder affecting patients in an age range similar to those 
affected by sporadic CJD. 
 
ii) VPSPr is transmissible experimentally to transgenic mice expressing 
varying levels of the human prion protein, but the results suggest that the 
potential for human to human transmission may be limited1,2. The 
transmission characteristics of VPSPr are different from those of sporadic 
CJD and variant CJD in the transgenic mice studied. 
 
iii) There is very little data on the detection of abnormal prion protein outside 
the CNS in VPSPr, so as for other prion diseases where these data are 
lacking (e.g. many genetic forms of prion disease) it seems reasonable to 
assume a similar tissue distribution to sporadic CJD, since there is no 
evidence to indicate that VPSPr is a BSE-related disorder. 
 
iv) Further advice on VPSPr can be obtained from NCJDRSU (Professor 
James Ironside or Dr Anna Molesworth). 
 
1
 Diack et al. 2014.Variably Protease-Sensititve Prionopathy, a Unique Prion Variant 
with Inefficient Transmission Properties. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, 1969-79. 
 
2
 Notari et al. 2014. Transmission Characteristics of Variably Protease-Sensitive 
Prionopathy. Emerging Infectious Disesases 12, 2006-14.
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February 2015 
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Introduction 
4.1 This guidance provides advice on safe working practices with the aim of 
preventing the transmission of CJD and variant CJD (vCJD) in hospital and 
community healthcare settings. 
 
4.2 The use of the term “CJD” in this guidance encompasses sporadic CJD, sporadic 
fatal insomnia, variable protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr), vCJD, iatrogenic 
CJD, genetic CJD, Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI) and Gerstmann-Straussler-
Scheinker Disease (GSS), in order to assist readability. 
 
4.3 In this guidance document, the term ‘patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD’ 
is used as a proxy for all patient groups in Table 4a. Where this term is used, the 
guidance is applicable to all patient groups in this Table. 
 
4.4 Advice is available from the Public Health England CJD Section, who can be 
contacted on 020 8327 6090. 
 
Other relevant guidance 
 
Caring for patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD 
4.5 “Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: Guidance for Healthcare Workers” advice on the 
care of patients with CJD is available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk
/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_
4082370.pdf. This document refers to a “key worker” who will be constantly 
involved in the co-ordination of care of a patient with a clinical diagnosis of CJD, 
in either a hospital or community setting. This is a named professional with a 
good knowledge of local health and social services, who should be identified as 
soon as possible after a diagnosis of CJD seems likely. The “key worker” will 
provide continuing support and be the primary source of advice and information, 
to both the patient and their family, and act as a patient advocate for necessary 
resources. Practical advice on developing patient care packages can be obtained 
from the National Care Team (http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/care.html) at the National 
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CJD Research and Surveillance Unit, Western General Hospital, Crewe Road, 
Edinburgh, telephone number 01313 537 1980.  
 
4.6 Guidance from the vCJD Clinical Governance Advisory Group, available here, 
recommends that GPs should remain the patient’s clinical guardian and anchor, 
supported by consultant neurologists and the specialist national centres – the 
National CJD Research and Surveillance Unit and the National Prion Clinic. 
 
Management arrangements for infection prevention and control 
4.7 Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008, NHS bodies in England have to 
register with the Care Quality Commission (CQC), and as a requirement of 
registration they must protect patients, workers and others who may be at risk of 
acquiring a healthcare-associated infection (including CJD). 
 
4.8 The 2008 Act enables the Secretary of State for Health to issue a Code of 
Practice relating to healthcare-associated infections and the CQC to assess 
compliance with registration requirements on cleanliness and infection prevention 
and control by reference to this Code. A revised ‘Code of Practice on the 
prevention and control of infections and related guidance’ was published in 
January 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-health-and-
social-care-act-2008-code-of-practice-on-the-prevention-and-control-of-
infections-and-related-guidance  
 
4.9 The Code of Practice applies to registered providers of all healthcare and adult 
social care in England. This includes NHS bodies, independent providers, 
primary dental care providers, independent sector ambulance providers and 
primary medical care providers 
 
4.10 The Code of Practice supersedes ‘Standards for Better Health’ and Controls 
Assurance standards. 
 
4.11 The Code of Practice does not replace the requirement to comply with any other 
legislation that applies to health and social care services; for example, the Health 
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and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, and the Control of Substances Hazardous to 
Health Regulations 2002. 
 
Tissue infectivity 
4.12 Annexes A1 and A2 provide a summary of the distribution of abnormal prion 
protein in human tissues, a classification of infectivity in human tissues and body 
fluids in CJD, based (where available) on data from experimental studies, and a 
summary of information from other studies of natural transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy (TSE) diseases in humans and animals. 
 
Iatrogenic transmission 
4.13 There is no evidence to suggest that CJD is spread from person to person by 
close contact, though it is known that transmission of CJD can occur in specific 
situations associated with medical interventions – iatrogenic infections. Due to 
the possibility of iatrogenic transmission of CJD, precautions need to be taken for 
certain procedures in healthcare, to prevent transmission. 
 
CJD (except vCJD) 
4.14 Worldwide, cases of iatrogenic CJD have been associated with the administration 
of hormones prepared from human pituitary glands and dura mater preparations, 
and one case has been reported associated with a corneal graft (it is possible 
that the corneal tissue was contaminated by posterior segment tissue during 
processing). Iatrogenic transmission has also been identified following 
neurosurgical procedures with inadequately decontaminated instruments or EEG 
needles. 
 
vCJD 
4.15 There have been no known transmissions of vCJD via surgery or use of tissues 
or organs. Since 2003, four cases (three clinical and one asymptomatic) of 
presumed person-to-person transmission of vCJD infection via blood transfusion 
of non-leucodepleted red blood cells have been reported in the UK. In addition, in 
2009, a case of probable asymptomatic vCJD infection via plasma products was 
reported in a haemophiliac. 
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4.16 Since 1997, when the theoretical risk of vCJD transmission through blood was 
first considered, the UK blood services have taken a number of precautionary 
measures to protect the blood supply and associated plasma products. These 
precautionary measures to reduce the risk include: 
 Blood components, plasma products or tissues obtained from any individual 
who later develops vCJD are withdrawn/recalled to prevent their use; 
 Plasma for the manufacture of plasma products, such as clotting factors, has 
been obtained from non-UK sources since 1998; 
 Synthetic (recombinant) clotting factor for treatment of haemophilia has been 
provided to those aged under 16 since 1998, and for all patients in whom it is 
suitable since 2005; 
 Since 1999 white blood cells (which may carry a significant risk of 
transmitting vCJD) have been reduced in all blood used for transfusion, a 
process known as leucodepletion; 
 Since 2002, fresh frozen plasma for treating babies and young children born 
on or after 1 January 1996 has been obtained from the USA. In 2005 its use 
was extended to all children up to the age of 16; 
 Since 2004, individuals who have received a transfusion of blood 
components since January 1980, or are unsure if they have had a blood 
transfusion, are excluded from donating blood or platelets; 
 Since 2009, cryoprecipitate, a special cold-treated plasma preparation, has 
been imported from the USA for children up to the age of 16. 
 
Patient categorisation 
4.17 When considering measures to prevent transmission to patients or staff in the 
healthcare setting, it is useful to make a distinction between: 
 symptomatic patients, i.e. those who fulfil the diagnostic criteria for definite, 
probable or possible CJD (see Annex B for full diagnostic criteria), and; 
 patients “at increased risk” i.e. those with no clinical symptoms, but who are 
“at increased risk” of developing CJD, because of their family or medical 
history. For this group of patients, the infection prevention and control advice 
differs in some circumstances for: 
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o Patients at increased risk of genetic CJD 
o Patients at increased risk because they have received blood from an 
individual who later developed variant CJD 
o Other patients at increased risk of iatrogenic CJD 
Table 4a details the classification of the risk status of symptomatic patients and 
patients “at increased risk”. 
 
Patients “at increased risk” of CJD 
4.18 A number of patients have been identified as “at increased risk” due to a medical 
or family history which places them “at increased risk” of developing CJD. These 
patient groups are outlined in Table 4a. 
 
4.19 In most routine clinical contact, no additional precautions are needed for the care 
of patients in the “at increased risk” patient groups. However, when certain 
invasive interventions are performed, there is the potential for exposure to the 
agents of TSEs. In these situations it is essential that control measures are in 
place to prevent iatrogenic CJD transmission. 
 
4.20 All people who are “at increased risk” of CJD are asked to help prevent any 
further possible transmission to other patients by following this advice: 
 Don’t donate blood. No-one who is “at increased risk” of CJD, or who has 
received blood donated in the United Kingdom since 1980, should donate 
blood; 
 Don’t donate organs or tissues, including bone marrow, sperm, eggs or 
breast milk; 
 If you are going to have any medical, dental or surgical procedures, tell 
whoever is treating you beforehand so they can make special arrangements 
for the instruments used to treat you if you need certain types of surgery or 
investigation; 
 You are advised to tell your family about your increased risk. Your family can 
tell the people who are treating you about your increased risk of CJD if you 
need medical or surgical procedures in the future and you are unable to tell 
them yourself. 
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Table 4a: Categorisation of patients by risk 
 
 Patient groups 
Symptomatic 
patients 
 Patients who fulfill the diagnostic criteria for definite, probable 
or possible CJD (see Annex B for diagnostic criteria) 
 Patients with neurological disease of unknown aetiology, who 
do not fit the criteria for possible CJD, but where the diagnosis 
of CJD is being actively considered  
Patients “at 
increased risk” 
from genetic 
forms of CJD 
 Individuals who have been shown by specific genetic testing to 
be at significant risk of developing CJD. 
 Individuals who have a blood relative known to have a genetic 
mutation indicative of genetic CJD; 
 Individuals who have or have had two or more blood relatives 
affected by CJD or other prion disease 
Patients 
identified as “at 
increased risk” 
of vCJD through 
receipt of blood 
from a donor 
who later 
developed vCJD 
 Individuals who have received labile blood components (whole 
blood, red cells, white cells or platelets) from a donor who 
later went on to develop vCJD.  
Patients 
identified as “at 
increased risk” 
of CJD through 
iatrogenic 
exposures 
 Recipients of hormone derived from human pituitary glands, 
e.g. growth hormone, gonadotrophin, are “at increased risk” of 
transmission of sporadic CJD. In the UK the use of human-
derived gonadotrophin was discontinued in 1973, and use of 
cadaver-derived human growth hormone was banned in 1985. 
However, use of human-derived products may have continued 
in other countries after these dates. 
 Individuals who underwent intradural brain or intradural spinal 
surgery before August 1992 who received (or might have 
received) a graft of human-derived dura mater are “at 
increased risk” of transmission of sporadic CJD (unless 
evidence can be provided that human-derived dura mater was 
not used). 
 Individuals who have had surgery using instruments that had 
been used on someone who went on to develop CJD, or was 
“at increased risk” of CJD; 
Continued overleaf 
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 Individuals who have received an organ or tissue from a donor 
infected with CJD or “at increased risk” of CJD; 
 Individuals who have been identified as having received blood 
or blood components from 300 or more donors since January 
1990; 
 Individuals who have given blood to someone who went on to 
develop vCJD; 
 Individuals who have received blood from someone who has 
also given blood to a patient who went on to develop vCJD; 
 Individuals who have been treated with certain implicated UK 
sourced plasma products between 1990 and 2001  
 
4.21 GPs are asked to record their patient’s CJD risk status in their primary care 
records. The GP should also include this information in any referral letter should 
the patient require surgical, medical or dental procedures. 
 
4.22 Recipients of ocular transplants, including corneal transplants, are not considered 
to be “at increased risk” of CJD. 
 
Hospital care of CJD patients 
4.23 There is no evidence that normal social or routine clinical contact with a CJD 
patient presents a risk to healthcare workers, relatives or others. Isolation of 
patients with CJD is not necessary, and they can be nursed in an open ward 
using standard infection prevention and control precautions in line with those 
used for all other patients. 
 
Sample-taking and other invasive medical procedures 
4.24 When taking samples or performing other invasive procedures, the possible 
infectivity of the tissue(s) involved must be considered, and if necessary suitable 
precautions taken. Information on tissue infectivities for CJD is included in Annex 
A1 of this guidance. It is important to ensure that only trained staff, who are 
aware of the hazards, carry out invasive procedures that may lead to 
contact with medium or high risk tissue. 
 
4.25 Body secretions, body fluids (including saliva, blood, cerebrospinal fluid [CSF] 
and excreta) are all low risk for CJD. It is therefore likely that the majority of 
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samples taken or procedures performed will be low risk. Contact with small 
volumes of blood (including inoculation injury) is considered low risk, though it is 
known that transfusion of large volumes of blood and blood components may 
lead to vCJD transmission. 
 
4.26 Blood and body fluid samples from patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD 
should be treated as potentially infectious for blood-borne viruses and handled 
with standard infection prevention and control precautions as for any other 
patient, i.e.; 
 use of disposable gloves and eye protection where splashing may occur; 
 avoidance of sharps injuries and other forms of parenteral exposure; 
 safe disposal of sharps and contaminated waste in line with locally approved 
arrangements; and 
 single-use disposable equipment should be used wherever practicable. 
 
4.27 When taking biopsy specimens of medium or high risk tissue, for example tonsil 
biopsy in a patient with suspected vCJD, or intestinal biopsy in a patient “at 
increased risk” of vCJD, every effort should be taken to minimise the risk of 
infecting the operator or contaminating the environment. 
 
4.28 In the event of needing to consider a brain biopsy, advice from the Department of 
Health, endorsed by the Chief Medical Officer, is available in Annex I. 
 
4.29 Samples from patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD should be marked with 
a ‘Biohazard’ label, and it is advisable to inform the laboratory in advance that a 
sample is being sent. 
 
Spillages 
4.30 When a spillage of any fluid (including blood and CSF) from a patient with, or “at 
increased risk” of, CJD occurs in a healthcare setting, the main defence is 
efficient removal of the contaminating material and thorough cleaning of the 
surface. 
 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Part 4 
12 
Published: June 2003 
Revised and updated: February 2015 
4.31 Standard infection prevention and control precautions should be followed for any 
spillages, which should be cleared up as quickly as possible, keeping 
contamination to a minimum. Disposable gloves and an apron should be worn 
when removing such spillages. 
 
4.32 For spillages of large volumes of liquid, absorbent material should be used to 
absorb the spillage, for which a number of proprietary absorbent granules are 
available. 
 
4.33 Standard disinfection for spillages (eg. 10,000ppm chlorine-releasing agent) 
should be used to decontaminate the surface after the spillage has been 
removed. A full risk assessment may be required. It should be noted that none of 
the methods currently suggested by WHO for prion inactivation are likely to be 
fully effective. 
 
4.34 Any waste (including cleaning tools such as mop heads, and PPE worn) should 
be disposed of as clinical waste (see below and Table 4b). 
 
Clinical waste 
4.35 General guidance on the safe management of clinical waste is given in the 
Department of Health’s guidance document ‘Health Technical Memorandum 07-
01: Safe Management of Healthcare Waste’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-the-safe-management-
of-healthcare-waste. 
 
4.36 According to this guidance, “Waste known or suspected to be contaminated with 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) agents, including CJD, must be 
disposed of by high temperature incineration in suitable authorised facilities.”  
 
4.37 The ACDP TSE Sub Group have considered the disposal of clinical waste, and 
have agreed that tissue and contaminated materials such as dressings and 
sharps, from patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD, should be disposed of 
as in Table 4b. 
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Table 4b: Disposal of clinical waste from patients with, or “at increased risk” of, 
CJD 
Diagnosis High or medium risk 
tissue* 
Low risk tissue and body 
fluids** 
Definite Incinerate Normal clinical waste 
disposal 
Probable Incinerate Normal clinical waste 
disposal 
“At increased risk” Incinerate Normal clinical waste 
disposal 
* See Annex A1 
** Tissues and materials deemed to be low risk include body fluids such as urine, 
saliva, sputum, blood, and faeces. Blood from vCJD patients is considered to be 
low risk except when transfused in large volumes. 
 
 
Childbirth 
4.38 In the event that a patient with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD becomes pregnant, 
it is important to ensure that patient confidentiality is properly maintained, and 
that any action taken to protect public health does not prejudice individual patient 
care. 
 
4.39 Childbirth should be managed using standard infection prevention and control 
procedures. The placenta and other associated material and fluids are 
designated as low risk tissues, and should be disposed of as clinical waste, 
unless they are needed for investigation, in which case the precautions outlined 
in paragraphs 4.24-4.29 above should be followed. Instruments should be 
handled following the advice in paragraphs 4.46-4.56 below. 
 
Bed linen 
4.40 Used or fouled bed linen (contaminated with body fluids or excreta), should be 
washed and dried in accordance with current standard practice. No further 
handling or processing is necessary. 
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Occupational exposure 
4.41 Although cases of CJD have been reported in healthcare workers, there have 
been no confirmed cases linked to occupational exposure. However, it is prudent 
to take a precautionary approach. 
 
4.42 The highest potential risk in the context of occupational exposure is from 
exposure to high infectivity tissues through direct inoculation, for example as a 
result of sharps injuries, puncture wounds or contamination of broken skin, and 
exposure of the mucous membranes. 
 
4.43 Healthcare personnel who work with patients with definite, probable or possible 
CJD, or with potentially infected tissues, should be appropriately informed about 
the nature of the risk and relevant safety procedures. 
 
4.44 Compliance with standard infection prevention and control precautions, in line 
with those set out in “Guidance for Clinical Health Care Workers: Protection 
Against Infection with Blood-borne Viruses” recommended by the Expert 
Advisory Group on AIDS and the Advisory Group on Hepatitis will help to 
minimise risks from occupational exposure. 
 
4.45 For any accident involving sharps or contamination of abrasions with blood or 
body fluids, wounds should be gently encouraged to bleed, gently washed (avoid 
scrubbing) with warm soapy water, rinsed, dried and covered with a waterproof 
dressing, or further treatment given appropriate to the type of injury. Splashes 
into the eyes or mouth should be dealt with by thorough irrigation. The accident 
should be reported as defined in local practice, and an accident or incident form 
completed. 
 
Surgical procedures and instrument management 
4.46 For all patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD, the following precautions 
should be taken for surgical procedures: 
 Wherever appropriate and possible, the intervention should be performed in 
an operating theatre; 
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 Where possible, procedures should be performed at the end of the list, to 
allow normal cleaning of theatre surfaces before the next session; 
 Only the minimum number of healthcare personnel required should be 
involved; 
 Protective clothing should be worn, i.e. liquid repellent operating gown, over a 
plastic apron, gloves, mask and goggles, or full-face visor; 
o for symptomatic patients, this protective clothing should be single-use 
and disposed of in line with local policies; 
o for patients “at increased risk” of CJD, this protective clothing need 
not be single-use and may be reprocessed; 
 Single-use disposable surgical instruments and equipment should be used 
where possible, and subsequently destroyed by incineration or sent to the 
instrument store; 
 Effective tracking of reusable instruments should be in place, so that 
instruments can be related to use on a particular patient. 
 
Single-use instruments 
4.47 Single-use instruments are utilised variably across surgical specialities and NHS 
Trusts. The following should be taken into account when using single-use 
instruments: 
 The quality and performance of single-use instruments should be equivalent 
to those of reusable instruments with appropriate procurement, quality control 
and audit mechanisms in place. This should include assessment of residual 
post-production organic contamination; 
 Procurement should be quality-based not cost-based, with the minimum safe 
functional requirements of each instrument purchased being understood by 
the purchaser; 
 For reusable instruments there is an internal quality control, with instruments 
noted as faulty being either repaired or returned to the system manufacturer. 
A similar process needs to be put in place for any single-use instrument that 
is purchased; 
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 A CE mark is not necessarily a mark of quality of instruments, and quality-
control of sub-contractors is often difficult when the number of instruments 
increases. 
 
Handling of instruments that are not designated as single-use 
4.48 Where single-use instruments are not available, the handling of reusable 
instruments depends on: 
 how likely the patient is to be carrying the infectious agent (the patient’s risk 
status); 
 whether the patient has, or is “at increased risk” of, CJD; and 
 how likely it is that infection could be transmitted by the procedure being 
carried out i.e. whether there is contact with tissues of high or medium 
infectivity. 
 
4.49 Tables 4c and 4d separately set out the actions to be taken for instruments used 
on patients with or “at increased risk” of CJD. The differences in instrument 
management are due to differences in tissue infectivities between CJD and 
vCJD. These actions are also summarised in the algorithm at the end of this 
document. 
 
Quarantining instruments 
4.50 Annex E provides guidance on the procedures that should be followed when 
quarantining surgical instruments is considered. 
 
Decontamination of instruments 
4.51 Effective decontamination is key to reducing the risk of transmission of 
CJD through surgery. Annex C contains advice on the general principles of 
decontamination for TSE agents, and Table C3 contains a list of selected 
guidelines and standards related to decontamination. 
 
4.52 It is important that the efficacy, safety, and compatibility with other 
decontamination processes of products and technologies claiming to remove or 
inactivate prion protein from contaminated medical devices in laboratory and 
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clinical practice, is established. Until this occurs, clinicians and laboratory 
managers should ensure that current guidelines are followed. 
 
 
 
Table 4c: Handling of instruments – patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD 
(other than vCJD) 
Tissue Infectivity Status of patient 
Definite or 
probable 
Possible At increased 
risk 
High* 
Brain 
Spinal cord 
Cranial nerves, specifically the 
entire optic nerve and the 
intracranial components of the 
other cranial nerves 
Cranial ganglia 
Posterior eye, specifically the 
posterior hyaloid face, retina, 
retinal pigment epithelium, 
choroid, subretinal fluid and 
optic nerve 
Pituitary gland 
 single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
 single-use 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient pending 
diagnosis 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Medium 
Spinal ganglia 
Olfactory epithelium 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Single-use 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient pending 
diagnosis 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Low 
 
No special 
precautions 
No special 
precautions 
No special 
precautions 
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Table 4d: Handling of instruments – patients with, or “at increased risk” of vCJD 
Tissue Infectivity Status of patient 
Definite or 
probable 
Possible At increased 
risk 
High* 
Brain 
Spinal cord 
Cranial nerves, specifically the 
entire optic nerve and the 
intracranial components of the 
other cranial nerves 
Cranial ganglia 
Posterior eye, specifically the 
posterior hyaloid face, retina, 
retinal pigment epithelium, 
choroid, subretinal fluid and 
optic nerve 
Pituitary gland 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Single-use 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient pending 
diagnosis 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Medium 
Spinal ganglia 
Olfactory epithelium 
Tonsil 
Appendix 
Spleen 
Thymus 
Adrenal gland 
Lymph nodes and gut-
associated lymphoid tissues 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Single-use 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient pending 
diagnosis 
Single-use 
or 
Destroy 
or 
Quarantine for 
re-use 
exclusively on 
the same 
patient 
Low 
 
No special 
precautions 
No special 
precautions 
No special 
precautions 
 
*Although dura mater is designated low infectivity tissue, procedures conducted on 
intradural tissues (i.e. brain, spinal cord and intracranial sections of cranial nerves) or 
procedures in which human dura mater has been implanted in a patient prior to 1992, 
are high risk and instruments should be handled as such. 
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Incineration of instruments 
4.53 The instruments should already be in a combustible sealed container. This 
should then be disposed of via the clinical waste stream, ensuring that this 
results in incineration. 
 
Complex instruments 
4.54 Some expensive items of equipment, such as drills and operating microscopes, 
may be prevented from being contaminated by using shields, guards or 
coverings, so that the entire item does not need to be destroyed. In this case, the 
drill bit, other parts in contact with high or medium risk tissues, and the protective 
coverings, then need to be incinerated. However, in practice, it may be difficult to 
ensure effective protective covering, and advice should be sought from 
neurosurgical staff and the manufacturer to determine practicality. 
 
Use of laser for tonsillectomy – smoke plumes 
4.55 Some ENT surgeons may use laser techniques as an alternative to ‘conventional’ 
surgery for tonsillectomy. There is no evidence of the transmission of TSEs by 
the respiratory route. Any risk to surgeons from smoke plumes is thought to be 
very low, but there are no data on vCJD. General guidance on the safe use of 
lasers is available from Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) - Device Bulletin 2008(03) ‘Guidance on the safe use of lasers, intense 
light source systems and LEDs in medical, surgical, dental and aesthetic 
practices’ – available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-the-safe-use-of-lasers-
intense-light-source-systems-and-leds. 
 
Problems with surgical instruments 
4.56 If any problems are identified with instruments or sets of instruments, this should 
be referred to MHRA through the Yellow Card Scheme 
(https://yellowcard.mhra.gov.uk/). 
 
Endoscopy 
4.57 Annex F contains advice on the precautions to be taken for endoscopic 
procedures on patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD. 
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Ophthalmology 
4.58 Annex L contains advice on the precautions to be taken for ophthalmic 
procedures on patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD. 
 
Anaesthesia and intensive care 
4.59 The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) in 2008 
published an update to their guidance “Infection Control in Anaesthesia.” This 
guidance includes a section on prion diseases and can be found here. 
 
Community healthcare of CJD patients 
4.60 People should not be dissuaded from routine contact with CJD patients as both 
CJD and vCJD are not thought to present a risk through normal social or routine 
clinical contact. 
 
4.61 No special measures over and above standard infection prevention and control 
precautions are generally required for caring for CJD patients in the community, 
as it is unlikely that procedures will be adopted that will lead to contact with high 
or medium risk tissues. 
 
Caring for symptomatic patients at home 
4.62 Those caring for patients at home should be advised of the standard infection 
prevention and control practices that would apply to any patient. They should be 
provided with disposable gloves, paper towels, waste bags and sharps 
containers, as appropriate. Provision should be made with the Local Authority for 
the removal and disposal of clinical waste and sharps from the home. 
 
4.63 Late stage CJD patients may experience tissue breakdown and the development 
of extensive pressure sores. These lesions should be dressed regularly, using 
standard infection prevention and control precautions, and contaminated 
dressings disposed of as normal clinical waste. 
 
Spillages 
4.64 It is assumed that all spillages in the community will be of low risk material, for 
example blood and urine. Standard infection prevention and control precautions 
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should be followed to clear up spillages of material from patients with, or “at 
increased risk” of, CJD in the community. Spillages should be cleared up as 
quickly as possible, keeping contamination to a minimum. Disposable gloves and 
an apron should be worn when removing such spillages. The surface should then 
be washed thoroughly with detergent and warm water. 
 
4.65 For spillages of large volumes of liquid, absorbent material should be used to 
absorb the spillage. A number of proprietary absorbent granules are available for 
such use, including those containing sodium dichloroisocyanurate, but it should 
be noted that these do not deactivate TSE agents. 
 
4.66 Any waste (including cleaning tools such as mop heads, and PPE worn) should 
be disposed of as normal clinical waste. 
 
Clinical waste 
4.67 Clinical waste should be disposed of as set out in Table 4b. 
 
Bed linen 
4.68 Patients’ clothes and bed linen can be washed as normal, although in the 
interests of general hygiene it may be preferable to wash fouled linen separately. 
Commercial laundry services can be used as an alternative and, particularly 
where patients are incontinent, a laundry service can be of great help to carers. 
 
Pregnancy 
4.69 In the event that a patient with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD becomes pregnant, 
no additional infection prevention and control precautions need to be taken 
during the pregnancy. If a home delivery is decided upon, it is the responsibility of 
the midwife to ensure that any contaminated material is removed and disposed of 
in line with the procedures described in paragraph 4.39. 
 
Dentistry 
4.70 The risks of transmission of infection from dental instruments are thought to be 
very low provided satisfactory standards of infection prevention and control and 
decontamination are maintained. There is no reason why any patient with, or “at 
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increased risk” of, CJD, should be refused routine dental treatment. Such people 
can be treated in the same way as any member of the general public. 
 
4.71 Information for dentists about the management of patients with, or “at increased 
risk” of, CJD can be found in Decontamination Health Technical Memorandum 
01-05: Decontamination in primary care dental practices (March 2013) at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/decontamination-in-primary-care-
dental-practices. This also includes advice for dentists on the re-use of 
endodontic instruments and vCJD.  
 
4.72 Dental instruments used on patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD can be 
handled in the same way as those used in any other low risk surgery, i.e. these 
instruments can be reprocessed according to best practice and returned to use. 
Dentists are reminded that any instruments labelled by manufacturers as ‘single-
use’ should not be re-used under any circumstances. 
 
4.73 Advice on the decontamination of dental instruments can be found in the 
Department of Health guidance HTM01-05 Decontamination Health Technical 
Memorandum 01-05: Decontamination in primary care dental practices (March 
2013). This guidance has been produced to reflect a reasonable and rational 
response to emerging evidence around the effectiveness of decontamination in 
primary care dental practices, and the possibility of prion transmission through 
protein contamination of dental instruments. It is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/decontamination-in-primary-care-
dental-practices. 
 
After death 
4.74 Guidance on dealing with the bodies of patients with, or “at increased risk” of, 
CJD, is contained in Annex H. This includes advice on carrying out post mortem 
examinations and transportation of bodies, and advice for undertakers on 
embalming, funerals and cremations. 
 
 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Part 4 
23 
Published: June 2003 
Revised and updated: February 2015 
 
Algorithm chart for precautions for reusable instruments for surgical procedures on patients with, or “at increased risk” of, CJD, vCJD 
and other human prion diseases 
 
PATIENT 
At increased risk Definite or probable Possible 
Procedure 
involves 
high or 
medium risk 
tissues 
Procedure 
involves 
low risk 
tissues 
EITHER: 
Dispose of instruments by 
incineration 
OR  
Maintain quarantine for re-
use exclusively on the same 
patient 
 
Reprocess 
instruments 
according to best 
practice and return 
to use 
Quarantine instruments for re-
use exclusively on the same 
patient pending diagnosis 
Definite or 
probable CJD 
confirmed or 
diagnosis 
inconclusive 
 
Alternative 
diagnosis 
confirmed 
Procedure 
involves 
high or 
medium risk 
tissues 
Procedure 
involves 
low risk 
tissues 
Reprocess 
instruments 
according to 
best practice 
and return to 
use 
Procedure 
involves 
low risk 
tissues 
Procedure 
involves 
high or 
medium risk 
tissues 
EITHER: 
Dispose of instruments by incineration 
OR 
Quarantine instruments for re-use 
exclusively on the same patient 
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ANNEX A1 
 
Distribution of TSE infectivity in human tissues and body 
fluids 
 
A1.1 There is evidence that the distribution of the disease-specific partially 
protease-resistant form of prion protein (PrPTSE) in tissues is more widespread 
in the body in variant CJD (vCJD) patients than in patients affected by 
sporadic CJD (1, 2, 3). In sporadic CJD, the presence of abnormal prion 
protein in patients with clinical disease appears to be restricted to the central 
nervous system (CNS). However, abnormal prion protein has been detected 
in various lymphoid tissues, including tonsils, spleen, gastrointestinal 
lymphoid tissue (appendix and rectum), lymph nodes, thymus and adrenal 
gland of patients with clinical vCJD. Abnormal prion protein has also been 
detected in lymphoid tissues within the appendix removed from 2 patients 
some 8 and 24 months before they developed vCJD (4, 5) suggesting that 
abnormal prion protein could be present in the lymphoid tissue of people 
incubating vCJD for some time before the onset of clinical disease. In similar 
tests, abnormal prion protein has not been detected in these tissues from 
sporadic CJD patients. Infectivity has been demonstrated in tonsil and spleen 
in vCJD by experimental transmission (6).  
 
A1.2 PrPTSE has been identified in posterior spinal nerve roots in only an 
occasional case of sporadic CJD and GSS (7), but not in peripheral nerve in 
vCJD (3, 8). Transmission studies on peripheral nerve samples from cases of 
sporadic CJD by intracerebral inoculation into primates have shown no 
evidence of infectivity (9). PrPTSE has been detected in spinal dorsal root 
ganglia and trigeminal ganglia in vCJD (8), and in trigeminal ganglia in 
sporadic CJD (10). PrPTSE has also been detected in olfactory epithelium in 
sporadic CJD patients at post mortem (11), and in the olfactory tract in vCJD 
(12). Infectivity and PrPTSE have not been detected in dental pulp in a series 
of sporadic CJD cases (13), and PrPTSE was not detected in the alveolar 
nerve, dental pulp, gingiva, salivary gland, tongue in a small series of vCJD 
cases (14). 
 
A1.3 Table A1 presents current information on the distribution of infectivity in 
tissues and body fluids in CJD other than vCJD, and in vCJD, based on data 
from experimental studies, where available, and on information from other 
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studies of natural TSE disease in humans and animals. It also shows where 
PrPTSE has been detected in tissues. 
 
A1.4 The precise relationship between the presence of PrPTSE and infectivity is not 
certain – for example, the absence of detectable PrPTSE does not necessarily 
mean absence of infectivity.  Conversely, detection of small amounts of 
PrPTSE in a tissue does not necessarily mean that it will transmit disease in all 
circumstances. This guidance has been formulated on the basis of likelihood 
of the presence of infectivity using the identification of PrPTSE as a specific 
marker. In general terms, there is thought to be a broad correlation between 
PrPTSE load in a given tissue and the likelihood that the given tissue might 
present a risk of infection. The relative levels of PrPTSE in different tissues 
provide useful information for the assessment of relative risks of different 
procedures. 
 
A1.5 In Table A1, tissue infectivity is classified as high, medium or low, on the 
basis of infectivity assays in experimental animals.  Although such studies are 
limited in CJD and vCJD tissues, the preliminary data that are available 
support the findings in tissues from other natural and experimental TSE 
models. Therefore the relative levels of PrPTSE in different tissues provide 
useful information for the assessment of relative risks of different surgical and 
endoscopic procedures. 
 
A1.6 The information given in this Annex describes the position at the time of 
publication.  This will be kept under review and is subject to change as further 
information becomes available. 
 
Table A1 – Distribution of TSE infectivity in human tissues and body fluids 
 
Key: +ve = tested positive  -ve = tested negative 
NT = not tested  P = infectivity proven in experimental  
     transmission studies 
Tissue 
 
Presence of abnormal prion protein and level of infectivity 
CJD other than vCJD vCJD 
 PrPTSE 
detected 
Assumed level 
of infectivity 
PrPTSE 
detected 
Assumed level 
of infectivity 
Brain +ve High      P +ve High      P 
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Spinal cord +ve High      P +ve High      P 
Cranial nerves, specifically 
the entire optic nerve and 
only the intracranial 
components of the other 
cranial nerves 
+ve High +ve High 
Cranial ganglia +ve High +ve High      P 
Posterior eye, specifically 
the posterior hyaloid face, 
retina, retinal pigment 
epithelium, choroid, 
subretinal fluid, optic nerve 
+ve High      P +ve High 
Pituitary gland +ve High (?) +ve High (?) 
Spinal ganglia1 +ve Medium +ve Medium    P 
Olfactory epithelium +ve Medium NT Medium 
Dura mater2 -ve Low +ve4 Low 
Tonsil -ve Low +ve Medium   P 
Lymph nodes and other 
organised lymphoid tissues 
containing follicular 
structures 
-ve Low       P +ve Medium   P 
Gut-associated lymphoid 
tissue 
-ve Low +ve Medium 
Appendix -ve Low +ve Medium 
Adrenal gland -ve Low +ve Medium 
Spleen  +ve Low       P +ve Medium   P 
Thymus -ve Low +ve Medium 
Anterior eye and cornea -ve Low -ve Low 
Peripheral nerve +ve Low +ve Low 
Skeletal muscle +ve Low +ve Low 
Dental Pulp -ve Low -ve Low 
Gingival Tissue NT Low -ve Low 
Blood and bone marrow   NT Low -ve Low 
CSF3 -ve Low     P -ve Low 
Placenta -ve Low -ve Low 
Urine -ve Low -ve Low 
Other tissues -ve Low      P +ve4 Low 
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1Spinal ganglia have a high assumed level of infectivity in the WHO Guidelines. 
However, unpublished results on the infectivity of spinal ganglia indicate that this 
tissue is of medium infectivity. 
2Dura mater is designated low infectivity as virtually no detectable abnormal prion 
protein has been found in cases of CJD; however, as grafts of these tissues are 
associated with CJD transmission, probably as a result of contamination by brain and 
because of the lengthy period of implantation in the CNS, procedures conducted on 
intradural tissues (i.e. brain , spinal cord and intracranial sections of cranial nerves) 
or procedures in which human dura mater was implanted in a patient prior to 1992, 
remain high risk. 
3Although PrPTSE has not been detected in the CSF in either sporadic or variant CJD 
(15), experimental transmission of infectivity has been achieved from CSF in 
sporadic CJD in 4 of 27 primates by intracerebral inoculation (9) indicating that levels 
of infectivity are likely to be much lower than in the central nervous system. 
4PrPTSE has been detected in dura mater, skin, kidney, liver, pancreas, ovary and 
uterus in a case of vCJD in USA with a lengthy duration of illness (16). Earlier studies 
of these tissues in UK vCJD cases gave negative results (2,8,17). 
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Annex A.2 
 
Distribution of infectivity in animal tissue and body fluids 
 
Introduction 
 
A.2.1 The following table (Table A2) presents a guide to the possible presence of 
TSE infectivity in various tissues and body fluids of cattle (exposed naturally or 
experimentally and orally to first passage BSE agent), sheep and goats (exposed 
naturally to scrapie agents and potentially to the BSE agent) irrespective of the 
stage of incubation. Table A2 has been updated in June 2010 taking account of the 
updated WHO Guidelines published in 2010 (WHO, 2010).  
 
A.2.2 This is the first time that the WHO Guidelines include tissues from Cervidae 
affected with Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD). CWD has not been reported in 
Europe despite some surveillance for it and there are no specific regulations in 
force. Should information on TSE infectivity in CWD be required, for example in 
regard to Cervidae in zoos or in animals in transit through our ports, please see 
updated 2010 WHO Guidelines. 
 
A.2.3 Throughout this document the term PrPTSE is used to denote the disease-
specific, partially protease resistant form of PrP.  In the previous version the term 
PrP-res was used but for practical purposes PrPTSE and PrP-res are the same. 
 
A.2.4 Additional notes are ascribed to certain entries to explain the differences 
(sometimes of interpretation) between the equivalent WHO table and Table A2, or 
to take account of new information. In case of doubt, please refer to the WHO 
Guidelines.  
 
A.2.5 Specified risk material (SRM) from cattle, sheep and goats in the UK and 
most other EU Member States, as at February 2007, is listed in a new table – 
Table A3 in this document. Please refer to the FSA website for up-to-date 
information and definitions.  
 
A.2.6 The list of tissues in Table A2 is divided into three categories; 
 
• High infectivity tissues: Central nervous system (CNS) tissues and other 
tissues anatomically closely associated with them (in italics in the attached 
table). These become detectably infected in the later stages of all TSEs and 
into the clinical phase of disease. 
• Lower infectivity tissues: A range of peripheral tissues including some or all 
(depending on species) lymphoreticular system (LRS) tissues that may be 
infected from shortly after exposure. 
• Tissues that have either been bioassayed with no infectivity being detected, 
and/or tested for PrPTSE and found negative.  
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A.2.7 A fourth category of tissues has not been tested in any of the species and 
therefore must remain as of uncertain infectivity. However, no tissue in this 
category is likely to have high infectivity but could become cross-contaminated in 
certain circumstances. 
 
A.2.8 The following notes are of considerable importance when the table data are 
used in risk assessments:   
• The precise relationship between the presence of PrPTSE and infectivity is 
not certain. For example, the absence of detectable PrPTSE does not 
necessarily mean the absence of infectivity. Conversely, detection of small 
amounts of PrPTSE in a tissue does not necessarily mean that it would 
transmit disease in all circumstances. 
• No account has been taken of the fact that a tissue having no detectable 
infectivity could become contaminated by inadequate care being taken at 
the point of collection. Such contamination could be direct (from other 
infected tissues) or indirect (from contaminated instruments). Furthermore, 
certain methods of stunning animals (such as those involving penetration of 
the cranium or use of a pithing rod) prior to killing by bleeding out may 
cause infected brain emboli to be dispersed into the blood stream and 
thence also to the heart, lungs and possibly to other organs and tissues. 
• In the EU and some other countries certain tissues of ruminant species are 
categorised as SRM on the basis of a judgment that in an infected animal 
they would be, or might be infected. The list of tissues classed as SRM may 
be varied depending on the geographical BSE risk (GBR) ascribed to the 
host country. Some tissues in the current EC SRM list may not have 
demonstrated either infectivity or PrPTSE, nevertheless any requirements of 
the law must be followed. 
• In research laboratories, tissues from every challenged animal potentially 
present a risk. However, in diagnostic laboratories in the UK, tissues listed 
in Table A.2 and the WHO table will present a risk less frequently unless 
they come from a suspect case of TSE or from a high-risk group. 
 
A.2.9 Extensive data on the distribution of infectivity, additional information and 
references can be found in the WHO guidelines at the WHO website:  
http://www.who.int/bloodproducts/tse/WHO%20TSE%20Guidelines%20FINAL-
22%20JuneupdatedNL.pdf. The WHO tables have copious notes which are not 
included in this ANNEX so the WHO tables should be consulted to aid 
interpretation of the indicated result, in any case of doubt or to extend knowledge. 
 
The 2010 WHO update can be found at: 
http://www.who.int/bloodproducts/tablestissueinfectivity.pdf  
TABLE A2: Distribution of TSE infectivity in animal tissues and body fluids  
        CATTLE                                SHEEP AND GOATS   
TISSUE  INFECTIVITY   PrPTSE  INFECTIVITY  PrPTSE
 
HIGH INFECTIVITY  
 
Brain     +  +   +  + 
 
Spinal ganglia 
(dorsal root ganglia)  +  +   +  + 
Spinal cord   +  +   +  + 
 
Trigeminal ganglia  +  +   NT  +  
Retina    +  NT   NT        + 
Optic nerve   +  NT   NT  + 
Pituitary gland  -  NT   +  +  
 
LOWER INFECTIVITY 
Peripheral nervous system 
Cauda equina  -  NT   NT  NT 
Peripheral nerves  [+]  +   +  + 
Autonomic ganglia  NT  +   NT  +                         
Lymphoreticular tissues 
Spleen   -  -   +  + 
Lymph nodes  -  -   +  + 
Nictitating Membrane +   -   [+]  +  
Thymus   -  NT   +                    + 
Tonsil    +  -   +  + 
Alimentary tract 
Oesophagus   -  NT   [+]  + 
Fore-stomachs  -  NT   [+]  + 
Abomasum   -  NT   [+]  + 
Duodenum   -  -   [+]  + 
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Jejunum   -  +   [+]  + 
Ileum       +  +   +  + 
Colon/caecum  -  -   +  + 
Rectum   NT  NT   NT  + 
Reproductive tissues 
Placenta   -  NT   +  + 
Ovary    -  NT   -  - 
Uterus   -  NT   -  - 
Body fluids, secretions and excretions 
CSF    -  NT   +  - 
Blood     -  ?   +  ? 
Saliva    NT  NT   -  NT 
Milk    -  -   +  [+] 
Urine    -  NT   -  - 
Faeces   -  NT   -  NT 
Other tissues**  
Adrenal   [+]  +      +  - 
Liver                                    -  NT   +  - 
Pancreas   -           NT   +    NT 
Nasal mucosa  -  NT   +  + 
Blood vessels  -  NT   NT  + 
Skeletal Muscle*  [+]  NT   [+]  +  
Salivary gland  -  NT   +  NT 
Mammary gland/udder -  NT   -  + 
Skin    -  NT   -  + 
Adipose tissue  -  NT   NT  NT 
Heart/pericardium  -  NT   -  NT 
Lung    -  NT   -  - 
Kidney   -  -   [+]  + 
Bone marrow  (+)  NT   +  NT 
Tongue   -  NT   [+]  + 
 
NO DETECTABLE INFECTIVITY 
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Reproductive tissues 
Testis    -  NT   -  - 
Prostate/Epididymis/ 
Seminal vesicle  -  NT   -  - 
Semen   -  NT   -  - 
Placenta fluids  -  NT   NT  NT 
Fetus    -  NT   -  - 
Embryos   -  NT   ?  NT 
Musculo-skeletal tissues 
Bone    -  NT   NT  NT 
Tendon   -  NT   NT  NT 
Other tissues** 
Trachea   -  NT   NT  NT 
Thyroid gland  NT  NT   -  NT 
Body fluids, secretions and excretions** 
Colostrum   (-)  -   (?)  NT 
Cord blood   -  NT   NT  NT 
 
Key:  
Italic type  Tissues included due to close anatomical proximity to 
high infectivity tissues   
+     Positive transmission or presence of PrPTSE detected 
-    Bioassay negative or PrPTSE not detected 
NT    Bioassay not undertaken or PrPTSE not tested for 
NA Not applicable 
No detectable infectivity Tissues not included in other parts of the table but 
bioassayed and /or tested for PrPTSE with negative 
result.  
( ) Limited or preliminary data 
? Uncertain interpretation 
[] Infectivity or PrPTSE data based exclusively on 
bioassays in transgenic (Tg)mouse over-expressing the 
PrP-encoding gene, or PrPTSE amplification methods 
 
* In cattle, preliminary data indicate a low level of infectivity in the M. semitendinosus from 
one cow with clinical BSE. A homogenate of this muscle was inoculated i/c-i/p into ten 
highly BSE-sensitive transgenic mice and PrPTSE was detected in one mouse (Buschmann 
and Groschup, 2005).  No transmissions have been reported when various bovine tissues 
have been inoculated into either susceptible mice or cattle by the i/c-i/p or i/c routes 
respectively.  Concern has been expressed about possible infectivity in lingual tonsillar 
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tissue at the root of the tongue, though the tongue itself shows no detectable infectivity 
(Wells et al., 2005). 
 
** Some tissues tested in humans have not been tested in animals such as cornea, some 
dental tissues, sweat, tears, mucus and bile. 
 
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIAL 
A.2.10 Specified Risk material (SRM) includes those tissues of cattle, sheep and 
goats which are known to, or might potentially, harbour detectable BSE infectivity 
in infected animals.  SRM is excluded from the human food and animal feed chains 
and cannot be used for any other purpose.  The tissues which fall within the current 
definition of SRM are listed on the UK Food Standards Agency website 
http://www.food.gov.uk/safereating/animaldiseases/bse/what/beef/controls and are 
given below in Table A3. 
TABLE A3   Specified risk material in the EU (as at November 2006)
Specified Risk Material in all Member States from 25 May 2006
Cattle 
 
 
 
 
All ages 
 The tonsils, the intestines, from the duodenum to the rectum, 
and the mesentery 
Over 12 months  
 Skull excluding the mandible but including the brains and eyes, 
and spinal cord  
Over 24 months  
 Vertebral column, excluding the vertebrae of the tail the spinous 
and transverse processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar 
vertebrae, the median sacral crest and the wings of the sacrum, but 
including the dorsal root ganglia 
Sheep and goats All ages  
 The spleen and the ileum 
Over 12 months (or permanent incisor erupted)  
 Skull including the brains and eyes, tonsils, spinal cord 
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Annex B 
Diagnostic criteria 
 
B1. Paragraphs 4.17 and 4.18 in Part 4 of this guidance, including Table 4a, 
categorise CJD patients in descending order of risk, distinguishing between 
symptomatic and asymptomatic patients. Symptomatic patients are those who 
fulfil the internationally accepted diagnostic criteria, set out below, for definite, 
probable and possible CJD or vCJD (http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/criteria.htm). 
 
B2. Suspect cases are classified according to these criteria by a neurologist from 
the National CJD Surveillance Unit (NCJDSU), on an on-going basis. The 
classification is recorded at 4 “key” stages: 
 
 at notification; 
 
 when the patient was first seen, in life, by a neurologist from the NCJDSU; 
 
 the highest classification on the sole basis of clinical information (i.e. not 
including neuropathological information); 
 
 when a NCJDSU review is completed (i.e. when the case-file is closed). 
The completed case file may, or may not, include neuropathological data 
 
B3. The date of any change of classification and the reason for such a change is 
recorded as necessary in the NCJDSU. 
 
Classification criteria 
 
Sporadic CJD 
 
B4. Neuropathological/immunocytochemical confirmation is required for a 
diagnosis of definite sporadic CJD. 
 
B5. Probable sporadic CJD patients will have rapidly progressive dementia, and 
at least two of the following four symptoms: 
a) myoclonus 
b) visual or cerebellar problems 
c) pyramidal or extrapyramidal features 
d) akinetic mutism 
 
plus typical electroencephalogram (EEG) with generalised triphasic periodic 
complexes at approximately 1 per second, 
 
or clinical criteria for possible sporadic CJD (see below) and a positive assay 
for 14-3-3 protein in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). 
 
B6. Possible sporadic CJD patients will have rapidly progressive dementia, two of 
the symptoms listed in paragraph B5(a)-(d) above and a duration of less than 
2 years. 
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Iatrogenic (accidentally transmitted) CJD 
 
B7. Definite iatrogenic CJD requires a neuropathological diagnosis of CJD in a 
patient with a recognised risk factor for iatrogenic CJD (see Box B1). 
 
 Probable iatrogenic CJD is defined as either a progressive predominantly 
cerebellar syndrome in a human pituitary growth hormone recipient, or a 
clinical diagnosis of probable CJD (see definition in paragraph B5 above) in a 
patient with a recognised risk factor for iatrogenic CJD (see Box B1) 
 
Box B1 
 
 
 
 
RELEVANT EXPOSURE RISKS FOR THE 
CLASSIFICATION AS IATROGENIC CJD 
 
The relevance of any exposure to disease causation 
must take into account the timing of the exposure in 
relation to disease onset 
 
 Treatment with human pituitary growth hormone, 
 human pituitary gonadotrophin or human dura mater 
 graft 
 
 Corneal graft in which the corneal donor has been 
 classified as definite or probable human prion 
 disease 
 
 Exposure to neurosurgical instruments previously 
 used in a case of definite or probable human prion 
 disease 
 
 Transfusion of blood from a donor subsequently 
 diagnosed with vCJD 
 
This list is provisional as previously unrecognised 
mechanisms of human prion disease may occur
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Genetic TSE 
 
B8. Definite genetic TSE requires a neuropathological confirmation of TSE, plus 
either definite TSE in a first degree relative (i.e. a parent, child or sibling), or 
a pathogenic prion protein gene (PRNP) mutation (see Box B2). 
 
Probable genetic TSE is defined as a progressive neuropsychiatric disorder 
plus either definite or probable TSE in a first degree relative, or a pathogenic 
PRNP mutation (see Box B2). 
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Box B2 
 PRNP MUTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH GSS*               
NEUROPATHOLOGICAL PHENOTYPE 
P102L, P105L, A117V, G131V, F198S, D202N, Q212P, 
Q217R, M232T, 192 bpi 
 
PRNP MUTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CJD 
NEUROPATHOLOGICAL PHENOTYPE 
D178N-129V, V180I, V180I+M232R, T183A, T188A, E196K, 
E200K, V203I, R208H, V210I, E211Q, M232R, 96 bpi, 120 bpi, 
144 bpi, 168 bpi,   48 bpdel 
 
PRNP MUTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH FFI** 
NEUROPATHOLOGICAL PHENOTYPE 
D178N-129M 
 
PRNP MUTATION ASSOCIATED WITH VASCULAR PrP 
AMYLOID 
Y145s 
 
PRNP MUTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PROVEN BUT 
UNCLASSIFIED PRION DISEASE 
H187R, 216 bpi 
 
PRNP MUTATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NEURO-
PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER, BUT NOT PROVEN PRION 
DISEASE 
I138M, G142S, Q160S, T188K,  M232R, 24 bpi, 48 bpi, 48 bpi 
+ nucleotide substitution in other octapeptides 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*GSS – Gertmann-Straussler-Scheinker disease 
**FFI – Fatal Familial Insomnia 
 
variant CJD (vCJD) 
 
B9. Definite vCJD patients will have a progressive neuropsychiatric disorder and 
neuropathological confirmation of the disease, showing spongiform change 
and extensive PrPSc deposition with florid plaques throughout the cerebrum 
and cellebellum. 
 
B10. Probable vCJD patients can be classified under two sets of criteria: 
 
(I) They will have progressive neuropsychiatric disorder of a duration 
greater than 6 months, where routine investigations do not suggest an 
alternative diagnosis. They will also have at least four of the following 
five symptoms: 
a) early psychiatric symptoms (depression, anxiety, apathy 
withdrawal, delusions) 
b) persistent painful sensory symptoms (including both frank pain 
and/or unpleasant dysaesthesia) 
c) ataxia 
d) myoclonus or chorea or dystonia 
e) dementia 
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An EEG will not show the typical appearances of sporadic CJD, or no 
EEG has been performed and there is a symmetrical high signal in the 
posterior thalamus on a MRI brain scan (1 Zeidler et al 2000). 
 
These patients would have had no history of potential iatrogenic 
exposure and no evidence of a familial form of TSE. 
 
(II) Alternatively, a probable vCJD patient will have had a progressive 
neuropsychiatric disorder for a period of longer than six months, where 
routine investigations do not support an alternative diagnosis, and 
where there is no history of potential of iatrogenic exposure or evidence 
of a familial form of TSE, plus a tonsil biopsy which is positive for PrPSc. 
 
B11. Possible vCJD patients will have progressive neuropsychiatric disorder of a 
duration greater than 6 months, where routine investigations do not suggest 
an alternative diagnosis, and there is no history of potential iatrogenic 
exposure or evidence of a familial form of TSE. They will also have at least 
four out of five of the symptoms listed in paragraph B10 (I) (a)-(e) above and 
an EEG that does not show the typical appearance of sporadic CJD or no 
EEG has been performed. 
 
Patients who do not fulfil the criteria for possible CJD 
 
B12. The NCJDSU have designated three additional categories for patients who 
are referred to the Unit but who do not meet the criteria for possible CJD. 
These can be summarised as: 
 
(i) Diagnosis unclear – the diagnostic criteria for definite, probable or 
possible CJD are not met, nor is there a reasonable alternative 
diagnosis. CJD therefore remains a possibility; 
 
(ii) CJD thought unlikely – information indicates that a clinical diagnosis 
of CJD is very unlikely because of atypical disease features, and/or an 
atypical course, and/or atypical clinical investigation results, and/or a 
reasonable alternative diagnosis is made but is not confirmed. This 
category includes cases which recover clinically without a firm 
alternative diagnosis; 
 
(iii) definitely not CJD – information indicates that CJD is not the 
diagnosis and there is an alternative definite diagnosis proven on the 
basis of clinical examination, clinical investigations or pathology. 
                                                 
1 Zeidler M, Sellar RJ, Collie DA, Knight R, Stewart G, Macleod MA, Ironside JW, Cousens S, 
Colchester AC, Hadley DM, Will RG. The pulvinar sign on magnetic imaging in variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. Lancet. 2000; 355: 1412-8 
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ANNEX C 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DECONTAMINATION AND WASTE DISPOSAL 
 
 
Summary of advice  
Annex C provides information on the general principles of decontamination and 
waste disposal for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). 
 
 
Previous revision date: November 2009 
Changes new to this edition: 
 
Date Change Notes 
February 2015 Change of terminology from 
“infection control” to “infection 
prevention and control”. 
Changed throughout the 
document as appropriate. 
February 2015 Decontamination cycle diagram 
updated, to allow for new prion 
deactivation technologies. 
This change affects 
paragraph C2.  
February 2015 Addition of advice to clean 
instruments as soon as possible 
after use. 
Paragraphs C4 and C5 
have been added and the 
numbering of subsequent 
paragraphs changed 
accordingly. 
February 2015 Clarification that the use of sodium 
hypochlorite is at ambient 
temperature. 
This change affects 
paragraph C8. 
February 2015 Additional advice on the use of 
formic acid. 
This change affects 
paragraph C10. 
February 2015 Expansion of the section on ‘Other 
processes’.   
This change affects 
paragraph C17, and 
paragraphs C18-C20 have 
been added. 
February 2015 Addition of a section on ‘Protein 
detection’. 
Paragraphs C21-C23 have 
been added. 
February 2015 Addition of a table with details of 
recent research projects relating to 
protein detection and 
decontamination, funded by the 
Department of Health. 
Table C2 has been added. 
February 2015 Update of the references to other 
relevant guidance. 
These changes affect Table 
C3. 
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Introduction 
C1. This annex provides information on the general principles of decontamination 
and waste disposal for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). A 
list of selected guidelines and standards related to decontamination and 
waste disposal is included as Table C3. Guidance on decontamination and 
waste disposal in a healthcare setting can be found in Part 4 of this guidance. 
Guidance on decontamination and waste disposal in a laboratory setting can 
be found in Part 3 of this guidance. 
 
The Decontamination Cycle for reusable medical equipment 
C2. 
Diagram from Department of Health CFPP 01-01 
 
Decontamination and TSE agents 
C3. TSE agents are particularly resistant to standard physical and chemical 
methods of inactivation and decontamination. Therefore, effective cleaning 
is of great importance in the removal of these agents.  
 
C4.  Research demonstrates that allowing surgical instruments to dry for more 
than  fifteen  minutes  before  reprocessing  greatly  increases  the  amount of  
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residual protein contamination1,2,3,4. Therefore instruments should be 
transported to the sterile services department (SSD) immediately after the 
close of the procedure, for cleaning and reprocessing as soon as practically 
possible. This will make the cleaning process more effective, hence reducing 
the risks to the patients and staff handling the devices. If devices cannot be 
returned in a timely manner, it is important that the instruments are kept moist 
using appropriate methods approved and verified by the SSD. 
 
C5.  For endoscopes, the bedside clean should take place immediately after the 
procedure has been carried out, and it is recommended that the endoscopes 
should be manually cleaned according to the manufacturer’s 
recommendations and passed through an Endoscope Washer Disinfector as 
soon as possible after use. See Annex F for further guidance about 
decontamination of endoscopes. 
 
C6.  Details of chemical and gaseous disinfectants and physical processes 
commonly used for decontamination, and their effectiveness at reducing 
infectivity, are outlined below. It should be noted that combinations of 
some agents and/or processes could be effective, for example, 
physical/chemical combinations such as autoclaving with sodium 
hydroxide. 
 
Chemical decontamination 
C7.  Most chemical disinfectants are ineffective at reducing infectivity and 
some, acting as protein fixatives, may stabilise the agent (see Table C1). 
 
Sodium hypochlorite 
C8. Sodium hypochlorite is considered to be effective at reducing infectivity but 
only at concentrations (20,000ppm available chlorine for 1 hour at ambient 
temperature) that pose certain practical constraints. The following should be 
taken into account when considering the use of sodium hypochlorite: 
o It must not be used on open surfaces i.e. benches due to the possible 
release of chlorine gas 
o It corrodes metal and steel 
o It is incompatible with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids 
o It is rapidly inactivated by protein residues 
                                                 
1
 Lemmer et al. 2004. Decontamination of surgical instruments from prion proteins: in vitro 
studies on the detachment, destabilization and degradation of PrP
Sc
 bound to steel surfaces. 
Journal of General Virology, 85; 3805-3816.  
 
2
 Rutala and Weber 2001. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: recommendations for disinfection and 
sterilization. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 32; 1348-1356. 
 
3
 Lipscomb et al. 2007. Effect of drying time, ambient temperature and pre-soaks on prion-
infected tissue contamination levels on surgical stainless steel: concerns over prolonged 
transportation of instruments from theatre to central sterile service departments. Journal of 
Hospital Infection, 65; 72-77. 
 
4
 Secker et al. 2011. Adsorption of prion and tissue proteins to surgical stainless steel 
surfaces and the efficacy of decontamination following dry and wet storage conditions. 
Journal of Hospital Infection, 78; 251-255. 
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o Concentrated stock dilutions last for only approximately 2-3 weeks 
o Diluted solutions are not stable and should be made up daily 
 
Sodium hydroxide 
C9.  Sodium hydroxide (2M for 1 hour) has a substantial effect, and will reduce 
infectivity to an acceptable level when used at ambient temperature. An 
increase in temperature will increase effectiveness. The following should be 
taken into account when considering the use of 2M sodium hydroxide: 
o It should not be used on aluminium or zinc 
o It will not cause fumes but is damaging to body tissue 
o It is an irritant and harmful as dust 
 
Formic acid 
C10. Formic acid (96% for 1 hour) may be used for histological samples of human 
or animal tissue that have previously been fixed in formalin. For material not 
treated with formic acid prior to processing, the immersion of formalin-fixed 
tissue sections (5µm or less) in undiluted formic acid (i.e. 96% or above) for at 
least 5 minutes is considered appropriate as a risk reduction measure.   
However, it should not be used on tissue that has previously been exposed to 
phenol, as this interacts deleteriously with formic acid. 
 
Table C1: Ineffective chemical disinfectants 
Chemical disinfectants commonly used for decontamination that are 
INEFFECTIVE at reducing infectivity 
Alcohols1 
Ammonia 
ß-propiolactone 
Chlorine dioxide 
Ethylene oxide  
Formaldehyde and related compounds1 
Glutaraldehyde and related compounds1 (e.g. orthophthalaldehyde [OPA]) 
Hydrochloric acid (Not reliably effective for practicable use) 
Hydrogen peroxide 
Iodophors 
Peracetic acid 
Aqueous solutions of phenol (≤10% phenol) 
Sodium dichloroisocyanurate (e.g. ‘Presept’)2 
10,000ppm sodium hypochlorite (Not reliably effective for practicable use) 
1
These agents are strong fixatives, may stabilise infectivity and thereby decrease the 
efficiency of the decontamination process  
2
The rate of release of chlorine from this product is insufficient to ensure complete inactivation 
of the agent 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Annex C 
 
 
5 
 
Phenol  
C11. Phenol (≥ 90% phenol) is highly effective at eliminating infectivity. Phenol is a 
toxic, corrosive and irritant chemical which can be absorbed through mucous 
membranes, wounds and intact skin, and should be used cautiously and with 
the appropriate personal protective clothing. 
 
Physical processes 
 
Incineration 
C12. Incineration is effective at removing the infectious agent and eliminating 
infectivity. Temperatures over 600ºC are likely to be practically effective, and 
850ºC is commonly used in practice. Temperatures ≥1000 ºC can produce 
sterility. The particle size of material to be combusted should be suitably small 
to ensure efficient heat penetration to the centre. 
 
Autoclaving  
C13. Autoclaving remains an important method of reducing infectivity. Different 
strains of TSE are known to vary in their sensitivity to heat. 
 
C14. The following methods will reduce infectivity but cannot be relied upon to 
completely eliminate infectivity (either porous load or gravity displacement).  
 121°C for 15 minutes 
 134-137°C for 3 minutes 
 134-137°C for 18 minutes 
 Six successive cycles of 3 minutes 
 
C15. The ‘Prion Cycle’ found on some benchtop vacuum autoclaves will also 
reduce infectivity but will not eliminate infectivity entirely. See MHRA 
Safety Notice ‘SN 2002(11): Benchtop vacuum steam sterilizers – the ‘prion 
cycle’, available here. 
 
Radiation  
C16. Ionising, UV or microwave radiation at conventional doses are not effective at 
reducing infectivity. 
 
Other processes 
C17. A number of anti-prion technologies are in development. In 2008 the 
Engineering and Science Advisory Committee into the Decontamination of 
Surgical Instruments including Prion Removal (ESAC-Pr) produced a report 
on prion inactivating agents. This report provides advice on various anti-prion 
technologies then available or in development, their applicability to the current 
decontamination process for reusable medical equipment, and the direction of 
future research needs. The report can be accessed here. 
 
C18.  Many products developed for prion inactivation have only been available as a 
pre-soak. There are problems associated with the soaking of instruments, and 
the ESAC-Pr report specifically notes that: 
“It is apparent that there needs to be greater discussion between the disinfectant 
product manufacturers, washer disinfector manufacturers and the end users, 
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particularly the Decontamination Leads and the Sterile Services Managers. The 
overwhelming conclusion of these professionals is that using these products, as a 
manual pre-soak is not a viable option in operating departments or in SSDs. It is not 
possible to validate reliably the soaking of instruments in open containers of 
chemical. Further, the question of penetration of chemical into serrations and box 
joints cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, it is vital that chemicals intended for this 
purpose are incorporated into the existing decontamination cycle practices i.e. as 
part of the washer disinfector process.” 
 
C19. A Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens TSE 
Subgroup was convened in 2014 to assess the outputs of Department of 
Health funded research projects aimed at improving the evidence base for the 
decontamination of reusable surgical instruments and protein detection. The 
Working Group reviewed several novel technologies then in development for 
protein detection and decontamination. It is hoped that these technologies will 
make decontamination practices even more effective in the future.  
 
C20.  New technologies being developed need to reflect the operational 
requirements of the service. The Engineering Research Group has suggested 
that a routine test for washer disinfectors could be developed to measure the 
cleaning efficacy at validation and routine testing, such as daily or weekly 
tests. This method could be based on a process challenge device system that 
will monitor the optimised wash cycles; the results must be quantifiable and 
objective. This method should be sensitive to the requirements of this 
document and be able to deliver a consistent and accurate set of results that 
can be assessed by the unit management and Notified Bodies. 
 
Protein detection 
C21. Work commissioned by the Department of Health indicates the upper limit of 
acceptable protein contamination after processing is 5g BSA equivalent per 
instrument side. A lower level is necessary for neurosurgical instruments. 
 
C22. It is necessary to use protein detection methods to check for the efficient 
removal of protein from surgical instruments after processing.  Protein levels 
are used as an indication of the amount of prion protein contamination. 
Ninhydrin swab kits are commonly used for this purpose, but recent evidence 
shows that ninhydrin is insensitive5,6. Furthermore, proteins are poorly 
desorbed from instruments by swabbing6. Other commonly used methods 
have also been shown to be insensitive7.  
                                                 
5
 Lipscomb et al. 2006. The sensitivity of approved Ninhydrin and Biuret tests in the 
assessment of protein contamination on surgical steel as an aid to prevent iatrogenic prion 
transmission. Journal of Hospital Infection, 64; 288-292. 
 
6
 Nayuni et al. 2013. Critical evaluation of ninhydrin for monitoring surgical instrument 
decontamination. Journal of Hospital Infection, 84, 97-102. 
 
7
 Nayuni and Perrett 2013. A comparative study of methods for detecting residual protein on 
surgical instruments. Medical Device Decontamination (incorporating the IDSc Journal), 18, 
16-20. 
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C23. New technologies are required on the market that can detect protein on 
instruments in situ, in nanogram quantities. 
 
 
Table C2: Research projects relating to protein detection and decontamination 
recently funded by the Department of Health 
Project Topic Publications arising to date 
007/0194  
Cold Gas Plasma 
Decontamination of 
Flexible Endoscopes  
 
Novel technology 
for decontamination 
of endoscopes.  
 
007/0196 Endoscope 
Decontamination: 
defining the problem  
 
Decontamination of 
endoscopes  
Hervé, R.C. and Keevil, C.W. 2013. 
Current limitations about the cleaning of 
luminal endoscopes.  Journal of Hospital 
Infection 83, 22-29. 
007/0200 
Optimisation of 
Automated Washer 
Disinfector Performance  
 
Parameters 
contributing to 
optimised 
automated washer 
disinfector 
performance. 
 
Nayuni, N. and Perrett, D. 2014. 
Valipro tags for the monitoring of washer 
disinfector efficiency. Medical Device 
Decontamination (incorporating the IDSc 
Journal) 18, 16-20. 
 
007/0201 
Meta and cluster 
analysis on Animal 
Models Used for TSE 
Decontamination 
Research   
 
Literature review of 
animal models 
used in 
decontamination 
research.   
 
 
007/0202 
Protein Detection Trial 
in SSDs  
High sensitivity 
protein detection in 
SSD environments. 
 
Perrett D and Nayuni N 2014. Assessing 
protein contamination on surgical and 
dental instruments Chapter 23 in 
Decontamination in Hospitals and 
Healthcare. Edited by Dr J.T. Walker, 
Woodhead Publishers  
 
Perrett D,et al. 2014. The in-situ detection 
of residual protein on surgical 
instruments: Development of the 
ProReveal system. Medical Device 
Decontamination (incorporating the IDSc 
Journal) 18, 8-17 
 
Nayuni N, et al. 2013. A critical evaluation 
of ninhydrin as a protein detection method 
for monitoring surgical instrument 
decontamination in hospitals. J Hospital 
Infection 84, 97-102 
 
Nayuni N. and Perrett D. 2013. A 
comparative study of methods for 
detecting residual protein on surgical 
instruments. Medical Device 
Decontamination (incorporating the  IDSc 
Journal) 18, 16-20 
007/0203 
Protein Detection Trial  
 
Detection of 
residual protein on 
instruments.  
 
 
 
 
Continued overleaf 
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007/0204 
Evaluation of EFSCAN 
Protein Detection for 
Monitoring 
Decontamination 
 
Detection of 
residual protein on 
instruments.  
 
Smith, A., et al. 2014. Dental handpiece 
contamination: a proteomics and surface 
analysis approach. Biofouling, 30, 29-39 
007/0208 
Selection and 
Preclinical Evaluation of 
Coatings for Surgical 
Instruments 
 
Coating surgical 
instruments to 
minimise protein 
attachment. 
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Table C3: Selected guidelines and standards related to decontamination and 
waste disposal  
Name Date 
published 
Brief description 
93/42/EEC  
The Medical 
Devices Directive 
1993 
UK law 
since 1998 
This Directive under European Law covers the 
placing on the market and putting into service of 
Medical Devices (other than active implantable and in 
vitro diagnostic devices). Available here. 
Essential requirements in the Directive are listed 
under Annex 1. Two essential requirements under 
section 8 – Infection and microbial contamination – 
are particularly relevant: 
“8.4: Devices delivered in a sterile state must have 
been manufactured and sterilised by an appropriate 
validated method.” 
“8.5: Devices intended to be sterilised must be 
manufactured in appropriately controlled (e.g. 
environmental) conditions.” 
Medical Devices 
Regulations 
2002 These UK Regulations are drawn from the Medical 
Devices Directive 93/42/EEC 
Department of Health NHS Estates and Facilities Policy (formerly NHS Estates) 
Health Building Notes (HBNs) 
HBNs provide advice to project teams designing and planning new buildings and 
adapting/extending existing buildings. HBNs are available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/health-building-notes-core-elements  
Department of Health Estates and Facilities Policy (formerly NHS Estates) 
Engineering Health Technical Memoranda (HTM) and Choice Framework for local 
policy and procedures (CFPP) 
HTMs and CFPPs provide evidence-based policy and guidance on the management and 
decontamination of reusable medical devices and other aspects of decontamination in 
healthcare settings.  
CFPP 01-01  
Management and 
decontamination of 
surgical 
instruments 
(medical devices) 
used in acute care  
2013 This CFPP offers best practice guidance on the 
whole decontamination cycle including the 
management and decontamination of surgical 
instruments used in acute care. It is in four parts: 
Part A – Formulation of local policy and choices 
Part B – Common elements 
Part C – Steam sterilization 
Part D – Washer disinfectors 
Part E - Alternatives to steam for the sterilization of 
reusable medical devices 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/manage
ment-and-decontamination-of-surgical-instruments-
used-in-acute-care 
CFPP 01-04 
Decontamination of 
linen for health and 
social care 
2013 This CFPP amalgamates earlier versions of laundry 
guidance. Earlier documentation incorporated in and 
superseded by this guidance includes HSG(95)18 
and parts of Health Building Note 25 – ‘Laundry’. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/deconta
mination-of-linen-for-health-and-social-care 
Continued overleaf 
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CFPP 01-06 
Management and 
decontamination of 
flexible 
endoscopes 
 
2013 This CFPP covers flexible endoscope management 
and decontamination. It is divided into five volumes: 
 Policy and management 
 Design and installation 
 Operational management 
 Validation and verification 
 Testing methods 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/manage
ment-and-decontamination-of-flexible-endoscopes 
HTM 01-05 Dental 
Decontamination 
2013 This guidance has been produced to reflect a 
reasonable and rational response to emerging 
evidence around the effectiveness of 
decontamination in primary care dental practices, and 
the possibility of prion transmission through protein 
contamination of dental 
instruments.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170689/HTM_0
1-05_2013.pdf 
HTM 07-01  
Safe management 
of healthcare waste 
2013 This document is a best practice guide to the 
management of healthcare waste. Healthcare waste 
refers to any waste produced by, and as a 
consequence of, healthcare activities. For the 
purposes of this document, this guidance also applies 
to offensive/hygiene and infectious waste produced in 
the community from non-NHS healthcare.  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo
ads/attachment_data/file/167976/HTM_07-
01_Final.pdf 
Technical requirements and Guidance in Scotland 
The Glennie 
framework 
2001 This document specifies the requirements for sterile 
service provision across NHS Scotland. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2001/10/101
06/File-1  
Compliant Dental 
Local 
Decontamination 
Units in Scotland 
(Primary Care) 
2013 This document specifies the requirements for 
compliant reprocessing of dental devices in Local 
Decontamination Units (Primary Care). 
http://www.hfs.scot.nhs.uk/publications-
1/decontamination/ 
Provision of 
Compliant Podiatry 
Instruments 
2014 This document specifies the requirements for 
compliant provision of podiatry instruments. 
http://www.hfs.scot.nhs.uk/services/decontamination-
services/guidance/ 
Other relevant 
decontamination 
guidance 
 http://www.hfs.scot.nhs.uk/services/decontamination-
services/guidance/ 
Continued overleaf 
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Welsh Health Technical Memoranda (WHTMs) 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/page.cfm?orgid=254&pid=64101 
WHTM 01-01 
Decontamination of 
medical devices 
within acute 
services 
2013-2014 This document gives guidance on the whole 
decontamination cycle in the management and 
decontamination of surgical instruments used in 
acute care. It is in five parts: 
Part A – Management and environment 
Part B – Common elements 
Part C – Steam sterilization and steam for sterilization 
Part D – Washer disinfectors 
Part E - Alternatives to steam for the sterilization of 
reusable medical devices 
WHTM 01-05 
Decontamination in 
primary care dental 
practices and 
community dental 
services 
2014 This guidance relates to locally conducted 
decontamination in primary care dental services 
WHTM 01-06 
Decontamination of 
flexible 
endoscopes 
 
2014 This guidance allows local decisions to be made in 
the formulation of an appropriately developed, risk 
controlled, operational environment within the 
healthcare facilities that decontaminate flexible 
endoscopes. It is in five parts: 
Part A - Policy and management 
Part B - Design and installation 
Part C - Operational management 
Part D - Testing methods 
Part E - Validation and verification 
Guidance in Northern Ireland 
PEL (13) 12: Choice 
Framework for 
Local Policies and 
Procedures 
(CFPP)01-01 
2013 Management and Decontamination of Surgical 
Instruments (Medical Devices ) Used in Acute Care: 
Parts A, B,C,D, and E for use in Northern Ireland. 
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/pel_13_12_part_1.pdf 
 
PEL (13) 15: Choice 
Framework for 
Local Policies and 
Procedures 
(CFPP)01-06 
2013 Reprocessing of Flexible Endoscopes: For use in 
Northern Ireland. 
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/pel-13-15.pdf 
 
 
PEL (13) 16: 
Northern Ireland 
Addenda to Choice 
Framework for 
Local Policies and 
Procedures (CFPP) 
01-01 
2013 Management and Decontamination of Surgical 
Instruments (Medical Devices) Used in Acute Care 
and CFPP 01-06: Reprocessing of Flexible 
Endoscopes. NI/CFPP/01, NI/CFPP/02 and 
NI/CFPP/03 : Testing Requirements. 
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/pel-13-16.pdf 
 
HSS(MD)4/01 2001 Protocol for local decontamination of surgical 
instruments 
HSS(MD)4/01 2001 Decontamination of reusable medical devices 
Addendum 3 
Continued overleaf 
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HSS(MD)16/99 1999 Controls Assurance in Infection Control: 
Decontamination of Medical Devices. (and 
accompanying Decontamination Guidance CD-ROM) 
HSS(MD)12/2007 2007 Decontamination of Surgical Instruments in light of 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) Guidance – Patient Safety and Reduction of 
Risk of Transmission of CreutzfeldtJakob Disease 
(CJ) via Interventional Procedures 
PEL (13) 13 2013 Updated Northern Ireland Guidance on 
Decontamination in Primary Care Dental Practices: 
Health Technical Memorandum 01:05 2013 Edition 
http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/pel_13_13.pdf 
Other relevant guidance 
Standards and 
Practice 
2012 The Institute of Decontamination Sciences (IDSc), 
formerly the Institute of Sterile Services Management, 
has produced a revised third edition of this guidance, 
which sets out in detail the operational, technical and 
managerial requirements of decontamination services 
and provides a useful resource for anyone working in 
or around decontamination. The revised 3rd edition 
has been extensively updated to include the latest 
legislative framework referencing the work of the 
Healthcare Commission, ISO 13485 and the revised 
HBN13.  
A hardcopy of ‘Standards and Practice’ is free to full 
members of the Institute. Non-members can 
purchase hardcopies of the guidance. More 
information available at  
http://www.idsc-uk.co.uk/publications.php 
Standards and 
Recommendations 
for Safe 
Perioperative 
Practice 
2015 The Association for Perioperative Practice (AfPP), 
formally NATN, has produced the fourth edition of 
their perioperative standards and recommendations. 
The Decontamination Section is found within chapter 
6 providing direction and guidance on all aspects of 
the decontamination life cycle processes, including 
direct links to all UK regions, National and 
International standards. The book is available to 
purchase via AfPP's website 
(www.afpp.org.uk/books-journals/afpppublication) 
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For legislation concerning transport of dangerous goods within, to or from 
Northern Ireland, see Appendix 2 for contact details for enquiries. 
 
Legislative Background 
 
International and national carriage of dangerous goods 
D1. The international carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail, sea and air is 
explained in full at the Department for Transport’s website:  
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/freight/dgt1/overview/international/internationaltransport 
Importation of TSE-infected material by air or sea to the UK may involve customs 
forms and import permits for individual countries outside Europe. 
  
D2. This document outlines the regulations and stipulations for national carriage of 
dangerous goods by road, rail, sea and air. However, as will be clear from the 
information below, many of these national regulations are derived from the 
international regulations for the carriage of dangerous goods, and thus the same 
rules apply for classification, packaging, marking and transporting. 
 
National carriage by sea 
D3. The safe transport of dangerous goods by sea in the UK, and internationally, is 
set out in the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. 
 
D4. The carriage of dangerous goods by inland waterway in the UK is subject to the 
Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987 or British Waterways 
by-laws. The amount of dangerous goods moved by this mode within the UK is 
small. Most estuarial waterways are open to sea-going vessels and are therefore 
governed by the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. 
 
D5. The carriage, loading, unloading and storage of dangerous goods in harbour 
areas in the UK is controlled by the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas 
Regulations 1987.  Provisions are made under the Merchant Shipping Acts for 
ships' crews by way of the Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine 
Pollutants) Regulations 1997 which bring in the IMDG Code for domestic 
transport. 
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National carriage by air 
D6. Requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods in the UK, and internationally, 
by air are set out by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in the 
ICAO Technical Instructions for Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 
which are revised every two years.  The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) 
Regulations 2002, and subsequent amendment regulations, bring the ICAO 
Technical Instructions into domestic legislation. 
 
National carriage by road and rail 
D7. Carriage of dangerous goods by road and rail within Great Britain is required to 
comply with the European agreement concerning the international carriage of 
dangerous goods by road (ADR) and the Regulations concerning the 
international carriage of dangerous goods by rail (RID) subject to agreed 
derogations, exemptions etc. as set out in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and 
Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2007, which came into 
force on 1st July 2007. Note that these are expected to be replaced by updated 
regulations in July 2009. ADR and RID are in turn based on the UN 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (Model Regulations).  
 
D8. For enquiries on legislation concerning transport of dangerous goods by road or 
rail in Northern Ireland – see Appendix 2 for contact details. 
 
Application of relevant legislation 
 
Transporting TSE infected material by road, rail and air in Great Britain 
D9. There are 4 steps involved in the safe transport of TSE infected material by road, 
rail and air in Great Britain. These are: 
(i) Classification of the samples to be transported 
(ii) Packaging 
(iii) Marking 
(iv) Transporting 
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Classification 
D10. All TSE infected specimens of human and animal origin are classified for 
transport purposes as Dangerous Goods, in Class 6.2 Infectious Substances.  
The UN Model Regulations define infectious substances as: “substances known 
or reasonably expected to contain pathogens” and pathogens are defined as 
micro-organisms including (bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, parasites, fungi) and 
other agents such as TSEs which can cause disease in humans or animals. 
Class 6.2 covers biological products used for diagnosis or research, genetically 
modified micro-organisms (GMMs), genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and 
clinical/biological waste. Determination of which UN number to assign within 
Class 6.2 Infectious Substances is based on whether the materials meet the 
criteria for a Category A or a Category B. 
 
Category A 
D11. An infectious substance which is carried in a form that, when exposure to it 
occurs, is capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening or fatal 
disease in otherwise healthy humans or animals and should be assigned to 
Category A, UN2814 (humans) or UN2900 (animals). 
 
D12. Specimens would be assigned to Category A for transport if the source patient or 
animal has or may have a serious human or animal disease which can be readily 
transmitted from one individual to another, directly or indirectly, and for which 
effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available. 
Note: An exposure occurs when an infectious substance is released outside of 
the protective packaging resulting in physical contact with humans or animals. 
 
D13. TSE samples are not considered to be Category A for transport as TSEs are 
not considered to be readily transmissible. 
 
Category B 
D14. An infectious substance which does not meet the criteria for Category A, and 
does not appear on the indicative list for Category A, should be assigned to 
Category B and UN 3373. 
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TSE samples are considered to be Category B for transport, and thus 
transport of all TSE samples must follow the requirements of UN 3373. 
 
D15. Category B substances, which are assigned to UN 3373, should be deemed to 
include specimens of human or animal material, including but not limited to, 
excreta, secreta, blood and its components, tissue and tissue fluid swabs and 
body parts, being transported for purposes such as research, diagnosis, 
investigational activities, disease treatment or prevention, but excluding live 
infected animals. 
All TSE material including brain/spinal cord tissue and body fluid samples 
such as CSF, blood, urine and faeces must be sent as UN3373 Category B. 
 
D16. Cell lines known to be infected with a TSE agent are considered biological 
agents under the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 
(CoSHH), so should be transported as dangerous goods.  
 
Packaging 
D17. Category B specimens of TSE assigned to UN3373 must be packed in 
accordance with ADR packing instruction 650 for road and rail transport, and  
ICAO packing instruction P650 for airfreight (the ICAO packing instructions are 
also shown in the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations).  For full packaging 
details, particularly if transporting refrigerated or frozen specimens using ice, dry 
ice or liquid nitrogen, packaging instruction 650 should be consulted. Details of 
this packaging instruction are included in the Department for Transport’s 
guidance document on transport of infectious substances. 
 
D18. Packaging for Category B substances is not required to be UN-type approved, 
however it must meet all the requirements of P650 and the Department for 
Transport guidance document (as above). A P650 consists of a triple layer 
packaging system, comprising a primary receptacle, secondary packaging and 
outer packaging. For airfreight, the outer packaging must be rigid; for road and 
rail transport either the secondary or outer packaging must be rigid. The 
packaging supplier MUST provide clear instructions on filling and closing the 
package. 
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D19. There are no weight limits on the quantity of Category B material contained within 
either the primary receptacle(s) or the total package for transport by road or rail. 
This is in contrast to transport by air where other than for body parts, organs or 
whole bodies the outer package must not contain more than 4kg 
• On both passenger and cargo aircraft there is a 4L/4kg limit per outer 
package, with a IL limit per primary receptacle for liquids, whereas for 
solids the primary receptacle must not exceed the outer packaging mass 
limit of 4kg 
• A whole organ such as brain is regarded as an exceptional consignment 
and as such the restriction of the weight of material that can be placed in 
the primary does not apply.  
 
D20. It is permissible to have mixtures of samples within the same outer packaging 
providing each individual sample meets its specific requirements under 
packaging instruction 650. 
 
Marking/Labelling 
D21. Packaging must be clearly labelled with the delivery address and sender’s 
details.  The UN Number MUST be used with the proper shipping name which is 
“BIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE CATEGORY B” in text that is at least 6mm high 
The text ‘UN3373’ must be placed in a diamond-shaped mark. The length of the 
line shall be at least 50mm, the width of the line shall be at least 2mm and the 
lettering shall be at least 6mm high.  
UN3373
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D22. TSE samples being sent as Category B substances must be marked and labelled 
as follows: 
 
1. ”UN 3373 BIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCE CATEGORY B” 
2. Name and full address of both shipper and consignee 
3. Name and telephone number of the person responsible for the shipment 
(emergency contact) 
4. In addition, the following labels must be placed on the overpack for 
shipments involving solid carbon dioxide (dry ice): 
 Hazard label for solid carbon dioxide (dry ice) 
 Net weight of dry ice  
 The overpack must be marked as “OVERPACK” 
 
Transporting 
D23. Consignors should always discuss the transport requirements with their chosen 
carrier. 
 
D24. In general, samples that are travelling as UN3373 Biological substance Category 
B can be sent via the postal service (UK only) or using a courier.  A dangerous 
goods document is not required for the transport of a Category B substance 
going by road or rail within Great Britain, or on an international RID/ADR journey 
within Europe.  A copy of the emergency response procedure (see paragraph 
D27 below for an example of this), details of the sample enclosed, and a packing 
list must be provided with any package. 
 
D25. If you are intending to import or export human body parts and tissue for non-
therapeutic purposes then the guidance outlined in “The import and export of 
human body parts and tissue for non-therapeutic purposes Code of Practice” 
should be followed. 
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D26. Example emergency response sheet for TSE-infected material 
 
• No immediate hazard to health unless ingested or injected into the body 
• No risk of fire or explosion 
• In event of accident wear disposable gloves and other necessary personal 
protective clothing for handling the material 
• For spillages, cover areas with 2M sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite 
(20,000ppm available chlorine). Note that both sodium hydroxide and 
sodium hypochlorite are caustic chemicals that may produce dangerous 
fumes. Appropriate personal protective clothing must be worn by handlers of 
these chemicals 
• Use absorbent material to clean up the spillage 
• Dispose of waste by incineration 
• Dangerous goods are infectious substances affecting humans Class 6.2, UN 
number 3373 
 
Training 
D27. All personnel involved in the transport of infectious substances should be given 
the appropriate training. 
 
Transport of animals 
D28. Exposure to agents in intact large animals, whether alive or dead, can be 
considered to be remote. 
 
D29. Regulations covering the transport of live animals infected with a TSE agent are 
the responsibility of the Home Office and Defra in England, and the devolved 
administrations in Scotland and Wales (see Appendix 1). For information on 
transport of live animals within, to or from Northern Ireland, see Appendix 2 for 
contact details for enquiries. 
 
Transport of livestock 
D30. Farm livestock, particularly adult cattle, but also sheep and pigs, pose no 
significant risks from exposure to TSEs for the stockman, haulier or anyone else 
Published: December 2003 
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involved in livestock transport. There are, however, considerable physical risks to 
these occupations due to the unpredictable behaviour of large animals especially 
when they are moved to unfamiliar surroundings (see HSE Guidance on 
Handling and Housing Cattle). Livestock must be transported in accordance with 
animal welfare and animal identification legislation. Transport of animals 
exhibiting clinical signs of TSE is inadvisable. 
 
D31. Although the incidence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the 
national herd is rapidly diminishing, TSE research with infected livestock is still 
ongoing and scrapie cases are routinely transported.  If you need to transport 
clinical TSE cases then further guidance can be obtained from Animal Health 
(see Appendix 2 for contact details). (Note: a special licence is required under 
the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 for all experimental work on 
animals).   
 
D32. One exception to the remote risk of exposure to BSE when transporting cattle is 
where an animal has been orally dosed with BSE (or other TSEs) for 
experimental purposes.  This procedure results in a risk of the agent being 
voided from the gut.  A precautionary 28-day risk period has been agreed, and 
thus livestock that have been orally dosed within the last 28 days must not be 
transported.  Where exceptional circumstances prevail, advice should be sought 
from HSE (see Appendix 2 for contact details).  
 
Transport of small live animals 
D33. Small live animals such as mice infected with TSE agents could pose a greater 
threat to humans than larger animals because of the risk from exposure to bites 
and scratches.  There are unlikely to be many situations when infected small 
animals would need to be transported; however, in cases where there is no 
alternative then advice should be sought from HSE (see contacts information in 
Appendix 2) and the following adhered to: 
 A thorough risk assessment must be carried out, which assesses: 
i. the time in transit 
ii. the infective agent 
iii. the number of animals 
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iv. supervision by experienced staff 
v. emergency procedures 
 Animals must be transported in secure containers that protect the 
handler from the animals. The animals themselves can be considered 
to be the primary containment 
 Containers must be fitted with suitable filters 
 Animals must not be transported when there is a possibility of 
infectivity from the inoculum being shed in excrement and/or urine 
 
D34. In addition the following regulations should be considered: 
• The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986;  
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (England) Order 2006 (SI 2006/3260)  
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (Wales) Order 2007 (WSI 
2007/1047(W.105))  
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (SSI 
2006/606)  
• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (England) Regulations 
2008 (SI 2008/1881) 
• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (Wales) Regulations 
2006 (WSI 2006/1226 (W.117)  
• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (Scotland) Regulations 
2006 (SSI 2006/530) 
Also see legislation on animal identification. 
 
Transport of dead animals 
D35. The Animal By-Products Regulations (ABPR) 2005 (parallel legislation in 
Scotland and Wales) lay down rules for the collection, transport and disposal of 
animal by-products. Animal by-products are defined as entire bodies or parts of 
animals or products of animal origin referred to in Article 4, 5 and 6 of Regulation 
(EC) No.1774/2002 not intended for human consumption, including ova, embryos 
and semen. 
 
D36. Dead animals infected with TSEs, and any TSE-infected tissue of animal 
origin, must be transported in accordance with ABPR 2005. 
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D37. Intact, dead, large animals do not pose a significant risk of transmitting TSE to 
humans.  The animal itself can be considered to be the primary containment. In 
the TSE context, TSE infectivity will not be aerosolised, excreted, secreted or 
otherwise liberated from the central nervous system (CNS). 
 
D38. Methods of killing which involve penetrating the cranial cavity should not be used 
for animals suspected of being affected with a TSE, as there is a risk of leakage 
of CSF fluid and possibly macerated neural tissue. The use of injectable 
barbiturates is the preferred method of euthanasia in such cases. If there is no 
alternative and a method of killing which involves penetrating the cranial cavity is 
used, the hole should be stoppered with an appropriately designed plug and the 
head enclosed in two layers of robust plastic sacks tied off at the neck of the 
animal. 
 
D39. Only hauliers who have the necessary competences, training and appreciation of 
the risks involved should transport livestock and carcasses. Hauliers need to 
comply with the following: 
Vehicles and containers must be leak proof and: 
o Cleaned, washed and disinfected after each use 
o Maintained in a clean condition 
o Clean and dry before use 
o Reusable containers must be dedicated to the carriage of a particular 
product to the extent necessary to avoid cross contamination 
o Packaging must be incinerated or disposed of after use in accordance 
with instructions from the competent authority 
 
D40. Bovine heads and whole brains must be double bagged, tied, and placed in 
robust plastic boxes (e.g. ‘Arca System’ boxes) before being transported by 
courier. 
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ANNEX D – APPENDIX 1  
 
Links to regulations, legislation and guidance 
 
United Nations recommendations 
• UN recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations 
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev13/13files_e.html 
 
International agreements and regulations on the transport of dangerous goods 
• European agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road (ADR) 2007 edition.  
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/adr/adr2007/07ContentsE.html 
 
• Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail 
(RID), Appendix C to the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, 
2007 edition. ISBN 10: 8086206289. 
 
• International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code 
http://www.imo.org/Safety/mainframe.asp?topic_id=158 
 
• ICAO Technical Instructions for Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 
2007-2008 edition 
http://www.icao.int/anb/FLS/DangerousGoods/TechnicalInstructions/ 
 
National regulations for the transport of dangerous goods 
• Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1987/Uksi_19870037_en_1.htm 
 
• Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine Pollutants) Regulations 1997 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1997/19972367.htm 
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• The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and use of Transportable Pressure 
Equipment Regulations 2007 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/uksi_20071573_en_1 
Note that these are expected to be replaced by updated regulations in July 2009 
 
• Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations 2002 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20022786.htm  
 
Other regulations 
• The Animal By-Products Regulations (ABPR) 2005 (parallel legislation in 
Scotland and Wales) http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20052347.htm and 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/Animalh/by-prods/default.htm  
 
• The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoc/321/321-xa.htm 
 
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (England) Order 2006 (SI 2006/3260) 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2006/20063260.htm  
 
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (Wales) Order 2007 (WSI 
2007/1047(W.105)) 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/wales/wsi2007/wsi_20071047_en_1  
 
• The Welfare of Animals (Transport) (Scotland) Regulations 2006 (SSI 2006/606)  
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2006/20060606.htm  
 
• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (England) Regulations 2008 (SI 
2008/1881) 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2008/pdf/uksi_20081881_en.pdf  
 
• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (Wales) Regulations 2006 
(WSI 2006/1226 (W.117) 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/wales/wsi2006/20061226e.htm  
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• The Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (Scotland) Regulations 2006 
(SSI 2006/530) 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2006/20060530.htm  
 
• The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2002/20022677.htm  
 
Relevant guidance 
• Department for Transport guidance on international transport of dangerous 
goods 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/freight/dgt1/overview/domestic/nationaltransport 
 
• Department for Transport guidance on national transport of dangerous goods 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/freight/dgt1/overview/international/internationaltransport 
 
• Department for Transport guidance on transport of infectious substances 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/freight/dgt1/guidance/guidancenonclass7/guidanceontr
ansportofinfecti3186 
 
• Carriage of Dangerous Goods Manual – HSE  
http://www.hse.gov.uk/cdg/manual/index.htm 
 
• Biological agents: Managing the risks in laboratories and healthcare premises.  
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens.  
 http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/biologagents.pdf  
 
• Defra guidance on Animal Welfare During Transport Requirements  
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/farmed/transport.htm 
 
• Defra guidance on Animal Identification Requirements 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/id-move/index.htm 
 
• Defra guidance on Animal By-Products Requirements 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/by-prods/default.htm 
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• Guidance on Handling and Housing Cattle 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/ais35.pdf 
 
• BSE Occupational Guidance 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/web22.pdf 
 
• Royal Mail Advice 
http://www.royalmail.com/portal/rm/jump2?catId=400023&mediaId=400044 
 
• The import and export of human body parts and tissues for non-therapeutic uses.  
Department of Health Publications 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicy
AndGuidance/DH_4009963 
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ANNEX D – APPENDIX 2  
 
Contact details 
 
• Department for Transport Dangerous Goods Division 
Email: dgenquiries@vca.gov.uk 
Telephone: 01372 226111 
 
• For information on transportation within, to and from Northern Ireland: 
Mr William Burns 
Health and Safety Inspector 
Health and Safety for Northern Ireland 
83 Ladas Drive 
Belfast 
Northern Ireland 
BT6 9FR 
Telephone: 0289 0546903 
Email: William.burns@detini.gov.uk  
 
• For advice on animal health and welfare: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalhealth/about-us/contact-us/animal-health-offices.htm  
 
• For general advice, contact HSE: 
Website: www.hse.gov.uk 
Email: hse.infoline@natbrit.com 
 
Published: December 2003 
Updated: January 2009 
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ANNEX E 
Quarantining of surgical instruments 
 
E1. Part 4 and Annex L of this guidance allows for the quarantining of instruments that 
have been used for procedures involving tissues designated as high or medium 
infectivity, on patients either; 
• with, or at increased risk of, CJD/vCJD, for reuse exclusively on the same 
patient; or 
• with a possible CJD/vCJD diagnosis, pending a confirmed diagnosis. 
Although it is not expected that this facility will need to be used widely, this Annex 
provides guidance on the procedures which should be followed when quarantining 
surgical instruments may be considered. 
 
E2. During a surgical procedure as defined in paragraph E1, instruments should be 
separated according to the principles set out in the NICE interventional procedures 
guidance 196. Instruments that come into contact with tissues designated as high 
or medium infectivity should be kept separate from those that only come into 
contact with tissues designated as low infectivity.  
 
E3. After completion of a surgical procedure as defined in paragraph E1, single-use 
instruments should be separated and disposed of by incineration with normal 
clinical waste. Re-usable instruments that have only come into contact with tissues 
designated as low infectivity may be decontaminated and returned to routine use. 
 
E4. Re-usable instruments that have come into contact with tissues designated as high 
or medium infectivity should be washed to remove gross soil. Care should be taken 
to avoid splashing and generating aerosols, by holding instruments below the 
surface of the water in a sink into which water is running and draining out 
continuously, for example in a sink in the theatre sluice room. Instruments should 
not be held directly under a flowing tap as this is likely to generate splashes. 
Operatives should wear protective gloves and either a visor or goggles, and care 
must be taken to avoid penetrating injuries. The sink does not require high level 
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decontamination afterwards – the dilution effect from the running water will be 
sufficient to remove contamination. 
 
E5. After washing, instruments should be placed on a disposable instrument tray and 
allowed to air-dry. They should then be placed in an impervious rigid plastic 
container with a close-fitting lid. The lid should be sealed with heavy duty tape and 
labelled with the patient’s identification details (i.e. name, date of birth and hospital 
number). The label should also state the surgical procedure in which the 
instruments were used and the name of the responsible person (e.g. the Team or 
Unit Manager). The disposable instrument tray should be disposed of by 
incineration with normal clinical waste. The sealed box can be stored indefinitely in 
a suitable designated place until the outcome of any further investigations is known 
(see paragraph E6), or the instruments are required for another surgery on the 
same patient (see paragraphs E7 and E8).  
 
E6. For patients with a possible CJD/vCJD diagnosis, if the patient is confirmed as 
suffering from CJD or vCJD, the box and its contents should be incinerated, or 
retained for use in research (see Part 4 for details), without any further 
examination. If an alternative diagnosis is confirmed, the instruments may be 
removed from the box by the responsible person (or a named deputy) and 
reprocessed according to best practice and returned to use. Additional 
decontamination procedures are not required. 
 
E7.  Rarely, it may be necessary to consider the re-use of a quarantined set of surgical 
instruments on the same patient. One such scenario would be the need to repeat a 
liver transplant on a patient who is at increased risk of vCJD. In these 
circumstances, the instrument set should be reprocessed through the Sterile 
Services Department in the usual manner. No special precautions are necessary 
because of the high dilution factor involved in the washer/disinfection process. It is 
important to ensure that the set is tracked through the whole decontamination cycle 
as previously directed.  
 
E8. Under no circumstances should quarantined instrument sets be reprocessed 
for use on other patients unless the diagnosis of CJD or vCJD has been 
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positively excluded. The possibility of residual abnormal prion on the instruments 
is of far greater concern than the possibility of contamination of instruments in other 
sets processed in the washer/disinfector either concurrently or subsequently. 
 
E9. Records must be kept of all decisions, and the Sterile Service Department must be 
informed about the decision before the instruments are sent for routine 
reprocessing. 
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Annex F 
ENDOSCOPY 
 
 
 
 
Summary of advice  
Annex F provides the definitive UK guidance on decontamination of flexible endoscopes for 
TSE infection prevention and control.  
The specific recommendations in this guidance are complementary to national guidance on all 
aspects of endoscope decontamination such as Choice Framework for local Policy and 
Procedures 01-06 (CFPP 01-06)i and the British Society of Gastroenterology (BSG) Guidance 
on Decontamination of Equipment for Gastrointestinal Endoscopyii. 
Annex F provides specific advice for the management of instruments used in all types of 
endoscopic procedures.  This advice differs depending on the type of CJD that a patient has 
been diagnosed with, or for which symptoms are being investigated, and for those who are 
asymptomatic but for whom an increased risk of developing disease has been identified. It is 
important to note that the risks from CJD and vCJD are different, as the distribution of 
infectivity in tissues and body fluids differs (see Annex A1) 
Paragraphs F4 to F27 set out the guidance for each circumstance in detail, while summary 
advice is provided in table F1 and table F2a. 
Endoscopes currently in quarantine 
Advice is given below regarding endoscopes that have been held in quarantine following 
previous use on patients who are “at increased risk” of vCJD.   
Endoscopes that have been placed into quarantine on or after 1 January 2010, assuming not 
used to treat one of the patient categories described at paragraphs F21 to F24 should be 
reviewed as follows: 
1) Was the endoscope properly decontaminated using a validated process prior to 
quarantine? 
2) Is there tracking to demonstrate (1)? 
3) Has the endoscope been stored properly whilst in quarantine (in a drying cabinet or 
at least positioned vertically, not coiled up in a case)? 
If all the above are met, the endoscope can be returned to use.   If the endoscope has been 
out of use for more than a few months it is recommended that it is returned to the 
manufacturer for service and a check of handling characteristics before returning to use. 
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Previous revision date: February 2015 
Changes new to this edition: 
 
Date Change Notes 
October 2015 Correction to a statement from the 
introductory section 
covering  “Endoscopes currently in 
quarantine” 
None 
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F1. The general procedures set out in the Choice Framework for local Policy and 
Procedures 01-06 – Decontamination of flexible endoscopes: Policy and 
Management (CFPP 01-06)i or equivalent national guidance and the BSG Guidance on 
Decontamination of Equipment for Gastrointestinal Endoscopyii (2014) should be 
followed. In order to decrease the risk of transmission of TSEs through endoscopic 
procedures, additional precautions for the decontamination of flexible endoscopes used in 
all patients with definite, probable or possible CJD/vCJD, and i n those identified as “at 
increased risk” of developing CJD/vCJD, are recommended and general precautions are 
reinforced in this Annex: 
(a) Channel cleaning brushes and, if biopsy forceps or other accessories have been passed, 
the rubber valve on the endoscope biopsy/instrument channel port should be disposed of 
as clinical waste after each use. Single use (i.e. disposable) biopsy forceps should be 
used routinely in all patients. This guidance endorses the advice of the BSG that 
endoscope accessories should be s ingle use wherever possible. It is essential to have 
systems in place that enable endoscopes, together with all their detachable components 
and any re-used accessories, to be traced to the patients on whom they have been used. 
(b) As defined below, endoscopes used for certain procedures in the CNS and nasal cavity in 
individuals with possible sporadic CJD, or in whom the diagnosis is uncleariii, should be 
removed from use or quarantined pending diagnosis or exclusion of CJD (see Table F1 for 
clarity of this issue). The principles and procedures recommended for quarantining of 
surgical instruments in Annex E of this guidance should be f ollowed, except the 
endoscope should be fully cleaned and dec ontaminated immediately after use, before 
being quarantined. 
(c) Endoscopes other than those used in the CNS and nasal cavity, which have been used for 
invasive procedures in most individualsiv designated as “at increased risk” of vCJD, can be 
decontaminated to the standards set out in CFPP 01-06 or equivalent national guidance 
and the BSG guidance and returned to use  (see Table F2a). The endoscope should be 
put through all the normal stages of cleaning, and be di sinfected separately from other 
equipment within an automated Endoscope Washer Disinfector (EWD). 
(d) Aldehyde disinfectants with fixative qualities (such as glutaraldehyde and O PA) tend to 
stabilise rather than inactivate prions, and are no longer recommended for use in the UK.  
Non-fixative disinfectants are used instead. 
(e) When decontaminating endoscope cleaning equipment, the EWD should be put through 
an “empty” self-disinfection cycle as per recommended routine.  Provided that the cleaning 
                                                 
i CFPP 01-06 was published in June 2012 by the Department of Health and can be accessed via 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/management-and-decontamination-of-flexible-endoscopes 
ii BSG Guidance on Decontamination of Equipment for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (2014) at 
http://www.bsg.org.uk/clinical-guidelines/endoscopy/guidelines-for-decontamination-of-equipment-for-
gastrointestinal-endoscopy.html 
iii Patients with neurological disease of unknown aetiology who do not fit the criteria for possible CJD but 
where a diagnosis of CJD is being actively considered (see Annex B of this guidance) 
iv This excludes a small number of asymptomatic individuals “at increased risk” of vCJD because they have 
received blood from a donor who later developed vCJD.  Endoscopes used to treat these patients should 
be removed from use or quarantined to be re-used exclusively on the same individual.  See Table F2a. 
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equipment is decontaminated as indicated, there is no known risk of transmission of TSE 
agents via this route.   
(f) Following use in patients at risk of vCJD endoscopic accessories (including normally 
reusable devices such as heater probes) and cleaning aids such as brushes should be 
disposed of by incineration. 
F2.  The bedside clean should take place immediately after the procedure has been carried 
out, and it is recommended that the endoscopes should be manually cleaned according to 
the manufacturers' recommendations, and passed through an EWD as soon as possible 
after use and in any case no more than 48 hours after the end of the procedure. 
 
F3. PrPres has been detected in the olfactory epithelium, but not the respiratory epithelium, of 
sporadic CJD patients (see paragraph 4.5 of Part 4 of this guidance). The olfactory 
epithelium is normally located along the roof of the nasal cavity but its distribution varies 
between individuals. On the lateral wall it may extend inferiorly onto the superior turbinate 
and the anterior insertion of the middle turbinate; on the medial wall it may extend onto the 
uppermost part of the septum. The advice of the consultant carrying out the endoscopic 
procedure in the nasal cavity should be sought to determine whether a r isk of 
contamination of the endoscope with olfactory epithelium can be excluded with 
confidence. If such contamination cannot be ex cluded, precautions should be t aken 
appropriate for medium infectivity tissues. 
 
Definitions 
 
F4. The definitions of different types of patients are as set out in: 
paragraphs 4.17– 4.18 and Table 4a in Part 4; and 
Annex B of this guidance. 
 
Sporadic and other non-variant CJD 
 
This includes sporadic CJD, sporadic fatal insomnia, VPSPr, iatrogenic CJD (other than 
iatrogenically acquired variant CJD), and genetic CJD, FFI and GSS. 
 
Symptomatic sCJD patients (definite, probable) 
 
F5. Neurological endoscopes would not normally be used on pat ients whose diagnosis is 
definite or probable sCJD. However, should such use be necessary, the endoscope 
should be single use if possible.  If this is not feasible or appropriate, the endoscope 
should be removed from use or destroyed. 
 
F6. Endoscopes that come into contact with the nasal cavity may, on occasion, be used in 
patients with definite or probable sCJD. If there is a risk that the endoscope could become 
contaminated with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a single use endoscope 
should be used if possible. If this is inappropriate, the endoscope should be removed from 
use or destroyed (as above).  
 
F7. For all other types of endoscopy, decontaminate according to CFPP 01-06 or equivalent 
national guidance and the BSG guidance with the additional precautions for flexible 
endoscopes as set out in paragraph F1 above. 
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Symptomatic patients (possible sporadic, or diagnosis unclear, but variant CJD is not being 
considered) 
 
F8.  Neurological endoscopes would not normally be used on pat ients whose diagnosis is 
possible CJD or for whom the diagnosis of CJD is unclear. However, should use be 
necessary, a single use endoscope should be used if possible.  If this is not appropriate, 
the re-usable endoscope should be quarantined pending a more definitive diagnosis. The 
quarantined endoscope may be re-used exclusively on the same individual patient if 
required. If further clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the endoscope should be 
removed from use. 
F9.  Endoscopes that are used in the nasal cavity may, on occasion, be used in patients with 
definite or possible CJD. If there is a risk that the endoscope could become contaminated 
with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a single use endoscope should be 
used where possible. If this is not appropriate, the endoscope should be decontaminated 
singly as at F1(c-f), then quarantined pending a more definitive diagnosis. The 
quarantined endoscope may be re-used exclusively on the same individual (index) patient 
if required. If further clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the endoscope should 
either be removed from use or retained for sole use on the index patient. 
 
F10. For all other types of endoscopy, decontaminate according to CFPP 01-06 or equivalent 
national guidance and the BSG guidance, with the additional precautions for flexible 
endoscopes as set out in paragraph F1 above. 
 
Asymptomatic patients “at increased risk” of CJD (other than variant CJD) 
 
F11. No special precautions are required for the use, in patients “at increased risk” of CJD, of 
rigid endoscopes without lumens that can be autoclaved. The guidance in Part 4 of this 
guidance for all surgical instruments can be followed. 
 
F12.  For other types of endoscope that are used for central nervous tissue investigations, 
single-use instruments should be us ed if possible. Where this is not possible without 
compromising clinical standards, the endoscope should be removed from use. 
Alternatively the endoscope can be decontaminated singly, as at F1(c-f) then quarantined 
after use to be re-used exclusively on the same individual patient if required. 
 
F13. If there is a r isk that an endoscope used in the nasal cavity could become contaminated 
with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a s ingle use endoscope should be 
used where possible. If this is not appropriate, the endoscope should be removed from 
use.  Alternatively the endoscope can be quarantined after use to be re-used exclusively 
on the same individual patient if required. For some procedures, the endoscope may be 
protected from contamination by a disposable sheath, which should then be destroyed by 
incineration. However, this does not obviate the need for routine decontamination 
following use on a patient. Additionally, in practice, it may be difficult to ensure effective 
protection, and advice should be sought from the surgical staff carrying out the procedure 
and the manufacturer of the endoscope to determine the practicality of this option. 
 
F14. For all other types of endoscopy, decontaminate according to CFPP 01-06 or equivalent 
national guidance and the BSG guidance. 
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Variant CJD & CJD type uncertain  
 
Symptomatic vCJD patients (definite, probable)  
 
F15. Neurological endoscopes would not normally be used on pat ients whose diagnosis is 
definite or probable vCJD. However, should such use be necessary, the endoscope 
should be s ingle use if possible. If this is not feasible or appropriate, the endoscope 
should be removed from use.  
 
F16. Endoscopes that come into contact with the nasal cavity may, on occasion, be used in 
patients with definite or probable vCJD. If there is a risk that the endoscope could become 
contaminated with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a single use endoscope 
should be used if possible. If this is inappropriate, the endoscope should be removed from 
use. 
 
F17. For all other types of endoscopy, providing decontamination of the endoscope is to 
approved standards, the use of the instrument for inspection in the absence of an invasive 
procedure, as defined in Table F2b, is deemed to be o f low risk.  I f biopsy or another 
invasive procedure is carried out, the possibility of contamination of the instrument 
channel with lymphoid tissue means the endoscope should be decontaminated singly as 
at F1(c-f), then quarantined pending assessment of likely contact with potentially infected 
tissue. 
 
Symptoms consistent with vCJD (possible or unclear diagnosisv) 
 
F18. Neurological endoscopes would not normally be used on pat ients whose diagnosis is 
possible vCJD or for whom the diagnosis of vCJD is unclear. However, should such use 
be necessary, a s ingle use endoscope should be us ed if possible or the endoscope 
should be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-f), then quarantined pending a more definitive 
diagnosis. The quarantined endoscope may be re-used exclusively on the same individual 
(index) patient if required. If further clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the 
endoscope should either be r emoved from use or retained for sole use on t he index 
patient. 
 
F19. Endoscopes that are used in the nasal cavity may, on occasion, be used in vCJD patients, 
and there is a risk that the endoscope could be contaminated with infectivity from the 
olfactory epithelium. Single use instruments should be used where possible. If this is not 
feasible or appropriate, the endoscope should be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-f), 
then quarantined pending confirmation of the diagnosis. The quarantined endoscope may 
be re-used exclusively on the same individual (index) patient if required. If further 
clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the endoscope should either be removed from 
use or retained for sole use on the index patient. 
 
F20. For all other types of endoscopy, providing decontamination of the endoscope is to 
approved standards, the use of the instrument for inspection in the absence of invasive 
procedures as defined in Table F2b, is deemed to be a low risk procedure.  If an invasive 
procedure is carried out, the possibility of contamination of the instrument channel with 
                                                 
v Patients with neurological disease of unknown aetiology who do not fit the criteria for possible vCJD but 
where a diagnosis of vCJD is being actively considered (see Annex B of this guidance) 
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lymphoid tissue means the endoscope should be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-f), 
then quarantined pending assessment of likely contact with potentially infected tissue. If 
this is considered possible and an a lternative diagnosis is not obtained, the endoscope 
should be removed from use. 
 
Asymptomatic patients “at increased risk” through receipt of labile blood components (whole 
blood, red cells, white cells or platelets) from a donor who later developed vCJDvi 
 
F21. No special precautions are required for the use, of rigid endoscopes without lumens that 
can be autoclaved. The guidance in Part 4 of this guidance for all surgical instruments can 
be followed. 
 
F22. Endoscopes that are used for central nervous tissue investigations may, on occasion, be 
used on pat ients “at increased risk” of developing vCJD and t here is a r isk that the 
endoscope could be c ontaminated with infectivity from the nerve tissue. Single use 
instruments should be employed if possible. Where this is not possible, the endoscope 
should be removed from use. Alternatively the endoscope can be decontaminated singly 
as at F1(c-f), then quarantined after use to be re-used exclusively on the same individual 
patient if required. 
 
F23. If there is a risk that an endoscope used in the nasal cavity could become contaminated 
with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a single use endoscope should be 
employed where possible. If this is not feasible or appropriate, the endoscope should be 
removed from use. Alternatively the endoscope can be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-
f)), then quarantined after use to be re-used exclusively on the same individual (index) 
patient if required. If further clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the endoscope 
should either be removed from use or retained for sole use on the index patient. 
 
F24. For all other types of endoscopy, providing decontamination of the endoscope is to 
approved standards, the use of the instrument for inspection in the absence of an invasive 
procedure, as defined in Table F2b, is deemed to be a low risk procedure.  If an invasive 
procedure is carried out, the possibility of contamination of the instrument channel with 
lymphoid tissue means the endoscope should be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-f), 
then quarantined pending assessment of likely contact with potentially infected tissue.  If 
this is considered possible the endoscope should be removed from use.  For some 
procedures, it may be possible to shield the working channel of the endoscope from 
contamination by a disposable sheath.  Once the procedure is completed, the tip of the 
accessory (e.g. biopsy forceps) is withdrawn into the sheath, before the tip of the sheath is 
cut off and, like the remainder of the sheath, is later destroyed by incineration. 
 
All other asymptomatic patients “at increased risk” of vCJD 
 
F25. No special precautions are required for the use, in all other patients “at increased risk” of 
vCJD, of rigid endoscopes without lumens that can be autoclaved. The guidance in Part 4 
of this guidance for all surgical instruments can be followed. 
 
                                                 
vi These individuals may be identified at pre-surgical assessment - using Annex J in conjunction with Part 4 
of this guidance.  
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F26. Endoscopes that are used for central nervous tissue investigations may, on occasion, be 
used on pat ients “at increased risk” of developing vCJD and t here is a r isk that the 
endoscope could be c ontaminated with infectivity from the nerve tissue. Single use 
instruments should be employed if possible. Where this is not possible, the endoscope 
should be removed from use. Alternatively the endoscope can be decontaminated singly 
as at F1(c-f), and quarantined thereafter to be re-used exclusively on the same individual 
patient if required. 
 
F27. If there is a risk that an endoscope used in the nasal cavity could become contaminated 
with olfactory epithelium (see paragraph F2 above), a single use endoscope should be 
employed where possible. If this is not feasible or appropriate, the endoscope should be 
removed from use. Alternatively the endoscope can be decontaminated singly as at F1(c-
f)), then quarantined after use to be re-used exclusively on the same individual (index) 
patient if required. If further clarification of the diagnosis is not possible, the endoscope 
should either be removed from use or retained for sole use on the index patient. 
 
F278. For all other types of endoscopy, decontaminate according to CFPP 01-06 or equivalent 
national guidance and the BSG guidance, with the additional precautions for flexible 
endoscopes as set out in paragraph F1 above. 
 
Currently funded research 
 
F29. Recent research funded by the Department of Health highlights the problems and 
limitations associated with the cleaning of endoscopesvii.  The research centres on the 
build up of  biofilms and protein deposits in the lumen of endoscopes as a r esult of 
abrasion and wearing through routine use and the use of forceps and other instruments 
inserted through the working channel of the instrument. It suggests that micro organisms 
can be displaced and spread through the cleaning process. 
 
F30.  Research into the efficiency of decontamination of endoscopes including manual cleaning 
processes is ongoing. Currently all endoscopes should be decontaminated according to 
CFPP 01-06 or equivalent national guidance and the BSG guidance, with the additional 
precautions for flexible endoscopes as set out in paragraph F1 above, and this should be 
reflected in the local policy. 
 
  
                                                 
vii Hervé and Keevil 2013. Current limitations about the cleaning of luminal endoscopes. Journal of Hospital 
Infection, 83; 22-29 
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Definition of the working channel of an endoscope 
 
F31 . The working channel of an endoscope is illustrated in the diagram below in red.
 
 . 
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SUMMARY OF PRECAUTIONS ADVISED FOR THE USE OF ENDOSCOPES 
 
Table F1 CJD - other than vCJD 
 
 
Tissue Infectivity 
Status of patient 
Symptomatic Asymptomatic 
Definite/ probable Possible / diagnosis unclear1 At risk2 inherited/ iatrogenic 
High: 
• Brain 
• Spinal cord 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
single use 
OR 
quarantine pending 
diagnosis 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use exclusively on the same index patient 
Medium: 
• Olfactory 
epithelium* 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
single use 
OR 
quarantine pending 
diagnosis 
single use  
OR 
destroy after use   OR 
quarantine3 for re-use exclusively on the same index patient 
Low/none 
detectable: 
• All other tissues 
no special precautions4 no special precautions4 no special precautions4 
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Table F2a. vCJD and CJD type uncertain  
 
Tissue Infectivity 
Status of patient 
Symptomatic Asymptomatic 
Definite /probable Possible vCJD, possible sCJD or diagnosis unclear1 
At risk (blood*** recipient 
from a donor who later 
developed vCJD) 
At risk2 
Other iatrogenic 
High:  
• Brain  
• Spinal cord  
single use 
OR 
destroy after use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
single use  
OR 
quarantine pending 
diagnosis 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use    
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on same patient 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use   OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on same 
patient 
Medium:  
• Olfactory 
epithelium* 
single use 
OR 
remove from use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
single use 
OR 
quarantine pending 
diagnosis 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use    
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient  
no special precautions 
unless contaminated with 
olfactory epithelium*  
If contaminated: single use 
OR 
destroy after use   
 OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
Medium: Lymphoid 
tissue** 
single use 
OR 
remove from use 
OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient 
single use 
OR 
quarantine pending 
diagnosis 
single use 
OR 
destroy after use   OR 
quarantine3 for re-use 
exclusively on the same 
index patient  
no special precautions4 
Low/none 
detectable: 
• All other tissues  
no special precautions4 no special precautions4 no special precautions4 no special precautions4 
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Notes 
 
* The advice of the consultant carrying out the endoscopic procedure in the nasal cavity should be sought to determine whether a risk of 
contamination of the endoscope with olfactory epithelium can be excluded with confidence. If such contamination cannot be excluded, take 
precautions appropriate for medium infectivity tissues. 
 
**For the purposes of this Annex, lymphoid tissue refers to the spleen, thymus, tonsils and adenoids, lymph nodes, the appendix and the gastro-
intestinal tract sub-mucosa. 
 
***A small number of individuals are known to have received labile blood components (whole blood, red cells, white cells or platelets) from a donor 
who later developed vCJD. 
 
1 This includes patients with neurological disease of unknown aetiology who do not fit the criteria for possible CJD but where a diagnosis of CJD is 
being actively considered (see also Annex B of this guidance). 
 
2 This advice refers to the use of flexible endoscopes in patients at risk of developing CJD. For guidance on the use of rigid endoscopes that can be 
autoclaved, refer to the guidance for the use of all surgical instruments in at risk patients in Part 4 of this guidance. 
 
3 Quarantined endoscopes may be re-used exclusively on the same individual patient if required. The principles behind the procedures 
recommended for quarantining of surgical instruments in Annex E of this Guidance should be followed except the endoscope should be fully 
cleaned and decontaminated immediately after use, before being quarantined. The endoscope should be decontaminated alone using an Automatic 
Endoscope Washer Disinfector (EWD). The EWD should be decontaminated as per paragraph F1(e) of this guidance. 
 
4 The decontamination procedures advised in paragraph F1 of this guidance, taken together with the CFPP 01-06 or equivalent national guidance 
and BSG Guidance for Decontamination of Equipment for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (2014) should be followed (http://www.bsg.org.uk/clinical-
guidelines/endoscopy/guidelines-for-decontamination-of-equipment-for-gastrointestinal-endoscopy.html). 
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Table F2b. Common flexible endoscopic procedures classified as invasive or non-invasive. (vCJD and CJD type uncertain). 
 
The term “working channel” applies to the endoscope channel that is used for both the passage of accessories and the suction removal 
of liquids and gases. 
 
 Procedure Contamination of working 
channel 
Mechanism Invasive (+) 
or 
Non-
Invasive (−) 
Notes/ Exceptions 
1 ARTHROSCOPY, BRONCHOSCOPY AND CYSTOSCOPY 
1a All arthroscopy 
procedures 
These procedures will not 
involve contact of the 
endoscope with infectious 
tissue. 
None _  
1b Diagnostic 
cystoscopy or  
* bronchoscopy 
Providing no biopsy is taken 
it is very unlikely that the 
endoscope will become 
contaminated*. 
None. Tissue contamination 
would not result from a 
straightforward diagnostic 
procedure. 
_  
1c Cystoscopy with 
biopsy to obtain 
fixed lymphoid 
tissue 
When a biopsy is taken of 
lymphoid tissue, there is a 
risk that the working channel 
could become contaminated 
with potentially infectious 
tissue. 
Lymphoid tissue could come 
into contact with the lining of 
the working channel.   Tissue 
may be deposited in the 
working channel. 
+ Biopsy of the bladder can 
be considered non-
invasive (-) if it can be 
determined with 
confidence that there has 
been no contact with, or 
invasion of, lymphoid 
tissue. 
1d Bronchoscopy 
with biopsy to 
obtain fixed 
lymphoid tissue 
When a biopsy is taken of 
lymphoid tissue, there is a 
risk that the working channel 
could become contaminated 
with potentially infectious 
tissue. 
Lymphoid tissue could come 
into contact with the lining of 
the working channel.   Tissue 
may be deposited in the 
working channel. 
+ Bronchoscopy with biopsy 
can be considered non-
invasive (-) if it can be 
determined with 
confidence that there has 
been no contact with, or 
invasion of, lymphoid 
tissue. 
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1e Transbronchial 
biopsy 
There is a risk that the 
working channel may 
become contaminated with 
lymphoid tissue during 
transbronchial biopsy. 
Lymphoid tissue could come 
into contact with the lining of 
the working channel.  Tissue 
may be deposited in the 
working channel. 
+  
2 ENDOSCOPIC ULTRASOUND (EUS) 
2a  Diagnostic EUS  Providing no biopsy is taken 
it is very unlikely that the 
endoscope will become 
contaminated. 
None. Tissue contamination 
would not result from a 
straightforward diagnostic 
ultrasound procedure. 
_  
2b  EUS with biopsy Biopsy utilises a needle that 
may result in contamination 
of the working channel with 
lymphoid tissue. 
The needle is sheathed and 
therefore not in contact with 
working channel 
_  
3 UPPER GI ENDOSCOPY 
3a * Diagnostic 
gastroscopy 
Providing no biopsy is taken 
it is very unlikely that the 
endoscope will become 
contaminated*. 
None. Tissue contamination 
would not result from a 
straightforward diagnostic 
endoscopy. 
_  
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3b Gastroscopy with 
biopsy 
Even with efficient single use 
forceps contamination of the 
working channel with 
submucosal lymphoid tissue 
is likely. 
Contaminated tissue may 
come into contact with the 
lining of the endoscope 
working channel. 
Tissue may be deposited on 
the internal surface of the 
working channel. 
Decontamination not proven 
to remove the infective agent. 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
Cytology is of negligible 
risk provided a sheathed 
technique is used. 
Alternatively cytology 
(using a sheathed cytology 
device) could be taken at 
the first gastroscopy if 
malignancy is strongly 
suspected.  Some larger 
channel endoscopes allow 
the passage of a sheath 
through which biopsy may 
be done while protecting 
the endoscope working 
channel from tissue 
contamination. Following 
biopsy, the tip of the 
biopsy forceps is fully 
retracted into the sheath, 
the tip of which is kept 
protruding from the 
endoscope tip throughout. 
The practice of taking a 
single biopsy and 
removing the endoscope 
with the forceps 
protruding, and then 
severing it with wire 
cutters, is to be 
discouraged. 
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3c Gastroscopy with 
brush cytology 
The cytology brush is 
sheathed and therefore there 
is low risk of the working 
channel becoming 
contaminated with lymphoid 
tissue. Cytology is of 
negligible risk provided a 
sheathed technique is used. 
No contact of lymphoid tissue 
with the working channel. 
_  
3d Gastroscopy and 
balloon dilatation 
of stricture 
(oesophagus or 
pylorus). 
Balloon dilatation may disrupt 
submucosal lymphoid tissue, 
which could be transferred to 
the working channel as the 
balloon is retracted back into 
this channel. 
Contamination would be 
through ‘contact’ and would 
be lower than biopsy. 
Modifying the technique to 
include removing the 
endoscope and used balloon 
as one (without retracting it 
back into the working 
channel) would minimise the 
risk. 
_ This technique should be 
considered non-invasive 
ONLY if the endoscope 
and balloon are withdrawn 
from the patient as one 
(i.e. without retracting the 
balloon into the working 
channel) and the balloon 
is cut-off and destroyed. 
3e Gastroscopy and 
bougie dilatation 
of oesophagus. 
Bougie dilatation over a guide 
wire involves disruption of 
submucosal tissue only when 
the endoscope has been 
withdrawn. 
No contamination of the 
working channel with 
lymphoid tissue. 
_ 
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3f 
 
Gastroscopy and 
polypectomy 
 
Polypectomy snares use 
diathermy, which coagulates 
tissue and this adheres to the 
snare. Although the snare is 
sheathed it is possible for 
lymphoid tissue to 
contaminate the working 
channel. 
 
Polyp tissue fragments are 
readily sucked into the 
working channel during and 
after polypectomy. 
 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
 
Some endoscopists 
advocate the use of slow 
continuous irrigation of the 
working channel with 
water during polypectomy 
in order to minimise the 
risk of polyp fragments 
coming into contact with 
the internal surface of the 
endoscope working 
channel.  Experience is, 
however, limited, and if 
polyp fragments become 
aspirated into the working 
channel (as is normally the 
case) the procedure is 
immediately deemed 
invasive. 
3g Gastroscopy and 
endoscopic 
mucosal 
resection (EMR) 
The risks are the same as for 
polypectomy but the 
disruption of submucosal 
lymphoid tissue will be 
greater. A diathermy current 
is used and tissue will adhere 
to the snare. 
Polyp tissue fragments are 
readily sucked into the 
working channel during and 
after EMR. 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
Some endoscopists 
advocate the use of slow 
continuous irrigation of the 
working channel with 
water during polypectomy 
in order to minimise the 
risk of polyp fragments 
coming into contact with 
the internal surface of the 
endoscope working 
channel.  Experience is, 
however, limited, and if 
polyp fragments become 
aspirated into the working 
channel (as is normally the 
case) the procedure is 
immediately deemed 
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invasive. 
3h Gastroscopy or 
enteroscopy and 
argon plasma 
coagulation 
In theory the technique 
involves no contact with the 
mucosa. However contact 
frequently occurs and tissue 
adheres to the catheter. 
Tissue is likely to enter the 
working channel. 
+  
3i Gastroscopy and 
use of heater 
probe 
Can be used to arrest 
bleeding but tissue may 
adhere to the probe and 
contaminate the working 
channel. 
Lymphoid tissue 
contamination of the working 
channel is possible. 
+ Heater probe should be 
discarded after use and 
disposed of by 
incineration. 
3j Gastroscopy and 
injection of ulcer 
This may be a necessary 
procedure and haemostasis 
may be achieved through a 
variety of methods. Injection 
of adrenaline would not 
disrupt submucosal lymphoid 
tissue but there is contact 
between the needle and 
submucosal tissue. 
Good technique would 
minimise risk. The needle is 
sheathed and therefore not in 
contact with the working 
channel. Poor technique 
might result in the 
unsheathed needle coming 
into contact with the channel, 
rendering the procedure 
invasive. 
_  
3k Gastroscopy and 
injection of 
varices 
This may be a necessary 
procedure and haemostasis 
may be achieved through a 
variety of methods. Injection 
of a sclerosing agent would 
not disrupt submucosal 
lymphoid tissue but there is 
contact between the needle 
and submucosal tissue. 
Good technique minimises 
the risk. The needle is 
sheathed and therefore not in 
contact with the working 
channel. Poor technique 
might result in the 
unsheathed needle coming 
into contact with the channel, 
rendering the procedure 
invasive. 
_  
  
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Annex F 
 
19 
Table F2b published: November 2005 
revised and updated: June 2008 
3l Gastroscopy and 
banding of 
varices 
Bands are applied to 
prominent veins in the 
oesophagus. Submucosal 
lymphoid tissue should not be 
disrupted and in theory the 
risk should be low. 
Tissue does not come into 
contact with the working 
channel during banding. 
_  
3m Gastroscopy and 
mucosal clipping 
No disruption of lymphoid 
tissue. 
No contamination of biopsy 
channel with lymphoid tissue. 
_  
3n Gastroscopy and 
insertion of a 
PEG 
(Percutaneous 
Endoscopic 
Gastrostomy) 
feeding tube 
Patients with vCJD may 
require a PEG feeding tube. 
Contamination of the biopsy 
channel is possible with 
some techniques. 
The most common ‘pull 
through’ method does involve 
a needle penetrating the 
stomach via the abdominal 
wall. In theory a small 
amount of submucosal 
lymphoid tissue might adhere 
to the needle and transfer to 
the wire or thread, which is 
pulled up via the working 
channel. However, the wire 
or thread can be withdrawn 
without entering this channel 
if the technique is modified so 
that the endoscope and wire 
or thread are withdrawn with 
the grasping device in full 
view (i.e. not withdrawing the 
wire or thread into the 
endoscope). 
_ 
 
if modified 
technique is 
used 
Non-endoscopic 
(radiological) gastrostomy 
is recommended if 
possible.  However, if this 
is not an option, the 
modified PEG technique 
must be used.  This 
means that the endoscope 
and wire or thread are 
withdrawn with the 
grasping device in full view 
(i.e. the wire or thread is 
NOT withdrawn into the 
endoscope). If the wire or 
thread is withdrawn into 
the endoscope, the 
procedure must be 
considered invasive. 
3o Gastroscopy and 
stenting 
No contact between working 
channel and lymphoid tissue. 
Insertion of oesophageal 
stents does not disrupt 
lymphoid tissue during 
placement as the endoscope 
has been withdrawn and 
even with rescoping the 
working channel is unlikely to 
become contaminated. 
_  
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3p Gastroscopy and 
drainage of 
pancreatic 
pseudocysts 
This is an invasive procedure 
that is potentially liable to 
contaminate the biopsy 
channel. 
Contact between working 
channel with gastric 
submucosal lymphoid tissue 
is possible. 
+  
4 ENDOSCOPIC RETROGRADE CHOLANGIOPANCREATO-GRAPHY (ERCP) 
4a ERCP without 
sphincterotomy 
It is unlikely that the 
endoscope will become 
contaminated. 
No contamination of the 
working channel with 
lymphoid tissue. 
_  
4b ERCP with 
sphincteroplasty 
There is a significant risk that 
the biopsy channel will 
become contaminated with 
lymphoid tissue. 
It is necessary to withdraw 
the dilatation balloon via the 
working channel of the 
endoscope so contamination 
with lymphoid tissue is 
possible.  Subsequent 
manoeuvres to remove 
stones from the bile duct 
using retrieval balloons or 
baskets could contaminate 
the duodenoscope working 
channel. 
+  
4c ERCP with 
sphincterotomy 
The diathermy papillotomy 
knife used in this procedure 
frequently has adherent 
tissue and it is likely that the 
working channel could 
become contaminated with 
lymphoid tissue. 
Adherent tissue may be 
deposited in the working 
channel as the 
sphincterotome is withdrawn. 
Subsequent manoeuvres to 
remove stones from the bile 
duct using retrieval balloons 
or baskets could also 
contaminate the 
duodenoscope working 
channel. 
+  
5 ENTEROSCOPY 
5a Enteroscopy 
without biopsy 
Tissue contamination of the 
working channel is very 
unlikely. 
No contamination would 
result from a straightforward 
diagnostic enteroscopy. 
_  
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5b Enteroscopy with 
biopsies 
It is likely that the working 
channel will become 
contaminated with lymphoid 
tissue. 
Contaminated tissue may be 
deposited in the working 
channel. 
+ It may be feasible to 
perform biopsy non-
invasively if long-sheathed 
biopsy forceps become 
available 
6 COLONOSCOPY 
6a Colonoscopy 
without biopsy 
A diagnostic colonoscopy is 
unlikely to contaminate the 
working channel with 
submucosal lymphoid tissue. 
No contamination would 
result from a straightforward 
diagnostic colonoscopy. 
_  
6b Colonoscopy and 
biopsy 
It is likely that the working 
channel will become 
contaminated with ileal 
submucosal tissue or colonic 
submucosal lymphoid 
aggregates. 
Contamination of the working 
channel very likely. 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
Sheathed biopsy, where 
feasible, may allow tissue 
sampling while avoiding 
the risk of working channel 
contamination. Following 
biopsy, the tip of the 
biopsy forceps is fully 
retracted into the sheath, 
the tip of which is kept 
protruding from the 
endoscope tip throughout. 
The practice of taking a 
single biopsy and 
removing the endoscope 
with the forceps 
protruding, and then 
severing it with wire 
cutters, is to be 
discouraged. 
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6c Colonoscopy and 
balloon dilatation 
procedure 
Balloon dilatation of an 
inflammatory stricture would 
disrupt lymphoid tissue and 
contaminate the balloon. 
Withdrawing the balloon 
through the working channel 
would contaminate the 
colonoscope. 
_ This technique should be 
considered non-invasive 
ONLY if the endoscope 
and balloon are withdrawn 
from the patient as one 
(i.e. without retracting the 
balloon into the working 
channel) and the balloon 
is cut-off and destroyed. 
6d Colonoscopy and 
polypectomy 
Coagulation of tissue which 
then adheres to the snare. 
Sometimes small polyps 
retrieved using the suction 
channel and a biopsy “trap” 
This would increase the risk 
of contamination with 
lymphoid tissue. 
Polyp tissue fragments are 
readily sucked into the 
working channel during and 
after polypectomy. 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
Some endoscopists 
advocate the use of slow 
continuous irrigation of the 
working channel with 
water during polypectomy 
in order to minimise the 
risk of polyp fragments 
coming into contact with 
the internal surface of the 
endoscope working 
channel.  Experience is, 
however, limited, and if 
polyp fragments become 
aspirated into the working 
channel (as is normally the 
case) the procedure is 
immediately deemed 
invasive. 
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6e Colonoscopy and 
endoscopic 
mucosal 
resection 
As with biopsy, lymphoid 
tissue may contaminate the 
biopsy channel. 
Tissue adheres to the snare 
which would have to be 
withdrawn through the 
colonoscope on most 
occasions. Polyp tissue 
fragments are readily sucked 
into the working channel 
during and after EMR. 
+ 
(but see 
exception, 
right) 
Some endoscopists 
advocate the use of slow 
continuous irrigation of the 
working channel with 
water during EMR in order 
to minimise the risk of 
polyp fragments coming 
into contact with the 
internal surface of the 
endoscope working 
channel.  Experience is, 
however, limited, and if 
polyp fragments become 
aspirated into the working 
channel (as is normally the 
case) the procedure is 
immediately deemed 
invasive. 
6f Colonoscopy and 
argon plasma 
coagulation 
Adherent tissue is likely to 
contaminate the 
suction/biopsy channel. 
Contact with lymphoid tissue 
frequently occurs and tissue 
adheres to the catheter. 
Tissue is likely to enter the 
working channel. 
+  
6g Colonoscopy and 
stenting 
No contact between working 
channel and lymphoid tissue. 
Insertion of colonic stents 
does not disrupt lymphoid 
tissue during placement as 
the endoscope has been 
withdrawn and even with 
rescoping the working 
channel is unlikely to become 
contaminated. 
_  
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7 FLEXIBLE SIGMOIDOSCOPY 
7a Flexible 
sigmoidoscopy  
This diagnostic procedure is 
unlikely to result in 
contamination of the working 
channel. 
No contamination of the 
channel with lymphoid tissue 
would occur. 
_ For ‘invasive’ procedures 
the risks are identical to 
those procedures 
associated with 
colonoscopy (see above) 
 
Notes 
 
* Where intubation is via the nasal cavity the advice of the endoscopist performing the procedure should be sought to determine whether a risk of 
contamination of the endoscope with olfactory epithelium can be excluded with confidence. If such contamination cannot be excluded it is advised 
to intubate via an oral route or take precautions appropriate for medium infectivity tissues. 
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           Annex H 
After Death 
 
H.1 On the death of a patient defined in Table 4a in Part 4 of this guidance, the 
removal of the deceased from the ward, community setting or hospice, to the 
mortuary, should be carried out using normal infection control measures. It is 
recommended that the deceased is placed in a body bag, which should be labelled 
as High-Risk or Danger of Infection prior to transportation to the mortuary, in line with 
normal procedures for deceased patients where there is a known infection risk. An 
infection control notification sheet should be completed and given to the undertakers 
concerned with the deceased. (A specimen sheet, similar to that included in the 
Health Services Advisory Committee guidance on “Safe working and prevention of 
infection in the mortuary and post-mortem room” (second edition, 2202) (HMSO. 
ISBN 07176 2293 2) is included at the end of this Annex). 
 
Post-mortem examination 
 
H.2 Post-mortem examinations are required in order to confirm a clinical diagnosis 
and the cause of death in patients with suspected CJD, vCJD or any other form of 
human prion disease. However, such procedures have the potential to expose 
pathologists and anatomical pathology technologists (APTs) to tissues containing 
high levels of infectivity. The following paragraphs give advice on basic precautions 
for safe working. Further advice is given in the Health Services Advisory Committee 
publication "Safe working and the prevention of infection in the mortuary and post 
mortem room" (second edition, 2002). Specific information on neuropathological 
post-mortems in CJD cases has been published (1). 
 
H.3 Only fully trained, competent staff should undertake any necessary post-mortem 
examination on patients defined in Table 4a. At least two people should be present 
during the examination: the pathologist assisted by one senior APT, with another 
APT (if required) to aid in the labelling of containers for tissue samples. Observers 
should be prohibited from entering the post-mortem room and should only observe 
via video or from a separate viewing gallery. APTs and others attending out of 
necessity should be fully trained, competent, understand all of the procedures for 
such post- mortem examinations, and made aware of the relevant history of the 
patient. 
 
H.4 Post-mortem examinations on CJD cases can be undertaken in any mortuary 
subject to local risk assessment; however, if available, a “high-risk” post-mortem 
suite should be used. If a general post-mortem suite is used, the CJD post-mortem 
should not be performed while other post-mortems are in progress. Additionally, 
appropriate care should be taken to minimise contamination of the working 
environment.  
 
H.5 In order to minimise contamination of the working environment, the examination 
may be carried out with the deceased in an open body bag with absorbent wadding 
alongside the body, to retain the body fluids. Examination of the brain is essential in a 
case of suspected CJD or vCJD, and absorbent wadding can be placed underneath 
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the head to contain the spread of blood when the scalp is reflected and CSF when 
the skull is opened. If preferred, the entire head can be enclosed within a large 
plastic bag during use of a bone saw to open the cranium. A hand saw or electric 
saw can be used, but if an electric saw is used then it should be a dedicated saw and 
only used for known or suspected CJD/vCJD. There should be no vacuum unit 
attached to the saw. The use of a bag to enclose the head during the opening of the 
skull and/or removal of the brain is an optional technique, but requires experience for 
optimal results. If a polythene bag is used, it should be fitted over the head and neck 
of the deceased, and a saw introduced through a hole in the bag, which may then be 
sealed with tape as necessary. The polythene bag (if used) and any soiled wadding 
should be incinerated after the post-mortem. 
 
H.6 Any mortuary undertaking a CJD autopsy should be prepared to perform a full 
autopsy and to freeze samples of brain and other tissues for biochemical evaluation 
for PrPSc. If local facilities cannot or are not prepared to do this, or do not have the 
expertise or equipment to sample and store the frozen tissues, then the deceased 
should be moved to a regional centre where the required experience and facilities 
exist. Advice on autopsy protocols and arrangements for refund of any removal costs 
for CJD post-mortems are made through the National CJD Surveillance Unit – see 
below for further details:  
 
National CJD Surveillance Unit, 
University of Edinburgh 
Western General Hospital 
Edinburgh 
EH4 2XU 
UK 
 
Tel: 0131 537 1980 
 
Personal Protective Equipment 
 
H.7 Disposable protective clothing should be worn during the post-mortem, including 
a theatre suit, gown or preferably a full disposable coverall, apron, hat, double 
gloves, and a full face visor or splash guard mask with visor which completely 
encloses the operator's head to protect the eyes and mouth. A full hood with battery-
powered ventilation may also be suitable. Consideration should be given to the use 
of hand protection, such as armoured or cut-resistant gloves.  Care should be taken 
when reconstructing in respect of needle stick injuries. The APT must not be rushed 
and be given sufficient time to perform this task safely.  
 
H.8 Disposable mortuary instruments should be used wherever possible, and be 
incinerated after use. If it is not feasible to use all disposable instruments due to 
some not being available in a disposable format then, a set of dedicated instruments 
for use in ALL definite, probable, possible or at risk cases is recommended. Manual 
or electric saws may be used. Although the former do not create aerosols and are 
easier to decontaminate after use, they may present a greater risk of injury. If an 
electric saw is used, it is advisable to have a dedicated saw for the same reasons as 
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above. Instruments and mortuary working surfaces should be decontaminated 
following the guidance in Annex C. The deceased should be washed in accordance 
with local protocols. 
 
H.9 In some instances, the relatives of the deceased may request that the body is 
dressed in clothes prior to viewing at the mortuary or at the funeral directors. This is 
best achieved at the end of the post-mortem, when the body can be dried and 
dressed and then placed in a clean body bag prior to viewing. 
 
Anatomy and pathology teaching 
H.10 Anatomy departments are advised not to accept for teaching or research 
purposes, bodies, body parts or organs from any patients defined in Table 4a. 
Departments should produce local policies to identify who is responsible for checking 
whether a potential donor may be in one of the defined categories. The extent of the 
checks necessary will vary with circumstances, but would normally include checking 
with those responsible for the donation and the medical staff involved in the care of 
the donor. 
 
Undertakers and embalmers 
H.11 The undertakers should receive an infection control notification sheet (see 
specimen form at the end of this Annex), appropriately completed, before handling 
the deceased. Concern about possible unknown CJD cases does not warrant a level 
of precaution for undertakers handling intact bodies other than those used generally 
for all work of this nature. Dressing and cosmetic work on deceased patients from 
this risk group may be undertaken if the usual precautions routinely used when 
dealing with the dead are observed. 
 
H.12 When the diagnosis of CJD or vCJD is known or suspected it is advisable to 
avoid embalming procedures. When embalming is required by the family, because of 
the need to preserve the deceased’s appearance for some time, or if the deceased is 
to be transported outside the UK, then it should be carried out in a facility that is fit for 
purpose and where the staff are trained, competent and qualified to do so. Single use 
needles should be used in embalming procedures. All embalmers should perform risk 
assessments of their premises to establish if they can facilitate embalming onsite, or 
if their company would need to refer any such request to a specialist establishment. 
 
H.13 The embalming process involves replacing the deceased's blood with a fixative 
that often includes a dye in order to counter the paleness of the deceased's 
appearance. The process involves inserting a cannula into an artery (similar to a 
central line), usually the common carotid, and slowly perfusing the tissues with this 
fixative. An instrument known as a trocar is used to remove gas and excess fluids 
from the thoracic and abdominal cavities, prior to injecting fluid into them. A 
hypodermic syringe is used to inject any tissues that have received insufficient fluid 
from the arterial injection. A deceased patient who has undergone a post-mortem 
examination will be subject to a different procedure, which generally involves 
reopening the body, via the PM incisions, and locating and using the arteries inside 
the deceased. 
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Funerals and cremations 
 
Viewing the deceased 
H.14 Relatives, friends or carers of the deceased may wish to view or have some 
final contact with the deceased. Such viewing and possible superficial contact, such 
as touching or kissing, need not be discouraged even if a post-mortem has taken 
place. Body bags may be rolled down temporarily to allow superficial contact; there is 
no need to deny the relatives, friends or carers this opportunity if a post-mortem 
examination has been performed. 
 
Return of tissues, blocks, slides etc. 
H.15 If consent has been obtained for the retention of tissue for teaching, research 
and other scheduled purposes, none of the tissues retained following the post 
mortem examination are required to be disposed of. If this is not the case, following a 
request from relatives, friends, carers or a person in a Qualifying Relationship (2) 
decisions about whether tissues, blocks, slides etc of a patient defined in Table 4a 
can be returned, should be made on the basis of an assessment of the risks. 
Respectful disposal of tissue by the hospital may be preferable. Each establishment 
will have their chosen method of respectful disposal, which should be in keeping with 
the Human Tissue Authority’s Code of Practice. If a risk assessment indicates that 
these items may be returned, this is best done via the funeral director. If return is not 
possible, families should have the reasons explained to them. Any retained items 
from such situations should only be returned, with information relating to the potential 
risks from the material (e.g. infection or chemical exposure), so that relatives can 
consider all the risks before selecting the most appropriate option for immediate 
respectful disposal. Care must be taken to ensure confidentiality in all dealings 
between funeral directors and a patient’s relatives.  
 
Environmental concerns 
H.16 There is no need to discourage burial of a patient with known or suspected CJD 
or vCJD, and no special arrangements for burial are required. Similarly, there is no 
need for any extra precautions to be taken for cremation. 
 
Transporting the deceased 
H.17 No additional precautions are needed for transporting the body within the UK. If 
there is a need to transport the body internationally, it will be necessary to comply 
with the IATA Restricted Articles Regulations. Any additional requirements of the 
individual carrier should be discussed on a case-by-case basis. The deceased will 
normally be required to have been embalmed prior to transport and a Notification of 
Infection form, to replace the usual free from infection form, must also be produced. 
 
Exhumation 
H.18 A Home Office licence is required before exhumation can take place. Those 
involved with such a procedure should follow normal standard practice for 
exhumations. 
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Specimen Infection Control Notification Sheet 
 
Name of deceased: ………………………………………………………… 
 
Date and time of death: …………………………………………………… 
 
Source hospital and ward: ………………………………………………… 
 
The deceased’s remains are a potential source of infection: 
 
YES / UNKNOWN (see note 1 below) (ring as appropriate) 
 
If YES (see note 2 below), the remains present an infectious hazard of transmission by: 
(ring as appropriate): 
 
Inoculation  Aerosol Ingestion 
 
Instructions for handling remains (If YES above, tick as appropriate): 
 
Body bagging     
 
Embalming presents high risk 
 
Signed: (Note 3) ………………………………………….. 
 
Print name ……………………………………………….. 
 
On behalf of: ………………………………….… (hospital / mortuary / General Practitioner) 
 
 
Notes 
 
Note 1: Not all infected patients display typical symptoms, therefore some infections may not have 
been identified at the time of death. 
 
Note 2: In accordance with health and safety law and the information provided in the Health Services 
Advisory Committee guidance Safe working and the prevention of infection in the mortuary and post-
mortem room (Second edition 2002). 
 
Note 3: 
 In hospital cases, the doctor certifying death, in consultation with ward nursing staff, is 
 asked to sign this Notification sheet; 
 Where a post-mortem examination has been undertaken, the pathologist is asked to sign  this 
Notification Sheet; 
 In non-hospital situations, the doctor certifying death is asked to sign this Notification  Sheet. 
 
ANNEX I 
Outline Protocol for Management of Instruments and Tissues from Brain 
Biopsy Procedures on Patients with Progressive Neurological Disorders 
 
The Department of Health has taken expert advice on the need for additional 
guidance on the quarantine of surgical instruments following brain biopsies.  
The Chief Medical Officer issued a protocol for management of surgical 
instruments and tissues from brain biopsy procedures on patients with 
progressive neurological disorders on 17 May 2004.  
This protocol is attached as the next 4 pages of this document. 
 
ANNEX I – updated May 2007 
17th May 2004
Dear Colleague
REDUCING THE RISK OF EXPOSURE
OF PATIENTS TO THE AGENT OF CJD
THROUGH BRAIN BIOPSY PROCEDURES
A brain biopsy can reveal a diagnosis of CJD that was not
suspected prior to the biopsy because CJD can present in
atypical ways with a differential diagnosis that includes
conditions such as cerebral vasculitis. The biopsy could result
in inadvertent exposure of subsequent patients to CJD agent
via the instruments used. The Department of Health has taken
expert advice on the need for additional guidance for the
quarantine of surgical instruments following brain biopsies in
such circumstances.
The attached protocol has been prepared in conjunction with
neurosurgeons, neurologists, neuropathologists and the
National CJD Surveillance Unit.
I strongly urge that this protocol be implemented within your
NHS Trust with immediate effect.
National guidance “Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection”1 on the
prevention of infection arising from the agents that cause
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and other spongiform
encephalopathies was last revised and issued in December
2003.
I would be grateful if Medical Directors would also review
present policies, procedures and practices within your NHS
Trusts to ensure that this guidance is being fully complied with
and that all staff in key roles are aware of it and fully
understand how to apply it. The protocol for brain biopsy
developed by the Department of Health has been added as an
Annex to this Guidance.
Sir Liam Donaldson
Chief Medical Officer
                                                                
1
 www.dh.gov.uk > Policy and Guidance>Health and Social Care Topics
>CJD >CJD publications > Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy
Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection.
From the
Chief Medical
Officer
Sir Liam Donaldson
MSc,MD,FRCS(Ed),FRCP,FFPHM
Richmond House
79 Whitehall
London  SW1A 2NS
PL/CMO/2004/2
Gateway Reference: 3105
For Action
· Medical Directors of NHS Trusts
· Neurologists
· Neurosurgeons
· Pathologists
For further information:
please contact:
Naima Khondkar
Tel: 020 7972 5057
Naima.Khondkar@doh.gsi.gov.uk
Requests for further copies  should be
addressed to:
Fax:  01623 724 524
Write to Department of Health
PO Box 777, London SE1 6XH
Email: doh@prolog.uk.com
For correction of any discrepancies in
changes of address, practice or name,
please contact:
The Medical Mailing Company
PO Box 60, Loughborough
Leicestershire  LE11 0WP
Tel: Freephone 0800 626387
This letter is also available on the
Internet at:
http://www.dh.gov.uk/cmo
2Outline Protocol for Management of Instruments and Tissues from Brain Biopsy
Procedures on Patients with Progressive Neurological Disorders
Department of Health 2004
CJD can present in atypical ways with a differential diagnosis that includes conditions such
as cerebral vasculitis.  A brain biopsy therefore could reveal a diagnosis of CJD that was not
suspected prior to the biopsy.  The protocol below minimises the risk that this could result in
inadvertent exposure of subsequent patients to CJD agent via surgical instruments.
A single person involved in the clinical care of the patient should take responsibility for co-
ordination of the procedures and communications, including alerting the neuropathology
laboratory in advance of sending samples and monitoring all aspects of the protocol.
A. Clinical assessment and biopsy procedure
1. This protocol should apply to all patients who have unexplained progressive dementia (or
ataxia or neuropsychiatric syndromes) in whom diagnostic brain biopsy is considered
appropriate in order to establish or exclude a diagnosis.
2. The neuro-radiology in such patients usually shows no evidence of a space-occupying
lesion.
3. The patient does not fulfil the WHO criteria2 for probable or possible CJD 3. Indeed CJD
may not have been considered on clinical grounds.
4. Brain biopsy, preferably an open block biopsy, is performed for diagnosis.
B. Handling the neurosurgical instruments and the biopsy tissues
5. Single use instruments should be used wherever possible without compromising patient
safety.
6. Any instruments that may have come into contact with brain or meninges of patients
identified (A) should be washed at the point of use and quarantined immediately after
use4
7. Send the tissue samples from the biopsy procedure unfixed directly to the
neuropathology laboratory, ideally within 10 minutes of collection.
8. In the neuropathology laboratory, using containment conditions appropriate for fresh
human brain, remove a small portion of unfixed cortical grey matter (at least 0.1g) from
the biopsy. Store the sample frozen, clearly labelled, and preferably at -70oC (-20oC is
sufficient for storage for several weeks) in a designated freezer.
9. Fix the remainder of the tissue samples in formalin and process into paraffin wax.
                                                                
2 The WHO criteria can be found at  www.cjd.ed.ac.uk
3  Precautions to be taken for procedures on symptomatic patients with possible or probable CJD, or when CJD is under active
consideration are set out in the ACDP/SEAC TSE Joint Working Group Guidance, which can be found at www.dh.gov.uk > Policy
and Guidance>Health and Social care Topics>CJD>CJD Publications>Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents: Safe working
and the prevention of infection.
4 Annex E of the above guidance for guidance on quarantine of instruments
3C. Neuropathological diagnosis and the fate of the neurosurgical instruments
10. If a definite diagnosis of a disorder other than CJD is made (and there is no other
evidence to suggest any form of CJD).
· The neurosurgical instruments can be reprocessed and reused.
11. If a definite diagnosis of CJD is made
· Destroy the neurosurgical instruments5 and refer the case to NCJDSU by the clinician
responsible for the patient (a request to review the biopsy will be made as part of
NCJDSU’s routine activities). Precautions to minimise the risk of transmission as a
result of procedures carried out in the pathology laboratory and the clinic should be
taken in accordance with the ACDP/SEAC TSE Guidance.
12. If the diagnosis is uncertain
· If the local neuropathologist cannot exclude CJD as a possible diagnosis, contact
NCJDSU to refer the case for further investigation. NCJDSU will arrange uplift and
transport of the fixed and frozen tissues.
· If an alternative diagnosis is made by the NCJDSU, the neurosurgical instruments
can be reprocessed and reused.
· The neurosurgical instruments should be destroyed4, if a definite diagnosis of CJD is
made by NCJDSU.
· If the diagnosis remains uncertain, the neurosurgical instruments should remain in
quarantine until a definite diagnosis is made, or the patient dies.  Precautions to
minimise the risk of transmission as a result of procedures in the pathology laboratory
and the clinic should be taken in accordance with the ACDP/SEAC TSE Guidance2 .
13. If the patient dies without a diagnosis
· Seek consent for postmortem examination of the brain and, if it is given, follow the
procedures set out in box 12 above.
· The instruments used for the biopsy should be destroyed4, if consent for postmortem
examination is not given.
· If the diagnosis is still uncertain after post-mortem examination of the brain, the
instruments used for biopsy should be destroyed4.
                                                                
5 Certain instruments can be used as a resource for research. Please contact the Department of Health
(John.Stephenson@doh.gsi.gov.uk / 0207 972 5607) to arrange for collection of any surgical instruments that would
otherwise be destroyed.
4D  Flow diagram of essential communications
A single person, usually the consultant neurologist responsible for the patient’s care, should
ensure that the relevant information is communicated to the appropriate people.
STEP INFORM ACTION
IC Team /SSD quarantine
instruments
Brain biopsy planned
on a patient
identified in Box A Neuropathology Lab process and store
biopsy sample
Neuropathologist
excludes CJD as a
diagnosis
IC Team/SSD
release quarantined
instruments
IC Team/SSD destroy instruments1
NCJDSU CJD surveillance
Neuropathologist
diagnoses CJD
National Prion Clinic Consideration for
clinical trial
Neuropathologist
neither diagnoses
nor excludes CJD
NCJDSU diagnosis
NCJDSU gives non-
CJD diagnosis
IC Team/SSD release quarantined
instruments
IC Team/SSD destroy instruments1NCJDSU diagnoses
CJD CCDC report to CJDIP
IC Team/SSD continue quarantine
of instruments
NCJDSU neither
diagnoses or
excludes CJD CCDC report to CJDIP
IC Team/SSD destroy instruments1Patient dies without
diagnosis and post
mortem is not
permitted
CCDC report to CJDIP
1
 Certain instruments can be used as a resource for research.  Please contact the Department of Health
(John.Stephenson@doh.gsi.gov.uk / 0207 972 5607) to arrange for collection of any surgical instruments that
would otherwise be destroyed.
Abbreviations used
IC Infection control
SSD Sterile Services Department
NCJDSU National CJD Surveillance Unit
CCDC Consultant in Communicable Disease Control
CJDIP CJD Incidents Panel
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Annex J 
Published: 31 July 2006 
Revised and updated: January 2014 
1 
ANNEX J 
Assessment to be carried out before surgery and/or endoscopy to identify patients with, 
or at increased risk of, CJD or vCJD 
 
 
Summary of advice (revised January 2014) 
 
Annex J provides a clear and pragmatic way of assessing CJD and vCJD risk prior to surgery or 
endoscopy.  Certain groups of patients have been informed that they are at increased risk of 
CJD or vCJD.  Therefore it is recommended that all patients about to undergo any surgery or 
endoscopy should be asked if they have ever been notified as at increased risk of CJD or vCJD.  
This recommendation is outlined in paragraphs J1 and J2. 
 
In addition, patients undergoing surgery or neuro-endoscopy which may involve contact with 
tissues of potentially high level TSE infectivity (“high risk tissues”) should, through a set of 
detailed questions, be assessed for their possible CJD/vCJD risk exposure.  These questions 
are outlined in Table J1 and paragraphs J3 to J6. 
 
 
Previous revision date: January 2013 
Changes new to this edition: 
 
Date Change Notes 
January 2014 
 
Alignment of the list of people 
considered at increased risk of vCJD 
with that contained in Part 4. 
This change affects paragraph 
J14. 
 
January 2014 Change of terminology from “infection 
control” to “infection prevention and 
control” 
Changed throughout the 
document as appropriate 
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Recommendation for all surgical and endoscopy patients 
 
J1. The CJD Incidents Panel has identified a number of individuals or groups who are at 
increased risk of CJD or vCJD (see paragraphs J14 – J18). 
At a local level arrangements should be put in place to ensure that patients who have been 
notified they are at increased risk of CJD/vCJD are identified before surgery or endoscopy, 
to allow appropriate infection prevention and control procedures to be followed. 
All patients about to undergo any elective or emergency surgical or endoscopic procedure 
should be asked the question: 
“Have you ever been notified that you are at increased risk of CJD or vCJD for public 
health purposes?” 
J2. The actions to take following the patient’s response to the above question are: 
Patient’s 
response 
Action 
No Surgery or endoscopy should proceed using normal infection prevention 
and control procedures unless the procedure is likely to lead to contact with 
high risk tissue. 
Yes Please ask the patient to explain further the reason they were notified. 
Special infection prevention and control precautions should be taken for all 
surgery or endoscopy involving contact with medium or high infectivity 
tissues (see Annex A1) and the local infection prevention and control team 
should be consulted for advice. 
Part 4 of this Guidance provides advice on the precautions to be taken 
during the treatment of patients with or at increased risk of CJD or vCJD, 
and Annex F provides information on endoscopic procedures. 
The patient’s response should be recorded in their medical notes for future 
reference. 
Unable to 
respond 
Surgery or endoscopy should proceed using normal infection prevention 
and control procedures unless the procedure is likely to lead to contact with 
high risk tissue. If this is the case, please refer to the additional 
recommendations for high risk procedures from paragraph J3 onwards, with 
particular reference to paragraphs J7 – J10. 
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Additional recommendations for surgery and neuro-endoscopy which may involve 
contact with high risk tissue only 
N.B.  These additional recommendations are only applicable to those assessing patients 
in neurosurgical and ophthalmic surgical departments for intradural and posterior 
ophthalmic surgical procedures. With regards to endoscopy, these additional 
recommendations are only applicable to those assessing patients for intradural 
neuro-endoscopic procedures. 
Procedures should not be delayed whilst information is being collected, and 
clinicians should be careful not to prejudice overall patient care. 
J3. As well as asking all patients whether they have been notified as being at increased risk of 
CJD/vCJD, clinicians assessing patients for procedures that involve contact with high risk 
tissues should ask supplementary questions (as outlined in Table J1) to assess further their 
CJD/vCJD risk. If a patient has answered ‘yes’ to the question in paragraph J1 there is no 
additional need to ask the questions in Table J1 – the patient’s risk status has been 
established. 
J4. Tissues assumed or proven to have high level infectivity for CJD or vCJD are: 
 Brain 
 Spinal cord 
 Implanted dura mater grafts prior to 1992 
 Cranial nerves, specifically: 
o the entire optic nerve 
o only the intracranial components of the other cranial nerves 
 Cranial nerve ganglia 
 Posterior eye, specifically: 
o posterior hyaloid face 
o retina 
o retinal pigment epithelium 
o choroid 
o subretinal fluid 
o optic nerve 
 Pituitary gland 
Annex A1 gives further advice on CJD/vCJD tissue infectivity 
J5. Table J1 outlines recommended questions to assess CJD/vCJD risk. It is recommended 
that patients are asked these questions prior to elective or emergency surgical or neuro-
endoscopic procedures likely to involve contact with tissues of potentially high infectivity.  
Paragraph J6 outlines the steps to take based on the patient’s responses. Appendix B is an 
information sheet for pre-surgical patients undergoing surgery or neuro-endoscopy on high 
risk tissues about the questions they will be asked. 
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Table J1 – CJD risk questions for patients about to undergo elective or emergency surgical 
or neuro-endoscopic procedures likely to involve contact with tissues of potentially high 
level infectivity 
 
 Question to Patient Notes to clinician 
1  Have you a history of CJD or 
other prion disease in your 
family? If yes, please 
specify. 
Patients should be considered to be at risk from genetic 
forms of CJD if they have or have had: 
i) Genetic testing, which has indicated that they are at 
significant risk of developing CJD or other prion disease; 
ii) A blood relative known to have a genetic mutation 
indicative of genetic CJD or other prion disease; 
iii) 2 or more blood relatives affected by CJD or other prion 
disease 
2  Have you ever received 
growth hormone or 
gonadotrophin treatment? 
If yes, please specify: 
i) whether the hormone 
was derived from human 
pituitary glands 
ii) the year of treatment 
iii) whether the treatment 
was received in the UK 
or in another country 
Recipients of hormone derived from human pituitary glands, 
e.g. growth hormone or gonadotrophin, have been identified 
as at increased risk of sporadic CJD. 
In the UK, the use of human-derived growth hormone was 
discontinued in 1985 but human-derived products may 
have continued to be used in other countries. 
In the UK, the use of human-derived gonadotrophin was 
discontinued in 1973 but may have continued in other 
countries after this time. 
3  Have you ever had surgery 
on your brain or spinal cord? 
(a) Individuals who underwent intradural brain or intradural 
spinal surgery before August 1992 who received (or might 
have received) a graft of human-derived dura mater are “at 
increased risk” of transmission of sporadic CJD (unless 
evidence can be provided that human-derived dura mater 
was not used). 
(b) NICE guidance emphasises the need for a separate pool 
of new neuroendoscopes and reusable surgical instruments 
for high risk procedures on children born since 1st January 
1997 and who have not previously undergone high risk 
procedures. These instruments and neuroendoscopes 
should not be used for patients born before 1st January 1997 
or those who underwent high risk procedures using reusable 
instruments before the implementation of this guidance. 
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J6. The actions to be taken following the patient’s response to the above questions are: 
 
Patient’s 
response 
Action 
No to all 
questions 
Surgery or neuro-endoscopy can proceed using normal infection prevention and 
control procedures. 
Yes to 
any of 
questions 
1, 2 or 3 
Further investigation into the nature of the patient’s CJD risk should be 
undertaken, and the patient’s CJD risk assessed.  This assessment of CJD risk 
should be recorded in the patient’s medical notes for future reference. 
If the patient is found to be at increased risk of CJD or vCJD following 
investigation, or the risk status is unknown at the time of the procedure, special 
infection prevention and control precautions should be taken for the patient’s 
procedure including quarantining of instruments, and the local infection prevention 
and control team should be consulted for advice.  Part 4 of this guidance provides 
advice for the precautions to be taken during the treatment of patients with or at 
increased risk of CJD or vCJD, and Annex F provides information on neuro-
endoscopic procedures. 
If the patient is found to be at increased risk of CJD or vCJD they should also be 
referred to their GP, who will need to inform them of their increased risk of CJD or 
vCJD and provide them with further information and advice.  This is available from 
the CJD Incidents Panel: http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJDIncidentsPanel 
Patients who are at increased risk of genetic forms of CJD should be offered the 
opportunity of referral to the National Prion Clinic, based at the National Hospital 
for Neurology and Neurosurgery, Queen Square, London: 
http://www.nationalprionclinic.org/ 
Patients who are at increased risk of sporadic CJD due to receipt of human-
derived growth hormone or gonadotrophin should be offered the opportunity of 
referral to the UCL Institute of Child Health, London. Contact: 
leahdavidson@msn.com, 020 7404 0536 
Unable to 
respond 
See paragraphs J7 – J10 below for advice. 
 
Emergency surgery or neuro-endoscopy which may involve contact with high risk tissue 
J7. In the event that a patient about to have emergency surgery or neuro-endoscopy is 
physically or otherwise unable to answer any questions, a family member, or someone 
close to the patient (in the case of a child, a person with parental responsibility), should be 
asked the CJD risk questions as set out in Table J1 prior to the surgery or neuro-
endoscopy. 
J8. If the family member, or someone close to the patient, is not able to provide a definitive 
answer to the CJD risk questions, the surgery or neuro-endoscopy should proceed but all 
instruments should be quarantined following the procedure (see Annex E of this guidance 
for details on quarantining).  The patient’s GP should be contacted after the surgery or 
neuro-endoscopy, and enquiries made as to whether the patient is at increased risk of 
CJD/vCJD according to the questions as set out in Table J1. 
J9. The actions to be taken following the GP’s response to the questions in Table J1 are: 
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GP’s 
response 
Action 
No to all 
questions 
The instruments can be returned to routine use after undergoing normal 
decontamination processes. 
Yes to 
any of 
questions 
1, 2 or 3 
Further investigation into the nature of the patient’s CJD risk should be undertaken, 
and the patient’s CJD risk confirmed or rejected. Confirmation or rejection of CJD 
risk should be recorded in the patient’s medical notes for future reference. 
If the patient is found to be at increased risk of CJD or vCJD following investigation 
then the quarantined instruments should be destroyed. Alternatively, instruments 
destined for disposal may instead be retained for research – refer to Annex E for 
details. 
The patient’s GP should inform the patient that they are at increased risk of CJD or 
vCJD and provide them with further information and advice.  This is available from: 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJDIncidentsPanel 
Patients who are at increased risk of genetic forms of CJD may benefit from 
discussions with the National Prion Clinic, based at the National Hospital for 
Neurology and Neurosurgery, Queen Square, London: 
http://www.nationalprionclinic.org/     
Patients who are at increased risk of sporadic CJD due to receipt of human derived 
growth hormone or gonadotrophin may benefit from discussions with the UCL 
Institute of Child Health, London. Contact: leahdavidson@msn.com, 020 7404 0536 
Uncertain 
about any 
of 
questions 
1, 2 or 3 
The instruments should be kept in quarantine. The local infection prevention and 
control team should carry out a risk assessment, and they may wish to involve the 
local Control of Communicable Disease Consultant in this process. The outcome of 
the risk assessment should determine whether or not to return the instruments to 
routine use. 
 
Additional actions to be taken during pre-surgery assessment for CJD risk 
J10. In addition to asking the patient CJD/vCJD risk questions, the following actions should also 
be carried out before any surgical or endoscopic procedure involving contact with high risk 
tissue.  The clinician undertaking the pre-surgery assessment should: 
 Check the patient’s medical notes and/ or referral letter for any mention of CJD or 
vCJD status 
 Consider whether there is a risk that the patient may be showing the early signs of 
CJD or vCJD, i.e. consider whether the patient may have an undiagnosed 
neurological disease involving cognitive impairment or ataxia 
J11. These actions, in conjunction with the CJD/vCJD risk questions, will minimise the chance of 
a CJD incident occurring and therefore reduce the risk of transmission of CJD or vCJD to 
subsequent patients. 
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Infection prevention and control guidance  
J12. Part 4 of this Guidance provides advice on the special infection prevention and control 
precautions that should be taken for patients with, or at increased risk of, CJD or vCJD, and 
Annex F provides information on endoscopic procedures. 
 
Patients at increased risk of CJD or vCJD 
J13. As outlined in Table 4A in Part 4, a number of patients have been identified as at increased 
risk of CJD or vCJD on the recommendation of the CJD Incidents Panel. Paragraphs J15 to 
J17 provide some further information on these individuals and the steps taken to ensure 
that health care staff are informed of their risk status. 
J14. Patients identified to be at increased risk include: 
Related to blood transfusions 
 People who have received blood or blood components from someone who went on 
to develop vCJD 
 People who have given blood or blood components to someone who went on to 
develop vCJD 
 People who have received blood or blood components from someone who has also 
given blood or blood components to a patient who went to develop vCJD 
 People who have received blood or blood components from 300 or more donors 
since 1990 (additional information on how this group is defined can be found in the 
ACDP TSE guidance FAQ document[1]). 
Related to surgery 
 People who have had surgery using instruments that had been used on someone 
who developed CJD 
 People who have had an intradural neurosurgical or intradural spinal procedure 
before August 1992 
 People who have received an organ or tissue from a donor infected with CJD or at 
increased risk of CJD 
Related to other medical care 
 People who have been treated with certain UK sourced plasma products between 
1990 and 2001 
 People who have been treated with growth hormone sourced from humans (before 
1985) 
 People who have been treated with gonadotrophin sourced from humans (before 
1973) 
 People who have been told by a specialist that they have a risk of developing the 
genetic form of CJD 
                                                 
[1]
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209775/Fre
quently_Asked_Questions.pdf) 
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J15. When someone is notified that they are at increased risk of CJD or vCJD, they are asked to 
take certain precautions to reduce the risk of spreading the infection to others. These 
include: 
 Not donating blood, tissue or organs; 
 Informing healthcare staff if they need to undergo an invasive surgical, medical or 
dental procedure; 
 Informing a family member or someone close to them, in case they need 
emergency surgery or endoscopy in the future 
J16. The individual’s GP is asked to record the patient’s CJD risk status in their primary care 
records. The GP should also include this information in any referral letter should the patient 
require invasive surgical, medical or dental procedures. 
J17. Further information on the work of the CJD Incidents Panel is available on the HPA 
website: http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJDIncidentsPanel  
 
Training  
J18. Health services should ensure that healthcare staff conducting pre-surgery assessments 
receive instruction and/or training necessary to understand the reasons for asking these 
questions. It is important that these questions are asked in a manner that does not 
cause undue anxiety, and therefore the questioner should be prepared and able to 
reassure the patient, and provide further information if needed. Information for 
patients is available from the CJD Incidents Panel website at: 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJDIncidentsPanel  
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Information for patients undergoing surgery or neuro-endoscopy on high risk tissues   Appendix B 
 
Part of your routine assessment before surgery includes some questions to find out whether you could have an 
increased risk of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). We will ask you: 
Have you ever been notified that you are at risk of CJD or vCJD for public health purposes?  
Have you any history of CJD or other prion disease in your family?  
Have you ever received growth hormone or gonadotrophin treatment? 
Have you had surgery on your brain or spinal cord at any time in the past? 
 
What is CJD? 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a rare brain disorder that affects about 1 in a million people each year. CJD is 
thought to be caused by the build up in the brain of an abnormal form of a protein called a ‘prion’.  Unfortunately CJD 
is fatal, and as yet there is no known cure. There are different types of CJD, including variant CJD (vCJD). vCJD is 
caused by eating meat from cows infected with BSE. 
How can CJD spread from person to person? 
A person who is infected with CJD may have abnormal prion protein in their body for years before becoming ill. If that 
person has an operation, or donates blood, tissues or organs, during that time, the abnormal prion protein that causes 
CJD could spread to other patients. 
Why are we asking you about CJD before your operation? 
The abnormal prion protein that causes CJD is very hard to remove or destroy. If surgical instruments are used on a 
patient who is infected with CJD they may still have prion protein on them, even after they have been properly 
washed and disinfected. They could then spread CJD to other patients. This is particularly important for operations on 
the brain, spinal cord and the back of the eye as these parts of the body contain the largest amount of abnormal prion 
protein. 
What have these questions got to do with CJD? 
CJD has been spread in several ways and different groups of people may have an increased risk of CJD. 
We ask whether there is anyone in your family who has had CJD because some types of CJD can be inherited. These 
types of CJD are caused by faulty genes and may be passed from parent to child. 
We ask whether you have had surgery on the brain or spinal cord because some of these operations used to use grafts 
of ‘dura mater’ (the tough lining round the brain and spinal cord). Some of these grafts have been linked to CJD 
infection - these grafts are no longer used.  
We ask whether you have been treated with growth hormone or gonadotrophin infertility treatment because these 
used to be prepared from pituitary glands. Some of these hormone treatments have been linked to CJD infection - 
these hormones are no longer used.  
We ask whether you have had a large number of blood transfusions as this could be related to an increased risk of 
variant CJD (vCJD). vCJD is the type of CJD which is caused by eating meat from cows infected with BSE. vCJD can be 
spread through blood transfusions.  
What happens if I answer ‘Yes’ to any of these questions? 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to any of these questions, medical staff will now examine your medical records in more detail to 
determine whether or not you may have an increased risk of CJD.  
What will happen then? 
If you do have an increased risk of CJD special precautions will be taken with the surgical instruments used in your 
operation. Your GP will be informed and will ask you to come and discuss what this means in more detail.  
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Please remember that the overall risk of CJD spreading by these routes is generally very low.  These questions are an 
extra measure to prevent CJD spreading through surgery. This should not affect the medical care you receive now or 
in the future. 
What if I don’t have a GP? 
The health protection unit for your area will make sure that another doctor discusses this with you. 
Can I have a blood test to see if I am infected with CJD? 
Unfortunately there is no blood test available yet which could show if you have CJD.   
Where can I find out more? 
The following organisations offer further information and support. 
 Public Health England: www.hpa.org.uk/cjd 
 CJD Support Network website: www.cjdsupport.net 
 National CJD Surveillance Unit website: www.cjd.ed.ac.uk 
 National Prion Clinic website:  www.nationalprionclinic.org/ 
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Annex K 
 
Guidelines for pathologists and pathology laboratories for the 
handling of tissues from patients with, or at risk of, CJD or 
vCJD 
 
Introduction 
 
K1. This guidance is aimed at pathologists and individuals working in pathology 
laboratories who handle tissues from patients. It aims to ensure that 
laboratory staff are aware of risk factors for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) 
or variant CJD (vCJD) prior to carrying out procedures on tissues. 
For the purposes of this guidance document, sporadic CJD, iatrogenic 
(accidentally transmitted) TSE and genetic TSE will all be referred to 
under the umbrella name of ‘CJD’. Variant CJD will be referred to as 
‘vCJD’. 
 
K2. The following information is outlined in this Annex: 
o How to identify a potential case of CJD or vCJD prior to handling 
tissues from a living patient, or performing an autopsy on a patient 
with a history of dementia or a progressive neurodegenerative 
disorder 
o the procedures for handling tissues of high or medium levels of 
infectivity from patients with, or at risk from, CJD or vCJD 
o what to do in the event that a routinely handled tissue sample is 
subsequently found to be from a patient with, or at risk of, CJD or 
vCJD 
 
K3. Other relevant information already covered by the ACDP TSE Working Group 
guidance includes: 
o general laboratory containment and control measures. These are 
covered by Part 3 of this guidance 
o the handling of brain biopsy tissues from patients with progressive 
neurological disorders. This is covered by Annex I of this guidance 
o the procedures needed for an autopsy on a patient with, or at risk of, 
all forms of CJD. This is covered by Annex H of this guidance 
 
K4.  An algorithm is included to enable easy decision making on the treatment of 
tissue samples from patients with or at risk of CJD or vCJD, based on patient 
diagnosis and tissue infectivity risk.  If the tissue sample is not designated 
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high or medium risk as outlined in Tables K1 and K2, no special precautions 
are needed, and normal protocols may be followed. 
 
Patient Classification  
K5.  Patients are classified as follows: 
 
A) Symptomatic  
Symptomatic patients are classified according to verified WHO clinical and 
pathological criteria for: 
a. Sporadic CJD 
b. Iatrogenic (accidentally transmitted) TSE 
c. Genetic TSE (familial CJD, GSS and FFI), and; 
d. variant CJD (vCJD) 
More information is available in Annex B of this guidance. 
 
B) Asymptomatic patients at risk of familial forms of CJD 
A patient should be considered to be at risk from familial forms of CJD linked 
to genetic mutations if they have or have had:  
a. Genetic testing, which has indicated that they are at significant risk of 
developing CJD or other prion disease 
b. A blood relative known to have a genetic mutation indicative of familial 
CJD 
c. 2 or more blood relatives affected by CJD or other prion disease 
 
C) Asymptomatic patients at risk of CJD or vCJD from iatrogenic exposure 
 
Risk Patient at risk 
of CJD 
Patient at risk 
of vCJD 
Received hormone derived from human 
pituitary glands, e.g. growth hormone or 
gonadotrophin.  In the UK, the use of human-
derived growth hormone was discontinued in 
1985, and the use of human-derived 
gonadotrophin was discontinued in 1973, but 
human-derived products may have continued to 
be used in other countries 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
Undergone intradural neurosurgical procedures 
or operations on the spinal cord prior to August 
1992 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Received blood, tissues or organs from a donor 
who went on to develop CJD or vCJD, or was 
at risk of CJD or vCJD 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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Risk Patient at risk 
of CJD 
Patient at risk 
of vCJD 
Received blood components or plasma 
derivatives from implicated batches of blood 
(this includes most adult haemophiliacs in 
the UK) 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Donated blood to an individual who was later 
found to have vCJD 
No Yes 
 
K6. Autopsy on patients with dementias, ataxia and other undiagnosed 
neurological disorders 
 In patients with a history of a neurodegenerative disorder, including dementia 
and ataxia, where the diagnosis is uncertain, the possibility of CJD should be 
considered before the autopsy is undertaken. Based on the clinical criteria 
listed above, CJD should be considered when there is a history of progressive 
dementia of less than 2 years duration when accompanied by myoclonus, 
visual problems, ataxia, pyramidal or extrapyramidal features, or akinetic 
mutism.  The results of EEG studies should be examined to see if changes 
suggestive of CJD were present, and a positive assay for 14-3-3 protein in the 
CSF may also support the diagnosis of CJD.  
 The National CJD Surveillance Unit can provide advice on individual cases 
upon request – please call 0131 537 1980. 
 
K7.  Autopsy on patients with known or suspected CJD or vCJD 
 Annex H provides advice on autopsies on patients known or suspected to 
 have CJD or vCJD. 
 
Clinical information  
K8. The clinical information on the request form accompanying the specimen 
should state the relevant information, and/or there may be such information 
on the hospital electronic patient record systems.  If the patient is 
symptomatic, or asymptomatic but ‘at risk’, then the appropriate staff must be 
informed prior to any procedures being carried out.  The samples should be 
handled only by fully trained staff who are aware of the relevant laboratory 
handling and health and safety guidelines. 
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NO,  
follow usual 
protocols and 
procedures 
Other 
diagnoses 
  
* See section K5 
Tissue risk 
 
See Table K1 for 
tissue risks for CJD 
 
See Table K2 for 
tissue risks for vCJD 
Patient 
Classification 
 
See sections K5 
and K6 
Special precautions 
required? 
 
Specialist precautions 
are outlined in sections 
K14 to K27 
Algorithm for the processing of tissue from patients with or at risk of CJD including vCJD 
Tissue sample
Symptomatic patients with 
definite, probable or possible 
forms of sporadic, variant, 
familial or acquired CJD*
High 
risk 
tissue 
Medium 
risk 
tissue 
YES,  
specialist 
precautions should 
be followed  
Asymptomatic 
patients at risk 
of CJD or 
vCJD*
High  
risk 
tissue 
Medium 
risk 
tissue 
YES, 
specialist 
precautions 
should be 
followed  
NO,  
follow usual 
protocols 
and 
procedures 
Individuals 
with other 
diagnosed 
neurological 
diseases 
NO,  
follow usual 
protocols and 
procedures 
Ascertain likelihood of CJD or 
vCJD diagnosis using section 
High 
risk 
tissue 
Medium 
risk 
tissue 
Undiagnosed individuals with 
e.g. dementias, ataxias 
NO,  
follow usual 
protocols 
and 
procedures 
K6 
YES, 
specialist 
precautions 
should be 
followed  
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Table of tissues assumed to have medium or high level infectivity for CJD 
other than vCJD  
 
K9. Table K1 outlines those tissues either assumed or proven to have medium or 
high level infectivity for CJD other than vCJD.  This table is based on Table 
A1 in Annex A1 of this guidance, which is updated regularly in accordance 
with international guidelines.  Tissues assumed or proven to have either 
low level, or no, infectivity have not been included in this table, e.g. 
liver, kidney, muscle. 
 
Table K1 – tissues either assumed or proven to have medium or high level 
infectivity for CJD other than vCJD 
Key: +ve = tested positive 
-ve = tested negative 
P = infectivity proven in experimental transmission studies   
PrPTSE = disease associated form of the prion protein 
 
Presence of abnormal prion protein and 
level of infectivity for CJD other than 
vCJD 
Tissue 
 
PrPTSE detected Assumed level of 
Infectivity 
Brain +ve High  P 
Spinal cord +ve High  P 
Dura mater* -ve High 
Cranial nerves, specifically:  
o the entire optic nerve 
o only the intracranial 
components of the other 
cranial nerves  
+ve High 
Cranial nerve ganglia +ve High 
Posterior eye  +ve High  P 
Pituitary gland +ve High  
Spinal ganglia  +ve Medium 
Anterior eye and cornea** -ve Medium 
Olfactory epithelium +ve Medium 
 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Annex K 
 
Published: March 2009 6
* Dura mater is considered a high risk tissue, despite no PrPTSE being detected. It is 
likely that dura mater used for grafting, and subsequently implicated in CJD 
transmission, could have been contaminated with brain tissue 
 
** Anterior eye and cornea are considered medium risk, despite negative PrPTSE 
tests, because corneal transplantation has been associated with CJD transmission 
 
Notable omissions 
K10. Peripheral tissues have been found to carry low levels of prion protein and/or 
infectivity in sporadic CJD.  They are considered low risk due to a lack of 
epidemiological evidence of transmission risk. 
 
K11. CSF and blood are classified as low risk tissues and do not require special 
precautions for biochemical or cytological investigations. 
 
Table of tissues assumed to have medium or high level infectivity for vCJD 
only  
 
K12. Table K2 outlines those tissues either assumed or proven to have medium or 
high level infectivity for vCJD.  This table is based on Table A1 in Annex A1 of 
this guidance, which is updated regularly in accordance with international 
guidelines. Tissues assumed or proven to have either low level, or no, 
infectivity have not been included in this table, e.g. liver, kidney, 
muscle. 
 
Table K2 – tissues either assumed or proven to have medium or high level 
infectivity for vCJD only  
Key: +ve = tested positive   
-ve = tested negative 
NT = not tested  
P = infectivity proven in experimental transmission studies 
PrPTSE = disease associated form of the prion protein 
Presence of abnormal prion protein and 
level of infectivity for vCJD 
Tissue 
 
PrPTSE detected Assumed level of 
infectivity 
Brain +ve High  P 
Spinal cord +ve High  P 
Dura mater* -ve High 
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Cranial nerves, specifically:  
o the entire optic nerve 
o only the intracranial 
components of the other 
cranial nerves 
+ve High 
Cranial nerve ganglia +ve High  P 
Posterior eye  +ve High 
Pituitary gland +ve High  
Spinal ganglia  +ve Medium  P 
Anterior eye and cornea** -ve Medium 
Olfactory epithelium*** NT Medium 
Tonsil +ve Medium  P 
Appendix +ve Medium 
Spleen  +ve Medium  P 
Thymus +ve Medium 
Other lymphoid tissues (such 
as gut-associated lymphoid 
tissues and lymph nodes) 
+ve Medium  P 
 
* Dura mater is considered a high risk tissue, despite no PrPTSE being detected. It is 
likely that dura mater used for grafting, and subsequently implicated in CJD 
transmission, could have been contaminated with brain tissue. 
 
** Anterior eye and cornea are considered medium risk, despite negative PrPTSE 
tests, because corneal transplantation has been associated with CJD transmission 
 
*** Olfactory epithelium is considered medium risk, despite not having been tested for 
the presence of PrPTSE, because PrPTSE is present in the olfactory tract and bulb in 
CJD 
 
Notable omissions 
K13. Blood is considered to have a low risk of infectivity despite the four cases of 
vCJD infection that have been transmitted by contaminated blood 
transfusions.  It is thought that the large volume and multiple infectious doses 
are important factors in transmission by packed red cells and other blood 
components. Blood is therefore classified as a low risk tissue and does not 
require special precautions for biochemical or cytological investigations 
 
K14. CSF is classified as a low risk tissue and does not require special precautions 
for biochemical or cytological investigations. 
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Extra precautions for handling tissues with high or medium infectivity from 
patients with, or at risk of, all forms of CJD and vCJD 
 
Trimming tissue 
K15. Wearing the appropriate protective personnel equipment (PPE), all fresh 
tissue should be sliced or trimmed in a Class 1 Microbiological safety cabinet 
using cut resistant/steel mesh gloves and, when possible, disposable 
instruments.  A disposable paper lining can be placed over the base of the 
cabinet to help contain splashes of contaminated formalin. After trimming, the 
cabinet should be wiped down with 2M sodium hydroxide and left for 1 hour. 
Do not use 20,000pmm sodium hypochlorite in cabinets as this will corrode 
the metal. Disposable instruments and sharps can be chemically 
decontaminated with 2M sodium hydroxide for 1 hour prior to placing them in 
a suitable container for disposal.  Waste contaminated formalin should be 
absorbed into sawdust in a combustible stout container with lid prior to 
disposal.  All this waste, including gowns, gloves and aprons should be sent 
for incineration.  Non-disposable instruments and cut resistant/steel mesh 
gloves should be autoclaved or decontaminated with 2M sodium hydroxide for 
1 hour. 
 
K16. Fixed tissues can be trimmed either in a Class 1 Microbiological Safety 
cabinet or on a ventilated bench, taking care not to allow contamination of the 
surrounding laboratory space. Cleaning and disposal can be performed as 
above.  
 
Treatment with formic acid prior to processing – to reduce infectivity 
K17. Treatment with formalin appears to improve the action of the formic acid in 
reducing infectivity of the sample.  The efficacy of formic acid in reducing 
infectivity in tissue samples from patients with CJD has been proven in the 
literature1.  
 
K18.  Using a cabinet/fume cabinet, depending on local risk assessment, fixed 
tissue samples should be immersed in 96% formic acid for 1 hour.  Samples 
must be thoroughly washed with water prior to further processing and 
examination.  
                                                 
1 Brown P, Wolff A, Gajdusek DC. A simple and effective method for inactivating virus 
infectivity in formalin-fixed tissue samples from patients with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 
Neurology. 1990; 40:887-90 
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K19. Formic acid is used normally in pathology laboratories to decalcify bones, and 
must be used in a cabinet/fume cupboard.  It does not appear to harm the 
morphology of the tissues, so the results of subsequent tests are not 
jeopardised.  In addition, plastic cassettes and other equipment are not 
affected.  Tissues treated with formic acid can become slightly brittle, but this 
is not usually a major problem at the time of microtomy.   
 
K20. Following treatment with formic acid, tissues should be processed and 
handled like any other routine pathological specimen. The processing 
fluids used on tissue blocks that have been exposed to formic acid (including 
high infectivity tissues e.g. brain) should not be treated as potentially 
contaminated and can be disposed of using routine precautions. 
 
Microtomy 
K21. Sections can be cut on a routine microtome using disposable blades. The 
blades should be discarded prior to cutting a different case.  Disposable 
microtome blades are available, and are used routinely by many laboratories. 
 
Frozen section work 
K22. It is advised that no frozen section work should be done on high risk tissues 
for patients with, or at risk of, CJD or vCJD. 
 
Disinfection and decontamination 
 
K23. Factors to consider when choosing chemical deactivation 
a. Sodium Hypochlorite 
 
o Requires a dilution yielding 20,000 ppm available chlorine 
o Must not be used on open surfaces i.e. benches due to harmful fumes 
o Corrodes metal and steel - do not use on cabinets (max. only 5,000 
ppm) 
o Incompatible with formaldehyde, alcohols and acids – explosive 
o Can be used for disinfecting glassware in a container within a cabinet 
o Concentrated stock dilutions last for only approximately 2-3 weeks 
o Diluted solutions are very unstable and should be made up daily 
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b. Sodium Hydroxide 
 
o Use as 2M sodium hydroxide 
o Should not be used on aluminium or zinc 
o Will not cause fumes but corrosive to body tissue 
o Irritant and harmful as dust 
 
Table K3 – Decontamination and disposal 
 
Item Action Contact 
Time 
Formaldehyde-fixed 
tissues 
Immersion in 96% formic acid (unless tissue has 
previously been exposed to phenol, which 
interacts deleteriously with formic acid) 
60 
minutes 
Disposable clothing, 
paper tissues, etc 
Double bag and dispose of by incineration  
Disposable sharps and 
instruments 
Decontaminate with 2M sodium hydroxide for 1 
hour. Collect in a suitable container, double bag 
and dispose of by incineration 
 
Non-disposable metal 
instruments 
Soak in 2M sodium hydroxide, then autoclave at 
134OC with holding time of 3 minutes 
60 
minutes 
 
Glassware including 
microscope slides 
Collect in a suitable container, double bag and 
dispose of by incineration 
60 
minutes 
Work surfaces / 
Microtome for non 
formic treated blocks 
Flood with 2M sodium hydroxide, then wash well 60 
minutes 
Microbiological Safety 
Cabinets 
Wash liberally with 2M sodium hydroxide, then 
wash well.  
Double bag filters and dispose of by incineration 
60 
minutes 
Xylene, chloroform, 
contaminated water, 
contaminated fluids e.g. 
formalin, solvents * 
Absorb on sawdust in a combustible stout 
container (with lid), double bag and then dispose 
of by incineration 
 
Paraffin wax and wax 
shavings 
If tissues have been treated with formic acid, 
handle like any other routine pathological 
specimen. 
If not, collect in stout container (with lid) then 
dispose of by incineration 
 
CSF, Blood Absorb on sawdust in a stout combustible 
container (with lid) then dispose of by incineration 
60 
minutes 
* For all liquid disposals, be careful to avoid dangerous chemical or explosive 
incompatibilities before disposal 
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Decontamination of specialist equipment 
K24. Providing other specialist pathology equipment is used after formic acid 
treatment, no decontamination of equipment is required. 
 
Retrospective diagnosis of CJD following normal tissue sample processing 
 
K25. The situation may arise whereby a patient is not suspected of having CJD, 
but is subsequently diagnosed following a biopsy or autopsy.  
 
K26.  The following needs to be taken into account when considering what action to 
take: 
o The type of tissue involved 
o The type of CJD that has been diagnosed 
o How recently the diagnosis was made following the laboratory 
processes carried out on this tissue 
o Whether the patient had clinical symptoms of CJD, or was in one of 
the "at risk" groups 
o Whether the case has been notified to the National CJD Surveillance 
Unit (see section K28) and whether any of the tissue should be 
referred for further specialist investigations 
 
K27.  The following actions should be undertaken (please note that these actions 
do not constitute best practice but reflect the best course of action to be 
taken under these particular circumstances): 
a. Any samples taken from the patient should be traced, to ascertain what 
the tissue had been used for. Establish if any residual tissue was being 
stored  
b. Fixed tissue should be double bagged and sent for incineration after the 
statutory 6 weeks. Prior to incineration, the NCJDSU should be contacted 
to ascertain whether they have a use for the tissue (see section K28) 
c. Frozen tissue, including cryostat sections, should be fixed and then 
double bagged and sent for incineration after the statutory 6 weeks. Prior 
to incineration, the NCJDSU should be contacted to ascertain whether 
they have a use for the tissue (see section K28) 
d. The paraffin blocks should be removed from main store and filed 
separately, clearly labelled as form of CJD and then stored separately. 
Reprocessing the blocks using formic acid is not required; the blocks can 
be sent for further investigations in the National CJD Surveillance Unit 
(see section K28) 
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e. Mounted (cover-slipped) slides can be filed as per usual 
f. Un-mounted slides should be sent for incineration. 
g. If it is still in use, the blade of the microtome used to cut the sample 
should be placed in a sharps box and this should be disposed of by 
incineration. The water in the water bath should be changed 
h. For brain banking, identify the brass plates used for dissection of the 
CJD sample. They can no longer be used for the dissection or freezing of 
brain tissues. Prions are known to bind to metal surfaces, and washing 
with water will not guarantee the removal of prion infectivity. Frozen tissue 
from the next two cases received and cut fresh on the same brass plate 
following the CJD sample should be identified and withdrawn from 
research and either stored with appropriate biohazard labelling or 
transferred to the National CJD Surveillance Unit (see section K28).  
It is recommended that brass plates used on unfixed tissues in brain 
banks should be washed and soaked in sodium hypochlorite between 
dissections of new cases.  
 
Where to send tissue samples for CJD testing  
 
K28. If any tissue sample requires further investigations for the possibility of CJD 
infection, please contact Professor James Ironside or Mrs Linda McCardle in 
the National CJD Surveillance Unit on 0131 537 1980. 
 
If any type of CJD has been diagnosed in an individual, please notify the 
National CJD Surveillance Unit on 0131 537 1980 
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ANNEX L 
MANAGING CJD/vCJD RISK IN OPHTHALMOLOGY 
 
Contents 
• Introduction 
• Definition of anterior segment and posterior segment eye surgery or procedure 
• Definition of risk of surgical and diagnostic procedures 
• Assessment of CJD/vCJD risk 
o Assessment for all elective and emergency ophthalmic surgery 
o Additional assessment for posterior segment surgery 
o Emergency surgery 
• Diagnostic examination, instruments and contact lenses 
• Surgical management  
o Posterior segment eye surgery  
 Posterior segment eye surgery on individuals with, or at increased risk of, 
CJD or vCJD 
 Posterior segment eye surgery on individuals not known to be infected 
and not at increased risk of CJD or vCJD 
o Anterior segment eye surgery  
 Low risk anterior segment eye surgery on individuals with, or at increased 
risk of, CJD or vCJD 
 Low risk anterior segment eye surgery on individuals not known to be 
infected and not at increased risk of CJD or vCJD 
o Ocular Tissue Transplantation 
 Transplant surgical procedure 
 Potential infectivity of the donor material and recipient status 
 Records management 
o Decontamination of surgical instruments 
o CJD incident management 
• Appendix 1: Surgical procedures regarded as high risk posterior segment eye surgery 
• Appendix 2: Surgical procedures regarded as low risk anterior segment eye surgery 
• Appendix 3: Guidance for the cleaning and disinfection (decontamination) of rigid 
contact lenses and ophthalmic medical devices which come into contact with the outer 
surface of the eye 
• Appendix 4: Single-use instrumentation in ophthalmology 
• Appendix 5: List of members of the ACDP TSE Working Group Ophthalmology subgroup 
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Introduction 
 
L1. This guidance has been produced by the ACDP TSE Working Group Ophthalmology 
subgroup (membership list included as Appendix 5 of this document).  
 
L2. Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) is an invariably fatal human disease belonging to the 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs). These conditions are caused by a 
pathological accumulation in the brain of an aberrant form (PrPSc) of a normal cell 
surface glycoprotein, prion protein (PrP).  CJD occurs in familial, sporadic and acquired 
(variant CJD and iatrogenic) forms. The familial forms of CJD are autosomal dominant 
traits associated with mutations in the prion protein gene (PRNP).  
 
L3. At present, sporadic CJD (sCJD) is the most commonly encountered form of the disease 
with an incidence of 1 case per million, thus giving approximately 60 new cases per year 
in the UK. Patients with sCJD are predominantly in their 60s and as such come into 
contact with ophthalmologists through a range of unrelated ophthalmic conditions or 
because of visual symptoms caused by their condition. 
 
L4. In the 1980s some British cattle developed bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
probably from an altered form of the prion responsible for scrapie in sheep which had 
entered cattle feed. Human ingestion of BSE contaminated beef products is thought to 
have then led to the development of a new acquired form of the disease known as 
variant CJD (vCJD). The first case of vCJD was identified in the UK in 1994. Since then 
there have now been over 160 cases in the UK, typically in young adults.  
 
L5. Although the majority of the human population of the UK was exposed at one time or 
another until 1996 to PrPSc
 
by ingestion of contaminated beef products, the precise 
prevalence of preclinical infection of vCJD in the UK is unknown. The most reliable 
evidence we have to date is from the analysis of anonymised appendix and tonsil tissue 
taken from patients across the UK in 1995-1999.  In this study, three positive samples 
were identified in the 12,674 samples tested, equating to a prevalence of approximately 
1 in 4000 cases (237 per million). Although the infective risk of these preclinical cases is 
uncertain there is the obvious potential for iatrogenic transmission in a significant 
number of cases. 
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L6.  Iatrogenic CJD has been associated most recently with blood transfusion (3 clinical 
vCJD cases), and historically with human cadaveric growth hormone treatment (>190 
cases), dura mater transplantation (>190 cases), contaminated neurosurgical 
instruments/EEG needles (6 cases) and corneal transplantation.  
 
L7. There has been one definite case of CJD transmission from corneal transplantation 
reported, in the US in 1974. The patient, a 55-year-old woman, received a cornea from a 
donor with biopsy-proven sCJD. She developed a neurologic illness eighteen months 
after surgery and died 8 months later. The recipient’s autopsy was positive for CJD. A 
further probable case of CJD transmission reported in Germany in 1997 was that of a 
45-year-old woman who developed clinical symptoms and EEG evidence of sCJD 30 
years after keratoplasty. The donor had biopsy-proven CJD but an autopsy of the 
recipient was refused. Several further possible cases of CJD transmission from corneal 
transplantation have been reported over the past 2 decades but it is uncertain as to the 
significance of the corneal transplantation in their subsequent CJD disease 
development. There are no other known cases of ophthalmic surgery or diagnostic 
procedure having resulted in CJD transmission between patients. 
 
L8.  Western blot analysis and immunohistochemistry of ocular tissues from sCJD and vCJD 
cases have found high levels of PrPSc in the retina, comparable to levels with cerebral 
cortex, and lower levels in the optic nerve. However, no detectable levels of PrPSc have 
been found in cornea, sclera, iris, lens, ciliary body vitreous or choroid. As prion proteins 
adhere strongly to materials including smooth metal surfaces and are not removed 
entirely by routine cleaning and autoclaving then there is the potential for iatrogenic 
transmission of PrPSc particularly during surgery involving the retina and optic nerve. 
Although the fact that PrPSc has not been found in other ocular tissues is reassuring, the 
demonstration of infectivity through transplantation suggests that practical precautions 
during diagnostic and surgical procedures are advisable to reduce the risk of iatrogenic 
transmission. 
 
L9. Guidance has been issued previously by the Medical Devices Agency, the College of 
Optometrists, the Association of British Dispensing Opticians, the Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to 
reduce the risk of iatrogenic CJD transmission in ophthalmic care. The purpose of this 
latest document is to consolidate and update the available guidance and offer pragmatic 
solutions to aid implementation of such guidance.  
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Definition of anterior segment and posterior segment eye surgery or procedure 
 
L10. Existing guidance has failed to clearly define anterior and posterior segment eye surgery 
or procedures for the purposes of CJD/vCJD risk. The ACDP TSE Working Group 
Ophthalmology Subgroup suggests the following definitions based on evidence of 
infectivity and presence of abnormal prion protein from animal and human studies: 
 
a) Posterior segment eye surgery or procedure is defined as any surgery or 
procedure that involves potential contact with the posterior hyaloid face, retina, 
retinal pigment epithelium, choroid, subretinal fluid and optic nerve. Due to the 
high incidence of subretinal fluid drainage performed either intentionally or 
inadvertently during scleral buckling surgery, this form of surgery is considered 
as posterior segment surgery. See Appendix 1 for a list of posterior segment 
surgeries. 
 
b) Anterior segment surgery or procedure is defined as any surgery or 
procedure involving ocular tissues other than those stated above, including: 
• Ocular adnexal tissue including eyelids, periorbital tissue and lacrimal 
system  
• Conjunctiva 
• Cornea and limbus 
• Iris 
• Crystalline lens  
• Anterior vitreous (excluding the posterior hyaloid face) 
• Anterior vitrectomy performed via the cornea  
• Extra-ocular muscle surgery  
• Ciliary body 
• Sclera (but not if allogeneic sclera used) 
• Tissues of the orbit except optic nerve 
See Appendix 2 for a list of anterior segment surgeries. 
 
Definition of risk of surgical and diagnostic procedures 
 
L11. The risk of iatrogenic transmission of CJD/vCJD during a surgical or diagnostic 
procedure is dependent on the risk of tissue infectivity and the nature of the procedure 
itself.  
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L12. Any posterior segment eye surgery or procedure is considered high risk.  
 
L13. Any anterior segment eye surgery or procedure is considered low risk. 
 
L14. The absence of any detectable abnormal prion protein in anterior segment tissue, the 
paucity of epidemiological evidence supporting iatrogenic transmission through anterior 
segment surgery and only a single definite case of iatrogenic transmission through 
corneal transplantation in 1974 (it is possible that the corneal tissue was contaminated 
by posterior segment tissue during processing) has led the ACDP TSE Working Group 
and its Ophthalmology Subgroup to propose anterior segment surgery or procedures as 
low risk for iatrogenic transmission. 
 
L15. The stratification of surgery and diagnostic procedures into high and low risk of infectivity 
has various implications for the management of patients and instruments. These 
implications are detailed in this guidance. 
 
Assessment of CJD/vCJD risk 
 
L16. A local level policy should be put in place to ensure that all patients with or at increased 
risk of CJD/vCJD are identified before ophthalmic surgery to allow the appropriate 
infection controls to be followed. 
 
L17. The ACDP TSE Working Group has issued advice for the assessment of patients’ risk of 
CJD and vCJD before elective or emergency surgery and endoscopy in Annex J of their 
guidance.  The following guidance for ophthalmic patients should be read in conjunction 
with Annex J. 
 
L18. Any patient symptomatic of CJD/vCJD or considered at increased risk of CJD/vCJD 
should have their status recorded in their primary healthcare records. The GP should 
always include this information when referring patients for ophthalmic care. The clinical 
team undertaking pre-surgical assessment should check the patient’s medical notes 
and/or referral information for any mention of CJD/vCJD status 
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Assessment for all elective and emergency ophthalmic surgery 
L19. Annex J recommends that all patients about to undergo any elective or emergency 
surgery should be asked the question: 
 “Have you ever been notified that you are at increased risk of CJD or vCJD for 
public health purposes?” 
 The actions to be taken following the patient’s response to the above question are 
outlined in paragraph J2 of Annex J. 
Ophthalmic units should therefore ensure that all patients are asked this question prior to 
any elective or emergency ophthalmic surgery. 
 
Additional assessment for posterior segment surgery 
L20. Annex J also recommends that those patients about to undergo surgery which may 
involve contact with tissues of potentially high level TSE infectivity (“high risk tissues”) 
should be assessed for CJD/vCJD risk through a set of detailed questions relating to 
possible exposure to CJD/vCJD outlined in Table J1 (see over).  For ophthalmic 
patients, only posterior segment eye surgery or procedures are defined as high 
risk, as outlined in section L3 of this document and listed in Appendix 1. Ophthalmic 
units should therefore ensure that patients about to undergo a posterior segment eye 
procedure or surgery should be asked the CJD risk questions in Table J1 of Annex J 
(see over). Paragraph J6 of Annex J outlines the action to take based on the patient’s 
responses. 
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Annex J Table J1 – CJD risk questions for patients about to undergo elective or 
emergency surgical or neuro-endoscopic procedures likely to involve contact with 
tissues of potentially high level infectivity 
 
 Question to Patient Notes to clinician 
1  Have you a history of CJD or 
other prion disease in your 
family? If yes, please specify. 
Patients should be considered to be at increased risk 
from genetic forms of CJD if they have or have had: 
i) Genetic testing, which has indicated that they are at 
significant risk of developing CJD or other prion disease; 
ii) A blood relative known to have a genetic mutation 
indicative of genetic CJD or other prion disease; 
iii) 2 or more blood relatives affected by CJD or other 
prion disease 
2  Have you ever received 
growth hormone or 
gonadotrophin treatment? 
If yes, please specify: 
i) whether the hormone was 
derived from human 
pituitary glands 
ii) the year of treatment 
iii) whether the treatment 
was received in the UK or 
in another country 
Recipients of hormone derived from human pituitary 
glands, e.g. growth hormone or gonadotrophin, have 
been identified as at increased risk of sporadic CJD. 
In the UK, the use of human-derived growth hormone 
was discontinued in 1985 but human-derived products 
may have continued to be used in other countries. 
In the UK, the use of human-derived gonadotrophin was 
discontinued in 1973 but may have continued in other 
countries after this time. 
3  Have you ever had surgery on 
your brain or spinal cord? 
(a) Patients who underwent intradural neurosurgical or 
spinal procedures before August 1992 may have 
received a graft of human-derived dura mater and 
should be treated as at increased risk, unless evidence 
can be provided that human-derived dura mater was not 
used. Patients who received a graft of human-derived 
dura mater before 1992 are at increased risk of 
transmission of sporadic CJD, but not vCJD.  
(b) NICE guidance emphasises the need for a separate 
pool of new neuroendoscopes and reusable surgical 
instruments for high risk procedures on children born 
since 1st January 1997 and who have not previously 
undergone high risk procedures. These instruments 
and neuroendoscopes should not be used for patients 
born before 1st January 1997 or those who underwent 
high risk procedures using reusable instruments before 
the implementation of this guidance.             [continued] 
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4 Since 1980, have you had any 
transfusions of blood or blood 
components (red cells, 
plasma, cryoprecipitate or 
platelets*)? 
If yes, have you either: 
i) received more than 50 
units of blood or blood 
components? or 
ii) received blood or blood 
components on more than 
20 occasions? 
Where possible, please 
provide the names of all the 
hospitals where you received 
blood or blood components. 
Patients who have received blood from more than 80 
donors have been identified as at increased risk of 
vCJD. Information on this notification is available from 
the HPA: 
http://www.hpa.org.uk/vCJDpresurgicalassessment  
* This does not include: 
• Autologous transfusion 
• Plasma products such as IVIG, albumin, 
coagulation factors and anti-D 
 
L21. Ophthalmic units with a mixed case load of anterior and posterior segment surgeries and 
procedures may wish to ask the questions in Table J1 of Annex J to all their patients for 
practical reasons. This is a local decision. 
 
L22. As a separate pool of new posterior segment surgical instruments should be used for 
children born since 1 January 1997, and who have not previously undergone high risk 
procedures (see paragraph L38), it is important to correctly and reliably identify patients 
born since 1 January 1997 and ensure that they have had no previous high risk surgery 
which may have exposed them to risk of CJD/vCJD. 
 
Emergency surgery 
L23. Guidance on what to do if a patient about to undergo emergency surgery is physically or 
otherwise unable to answer any questions is included in paragraphs J7-J10 of Annex J. 
 
Diagnostic examination, instruments and contact lenses 
 
L24. There have been no known cases of iatrogenic transmission of CJD/vCJD resulting from 
diagnostic examination or contact lens wear. Although contact with the cornea is 
considered as low risk in terms of iatrogenic transmission of CJD/vCJD any steps that 
can further reduce potential risk of iatrogenic transmission are to be encouraged. A 
balance between pragmatism and a precautionary approach has been reached in the 
following advice. 
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L25. Instruments and contact lenses considered within this section include: 
• Soft refractive and therapeutic contact lenses 
• Rigid trial contact lenses, both corneal and scleral 
• Tonometer prisms (Goldmann) and other contact tonometry devices 
• Diagnostic contact lenses such as gonioscopes, fundus lenses, 3-mirror 
lenses 
• Contact lenses used in therapy, often in conjunction with laser treatment, for 
example in capsulotomy, iridotomy, trabeculoplasty, retinopexy 
• A- and B-scan ultrasound probes 
• Electronic pachymeters 
• Electrodes used in electrodiagnostic procedures such as electroretinography 
• Prosthetic devices including trial or temporary artificial eyes 
 
L26. The use of single-use instruments or contact lenses is recommended for use on those 
designated at increased risk of CJD or vCJD. Alternatively, the instruments or contact 
lenses should be quarantined and used solely on that individual patient. This latter 
approach could be problematic in ensuring mandatory sole use and thus the single-use 
instrument approach is considered more practical in these circumstances. 
 
L27. The practice of single-use instruments or contact lenses for examination should be 
encouraged for other patients where cost and quality are acceptable. Several examples 
already exist in practice where potential iatrogenic transmission is reduced: 
• Many services have adopted the use of disposable tonometry systems for 
intraocular pressure measurements in general settings and reserving 
reusable Goldmann tonometry for glaucoma clinics 
• The use of non-contact biometry systems, for example IOLMaster 
• The widespread use of soft trial contact lenses and therapeutic lenses 
 
L28. This approach may not be practical for more specialised or complex instrumentation 
such as laser contact lenses and ultrasound probes. 
 
L29. If reusable instruments or contact lenses are to be used it is imperative that they are 
cleaned and decontaminated in an acceptable and consistent way. Previous guidance 
regarding cleaning and decontamination of lenses and tonometry prisms involving 
20,000ppm sodium hypochlorite is poorly adhered to, practised incorrectly (for example 
keeping tonometers wet after decontamination, varying concentrations of hypochlorite, 
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not changing the hypochlorite frequently enough) and carries the added risk of corneal 
burns.  
 
L30. Generic guidance regarding cleaning, decontamination and storage of reusable 
instruments or contact lenses is outlined in Appendix 3. This generic advice includes 
disinfection steps to reduce significantly the problem of cross infection by conventional 
organisms such as viruses and bacteria, and thorough washing steps to reduce the level 
of residual protein and possible prion infectivity. The combination of measures is 
designed to reduce possible prion load and be practical in terms of risk reduction rather 
than risk elimination. Further guidance is available in the Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists publication “Ophthalmic Instrument Decontamination”: 
     http://www.rcophth.ac.uk/docs/profstands/ophthalmic-services/DecontaminationApril2008.pdf 
 
L31. It is accepted that the guidance in Appendix 3 may be difficult to adhere to in busy 
ophthalmic clinics. However it is important that it is followed, to reduce the risk of 
iatrogenic disease transmission. Pragmatic solutions to aid ophthalmic practitioners in 
this area include: 
• Having a large subset of instruments (for example Goldmann tonometry 
prisms) which are used once each during a clinic, and following use are 
rinsed and kept wet. They can then be cleaned and decontaminated 
collectively at end of the clinic, according to the protocol in Appendix 3 
• The possibility of using wholly disposable or non-contact systems for 
examination 
• Encouraging procurement of non-contact or disposable covers for certain 
equipment, for example pachymeters or ultrasound probes 
• Discussion with the local infection control team, decontamination team and/or 
microbiologist should be encouraged to promote best practice 
 
L32. The practice of decontaminating tonometers with alcohol wipes alone is not 
sufficient to remove prion material, and may in fact fix the prion protein to the 
surface of the instrument. 
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Surgical management  
Posterior segment eye surgery  
 
Posterior segment eye surgery on patients with, or at increased risk of, CJD or vCJD 
L33. Where possible, procedures should be performed with the minimum number of 
healthcare personnel required and at the end of the list, to allow normal cleaning of 
theatre surfaces before the next session.  
 
L34. Single use instruments should be used if available provided they do not compromise the 
standard of clinical care. Following use, destroy all single-use items by incineration. This 
advice is also relevant to any instrument used during diagnostic procedures for such a 
patient. 
 
L35. If reusable instruments are used they may be quarantined strictly for repeated use on 
the same patient.  Facilities must be stringent for storage, identification and isolation of 
such instruments. Detailed guidance on the procedure for quarantining instruments, 
including initial washing to remove gross soil is available in Annex E of this guidance. If 
such instruments are to be reused on the same patient, they should be kept separate 
from other instruments whilst being cleaned and decontaminated e.g. in a separate 
basket in the washer disinfector. Alternatively the instruments must be disposed of by 
incineration. 
 
 
L36. In cases of suspected CJD/vCJD the instruments can be quarantined as outlined above 
and returned to use after standard decontamination if a definitive alternative diagnosis is 
confirmed.   
 
Posterior segment eye surgery on individuals not known to be infected and not at 
increased risk of CJD or vCJD 
L37. The NICE interventional procedure guidance 196 “Patient safety and reduction of risk of 
transmission of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD) via interventional procedures”, 
published in November 2006, states several important interventions that are specific to 
high risk posterior segment surgery. The guidance can be accessed here: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/pdf/ip/IPG196guidance.pdf.  Specifically, it states that, 
for high risk surgical procedures (intradural operations on the brain and operations on 
the retina or optic nerve – ‘high risk tissues’): 
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• “Steps should be taken urgently to ensure that instruments that come into 
contact with high risk tissues do not move from one set to another. Practice 
should be audited and systems should be put in place to allow surgical 
instruments to be tracked, as required by Health Service Circular 2000/032: 
‘Decontamination of medical devices’ and described in the NHS 
Decontamination Strategy” 
• “Supplementary instruments that come into contact with high risk tissues 
should either be single-use or should remain with the set to which they have 
been introduced. Hospitals should ensure without delay that an adequate 
supply of instruments is available to meet both regular and unexpected 
needs” 
 
L38. Pragmatic advice with regard to implementation of the NICE interventional procedure 
guidance 196 is outlined below: 
 
a) Definition of the surgical set 
i) The definition of a surgical set for posterior segment eye surgery is critical in 
implementing the NICE interventional procedure guidance 196. The greatest 
risk comes from instruments in contact with posterior segment tissues; 
however, splashes of vitreous or Hartmans’s solution could theoretically carry 
infectivity to more distant locations 
ii) The surgical set is defined as any instrument that comes into contact 
with the eye during a procedure 
iii) Cryoprobes are considered part of the surgical set, but it may not be feasible 
to have a separate cryoprobe for each set. A pragmatic approach to this 
problem would be to ally a cryoprobe to specific sets to limit migration. For 
example, cryoprobe A would be used with sets 1, 2 and 3; cryoprobe B would 
be used with sets 4, 5 and 6, and so on. Alternatively, the use of indirect laser 
or the use of single-use endo-laser probes may be recommended 
iv) Contact lenses used during surgery, irrigating or free standing, should also 
be defined as part of the set 
v) Microscope or other non-contact indirect viewing systems, for example 
EIBOS or BIOM, are not considered part of the surgical set 
 
b) Zero migration of instruments 
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i) Where reusable sets are used in high risk posterior segment surgery, zero 
migration of instruments must be adhered to and stringent tracking systems 
put in place 
ii) It is estimated that the incidence of at least one instrument migrating into or 
out of a surgical set is as high as 50%. This high level of migration of 
instruments during high risk posterior segment surgery has the potential to 
promote a self-sustaining epidemic of CJD or vCJD 
iii) Alternative pragmatic approaches to zero migration of instruments are 
outlined below: 
• Provision of large surgical sets covering all surgical eventualities 
• Provision of small surgical sets covering most surgical eventualities with 
the use of disposable instruments as supplements when required 
• Provision of small surgical sets covering most surgical eventualities with 
the use of reusable instruments as supplements when required which 
stay with the new surgical set. Sufficient quantities of additional 
instruments will need to be purchased to allow for immediate availability 
of supplementary instruments if required or if instruments in sets are 
found to be defective or become unsterile during procedures 
• Provision of small surgical sets covering most surgical eventualities with 
the use of clearly labelled reusable instruments as supplements, which 
are allied to a particular subset of surgical sets, and can be confidently 
tracked (e.g. cryoprobes) 
• Exclusive use of single-use instrumentation. This is now possible for 
most, if not all, posterior segment surgical cases including external 
buckling surgery. When procuring single-use instruments it is imperative 
that the quality and performance of these instruments be equivalent to 
those of reusable instruments with appropriate procurement, quality 
control and audit mechanisms in place. Further advice is found in 
Appendix 4 of this document  
 
 
 
c) Posterior segment surgery on children born since 1 January 1997 
i) The NICE interventional procedure guidance 196 specifically advises the 
following on this issue: 
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“A separate pool of new neuroendoscopes and reusable surgical instruments for 
high risk procedures should be used for children born since 1 January 1997 (who 
are unlikely to have been exposed to BSE in the food chain or CJD through a 
blood transfusion) and who have not previously undergone high risk procedures. 
These instruments and neuroendoscopes should not be used for patients born 
before 1 January 1997 or those who underwent high risk procedures before the 
implementation of this guidance.” 
ii) It is therefore important to identify patients born since 1 January 1997 and 
make sure that they have had no previous high risk surgery which may have 
exposed them to risk of CJD 
iii) A separate pool of new instruments should be used on this group of patients. 
However, it is important that this particular set does not become potentially 
infected through migration of other instruments into it, or its inadvertent use 
on patients born before 1 January 1997. This can be difficult to achieve 
confidently and thus it may be more practical in this group of patients to use 
single-use instruments. Where single-use alternatives are not practical, for 
example expensive instrumentation such as cryoprobes, mechanisms for the 
tracking, identification and storage of the new pool of reusable instruments 
should be stringent. 
 
Anterior segment eye surgery  
 
Low risk anterior segment eye surgery on individuals with, or at increased risk of, CJD or 
vCJD 
L39. Although no special precautions such as quarantining or incinerating instruments is 
mandatory in these cases the general principles of reducing instrument migration and 
stringent tracking systems are encouraged.  
 
L40. Due to the uncertainties of potential inadvertent contamination with tissues of high risk 
status during surgery then individual case by case assessment is required. In some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to follow the precautionary guidance outlined for 
high risk posterior segment eye surgery (see paragraphs L33-37).  
 
 
Low risk anterior segment eye surgery on individuals not known to be infected and not at 
increased risk of CJD or vCJD 
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L41. If any of the surgical procedures on low risk anterior segment eye tissues are 
complicated by surgery involving instruments coming into contact with the optic nerve or 
retinal tissue, the procedure should be considered as surgery on high risk posterior 
segment eye tissue. 
 
L42. Although NICE guidance 196 specifically refers to ensuring zero migration of instruments 
in high risk posterior segment eye surgery it is considered desirable and good practice to 
limit migration of instruments between sets for low risk anterior segment eye surgery.  
 
L43. Since Health Service Circular 2000/032: ‘Decontamination of medical devices’ all 
instrument trays must be identifiable and traceable. Tracking of all instruments or 
instrument trays is essential. 
 
L44. Cleaning and decontamination of re-useable instruments should follow the 
decontamination advice outlined in paragraphs L54-55. 
 
Ocular Tissue Transplantation 
 
L45. The issue of ocular tissue transplantation is often confusing with regards to CJD risk 
assessment and actions required to reduce potential iatrogenic transmission. When 
assessing the risk, one must consider the nature of the surgical procedure (i.e. does the 
surgery involve high risk posterior segment surgery or low risk anterior segment surgery) 
and the potential infectivity of the donor material. 
 
Transplant surgical procedure 
L46. If  the transplant surgical procedure involves high risk posterior segment surgery as 
defined in paragraph L10a then the precautions for high risk posterior segment surgery 
outlined in paragraphs L33-39 should be followed (e.g. potential future retinal pigment 
epithelium/retinal transplantation).  
 
L47.  If the transplant surgical procedure involves low risk anterior segment surgery as defined 
in paragraph L10b then the precautions for low risk anterior segment surgery outlined in 
paragraphs L40-45 should be followed (e.g. corneal transplantation). 
 
L48. If allogeneic sclera is used as part of a surgical procedure (e.g. glaucoma tube surgery), 
the procedure is considered to be high risk posterior segment surgery because the 
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donor allogeneic sclera may have been in direct contact with the retina and optic nerve 
during processing. Thus the precautions for high risk posterior segment eye surgery 
should be used as outlined in paragraphs L33-39. 
 
Potential infectivity of the donor material and recipient status 
L49. On the currently available evidence, the risk of an ocular tissue donor in the UK having 
CJD/vCJD lies between 1.3 and 6.0 per 45 000. This risk is far less than the 1% 
threshold level of risk used by the CJD Incidents Panel to determine whether an 
individual would be considered as at increased risk of CJD/vCJD. Therefore, transplant 
recipients of: 
• cornea 
• limbal tissue 
• sclera 
• amniotic membrane  
• ocular stem cells 
should not be designated as at increased risk of CJD/vCJD due to iatrogenic exposure. 
The same will apply to recipients of retina and retinal pigment epithelium allograft if and 
when such procedures become available. 
However, it must be noted that a recipient of any tissue or organ, including the 
above ocular tissues or cells, may not become a blood, tissue or organ donor. 
Organ donation from such individuals is not completely ruled out, but is 
considered on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Records management 
L50. Completion and return of the corneal, limbal and scleral transplant record and follow-up 
forms to NHSBT in a timely manner is a professional duty of ophthalmic surgeons, as 
stipulated by The Professional Standards Committee of the Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists. 
 
L51. NHSBT, specifically the National Transplant Database maintained by ODT (Organ 
Donation and Transplantation), holds ocular tissue transplant records including donor 
and recipient details, the transplant record form and the transplant follow-up forms, 
which include the incidence of serious adverse reactions. If an ocular tissue transplant is 
not recorded on the National Transplant Database, the transplanting surgeon and the 
surgeon’s hospital are legally responsible for ensuring the traceability of the tissue and 
maintenance of the two-way audit trail between donor and recipient.  
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L52. It is a statutory requirement under the Human Tissue (Quality and Safety for Human 
Application) Regulations 2007 for eye banks to maintain records for a minimum of 30 
years. 
 
L53. A serious adverse events and reactions reporting mechanism has been developed by 
the Ocular Tissue Advisory Group (OTAG) and implemented by NHSBT for all ocular 
tissue transplants. This complements the statutory reporting mechanism for serious 
adverse reactions and events through the Human Tissue Authority. Forms are provided 
to the transplant surgeon with the tissue to be transplanted and should be retained in the 
patient’s case notes.  If at any stage a serious adverse reaction should occur (such as 
the development of CJD in the recipient) the reporting mechanism is commenced. The 
transplant follow-up forms also include a question regarding the occurrence of serious 
adverse reactions.  Audit reports regarding issues of transplantation are reported to the 
Ocular Tissue Advisory Group. 
 
Decontamination of surgical instruments 
 
L54. Advice regarding decontamination of ophthalmic surgical instruments is available from 
the Royal College of Ophthalmologists publication “Ophthalmic Instrument 
Decontamination”: 
      http://www.rcophth.ac.uk/docs/profstands/ophthalmic-services/DecontaminationApril2008.pdf 
and from the forthcoming HTM01 01 series of documents (HTM01 01 A, B, C, D) which 
will cover, in detail, the decontamination of reusable medical and surgical devices. 
 
L55. The following key points are considered in the above guidance: 
 
a) Generic principles exist for the post-surgical handling/decontamination of ophthalmic 
instruments: 
i) their fine fragile nature which makes them prone to damage during cleaning 
processes 
ii) Fine bores which are difficult to clean 
iii) Instruments from single sets often require separation for cleaning and 
decontamination 
b) Generic advice for cleaning and decontamination includes: 
i) Proper tracking systems for all ophthalmic instruments 
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ii) Maintain integrity of sets throughout the cleaning and decontamination 
process 
iii) Keep instruments moist following surgery and prior to washing (this can be 
achieved either by use of sprays, mists or immersion – each of these have 
their own logistic issues) 
iv) Thorough cleaning in washer-disinfectors 
v) Promote use of specific washer-disinfector systems for ophthalmic 
instruments 
vi) Work closely with the decontamination manager within the unit to identify 
issues and highlight training for staff involved in cleaning and 
decontamination 
vii) Validation of systems within the unit and off-site Central Sterile Services 
Department (CSSD) 
c) Good practice examples of cleaning and decontamination practices in UK and 
abroad should be highlighted 
 
CJD incident management 
 
L56. In relation to ophthalmology, a CJD incident occurs when there is a possibility that a 
patient or patients could have been exposed to CJD/vCJD through contaminated 
surgical instruments that were previously used on a patient with, or at increased risk of, 
CJD/vCJD. Such incidents occur 6-14 times per year (mean 9.7 times) in UK ophthalmic 
units. 
 
L57. The CJD Incidents Panel advises on how to manage these incidents, and how to 
manage patients who could have been exposed to CJD/vCJD.  Local infection control 
teams and health protection teams should seek advice from the CJD Incidents Panel on 
how to manage these incidents. Information sheets for clinicians and patients on 
CJD/vCJD can be found at: http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJD  
 
L58. All incidents should be reported to the CJD Incidents Panel secretariat: 
The CJD Incidents Panel Secretariat, Health Protection Agency – Centre for Infections, 
61 Colindale Avenue, London NW9 5EQ 
Tel: 020 8327 6411, Email: cjd@hpa.org.uk,  
L59. The website http://www.hpa.org.uk/CJDIncidentsPanel includes the CJD Incidents Panel 
framework document which sets out the principles of managing CJD incidents, and also 
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describes the risk assessment models that underpin the risk management of surgical 
and blood incidents. 
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Appendix 1 
Surgical procedures regarded as High Risk Posterior Segment Eye 
Surgery 
 
Orbit (C01-C08)  
C01 Excision of eye  
C03  Insertion of prosthesis of eye  
C04  Attention to prosthesis of eye  
These orbital operations are only included if the surgery or implant is likely to come into contact 
with the optic nerve or retinal tissue (for example, evisceration of the eye and intra-orbital 
implant) 
 
Operations on Optic Nerve (A29.1–A36.4) 
A29.1 Excision of lesion of optic nerve 
A30.1 Repair of optic nerve 
A32.1 Decompression of optic nerve 
A34.1 Exploration of optic nerve 
A36.4 Radial Optic Neurotomy 
 
Sclera and iris (C52-C65)  
C54  Buckling operations for attachment of retina  
 
Retina, other parts of eye and anaesthetics (C79-C90)  
C79  Operations on vitreous body (only when this involves potential contact with the posterior 
hyaloid face). For example: 
 Codes C7910 for vitrectomy via anterior approach and C7923 for intravitreal 
injections are specifically excluded as they are unlikely to come into contact with 
posterior hyaloid face 
 Codes C7920 and C7922, which potentially could come into contact with hyaloid 
face, are included 
C80  Operations on retinal membrane  
C81  Photocoagulation of retina for detachment (only when the retina is handled directly) 
C82  Destruction of lesion of retina (only when retina is handled directly). For example: 
 Code C82.4 for insertion of radiotherapy plaques is specifically excluded 
C83  Translocation of retina  
C84  Other operations on retina  
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C85  Fixation of retina  
C86  Other operations on eye  
C88  Destruction of subretinal lesion  
C89  Operations on posterior segment of eye  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe Working and the Prevention of Infection: Annex L 
 
 
Published: 4 September 2009 
Updated: January 2011 
22 
Appendix 2 
Surgical procedures regarded as Low Risk Anterior Segment Eye 
Surgery 
Orbit (C01-C08)  
C02 Extirpation of lesion of orbit  
C05  Plastic repair of orbit  
C06  Incision of orbit  
C08  Other operations on orbit  
These orbital operations are only considered low risk if the surgery is unlikely to come into 
contact with the optic nerve (for example, drainage of orbit C0620 or retrobulbar injection 
C0840) 
 
Eyebrow and eyelid (C09-C22)  
C09  Replacement of canthal tendon  
C10  Operations on eyebrow  
C11  Operations on canthus  
C12  Extirpation of lesion of eyelid  
C13  Excision of redundant skin of eyelid  
C14  Reconstruction of eyelid  
C15  Correction of deformity of eyelid  
C16  Other plastic repair of eyelid  
C17  Other repair of eyelid  
C18  Correction of ptosis of eyelid  
C19  Incision of eyelid  
C20  Protective suture of eyelid  
C22  Other operations on eyelid  
 
Lacrimal apparatus (C24-C29)  
C24  Operations on lacrimal gland  
C25  Connection between lacrimal apparatus and nose  
C26  Other operations on lacrimal sac  
C27  Operations on nasolacrimal duct  
C29  Other operations on lacrimal apparatus  
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Muscles of eye (C31-C37)  
C31  Combined operations on muscles of eye  
C32  Recession of muscle of eye  
C33  Resection of muscle of eye  
C34  Partial division of tendon of muscle of eye  
C35  Other adjustment to muscle of eye  
C37  Other operations on muscle of eye  
 
Conjunctiva and cornea (C39-C51)  
C39  Extirpation of lesion of conjunctiva  
C40  Repair of conjunctiva  
C41  Incision of conjunctiva  
C43  Other operations on conjunctiva  
C45  Extirpation of lesion of cornea  
C46  Plastic operations on cornea  
C47  Closure of cornea  
C48  Removal of foreign body from cornea  
C49  Incision of cornea  
C51  Other operations on cornea  
 
Sclera and iris (C52-C65)  
C52  Excision of sclera  
C53  Extirpation of lesion of sclera  
C55 Incision of sclera  
C57  Other operations on sclera  
C59  Excision of iris  
C60  Filtering operations on iris  
C61  Other operations on trabecular meshwork of eye  
C62  Incision of iris  
C64  Other operations on iris  
C65  Operations following glaucoma surgery  
 
Anterior chamber of eye and lens (C66-C77)  
C66  Extirpation of ciliary body  
C67  Other operations on ciliary body  
C69  Other operations on anterior chamber of eye  
C71  Extracapsular extraction of lens  
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C72  Intracapsular extraction of lens  
C73 Incision of capsule of lens  
C74  Other extraction of lens  
C75  Prosthesis of lens  
C77  Other operations on lens  
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Appendix 3 
Guidance for the cleaning and disinfection (decontamination) of rigid 
contact lenses and ophthalmic medical devices which come into 
contact with the outer surface of the eye 
 
1. The lens or device should be decontaminated immediately after contact with the eye 
surface.  It should not be allowed to dry at this stage. 
 
2. It should be rinsed in Water for Irrigation BP for not less than 30 sec. 
 
3. It should then be cleaned on all surfaces with a liquid soap or detergent, then rinsed in 
Water for Irrigation BP for a further 30 sec.  
 
4. The lens or device should then be immersed in a freshly-prepared solution of sodium 
hypochlorite providing 10,000ppm of available chlorine for 10 min.   
 
5. It should then be rinsed in three changes of Water for Irrigation BP for a total of not less 
than 10 min. 
 
6. The device should then be shaken to remove excess water, dried with a disposable tissue, 
and stored dry in a suitable container. 
 
7. Any further measure (such as autoclaving) can then be carried out, if this is necessary and 
if the device is designed to withstand such a process.  Otherwise, it is ready for immediate 
re-use. 
 
8. Other chemical agents should not be used unless the device manufacturer advises 
against the use of sodium hypochlorite.  However, agents or procedures capable of 
binding proteins to surfaces (e.g. isopropyl alcohol, glutaraldehyde, autoclaving) should 
never be used, unless devices are first decontaminated according the above protocol. 
 
9. The procedure described above is suitable for the great majority of devices manufactured 
from PMMA, glass or non-ferrous metals.  Where other materials are used, the 
manufacturer’s advice should be sought. 
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Notes on steps 1-6 
 
1. If circumstances do not permit the immediate decontamination of a contact lens or device, 
it should be immersed in Water for Irrigation BP contained in a disposable galley-pot, and 
decontaminated as soon as possible thereafter. 
 
2. Most medical devices and instruments are decontaminated with the use of potable 
(drinking) water.  However, this has not been recommended for contact lenses and 
ophthalmic instruments that come into contact with the ocular surface.  This is because of 
the risk of contamination with Acanthamoeba spp. and is in line with the advice given to 
contact lens wearers, namely never to rinse their lenses or lens cases in tap water, and to 
avoid swimming and showering while wearing their lenses.  The argument that rising 
mains water (as opposed to water from storage tanks) should be safe is not sustainable as 
it has been shown that rising mains pipework can become colonised by Acanthamoeba 
spp. even a short distance from its source. Moreover, in the clinical situation most people 
are unaware of the source of the water available to them at their workstations or in 
preparation rooms, or its distance from the mains supply.  For these reasons, the use of 
tap water has not been recommended in this guidance. 
 
3. The type of liquid soap or detergent is not specified.  Unless the manufacturer publishes 
guidance, the advice of the local Sterile Services Department should be sought.  
Household detergents such as washing up liquid, and surgical scrub solutions, should not 
be used. 
 
4. The sodium hypochlorite solution should be prepared immediately before the episode of 
decontamination.  Such solutions are unstable and the concentration of available chlorine 
diminishes with time, especially in open containers. A recommended alternative to sodium 
hypochlorite solutions is NaDCC (sodium dichloroisocyanurate) which is available as 
tablets which are mixed just before use with a dedicated diluent or with Water for Irrigation 
BP.  NaDCC, like sodium hypochlorite, is a source of hypochlorous acid and hence of 
available chlorine, and is widely used in healthcare environments; for example, dilutions 
giving 10,000 ppm available chlorine are recommended for the decontamination of blood 
spillages. 
The solution should be placed in a disposable plastic galley pot or similar disposable 
container.  This should have a volume of not less than 50ml.  (In the case of certain 
devices that cannot be wholly immersed, that part which comes into contact with the 
ocular surface must be so treated; the same consideration applies to Steps 2, 3 and 5.) 
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5. Starch iodide paper can be used to test the final rinse water.  In the presence of residual 
hypochlorite or chlorine, the paper that is initially white will turn purple. 
 
6. The lens or device will often have its own dedicated case for dry storage, but if not, a 
suitable case will have to be procured. 
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Appendix 4 
Single-use instrumentation in ophthalmology 
 
• The quality and performance of single-use instruments (SUI) should be equivalent to those 
of reusable instruments with appropriate procurement, quality control and audit mechanisms 
in place 
 
• For reusable instruments there is an internal quality control, with instruments noted as faulty 
being either repaired or returned to the manufacturer. A similar process needs to be put in 
place for any SUI that is purchased 
 
• A CE mark is not necessarily a mark of quality of instruments, and quality control of sub-
contractors is often difficult when the number of instruments increases 
 
• Manufacturers need to be encouraged to continue to produce high quality SUIs 
 
• National contracts with manufacturers should be developed 
 
• Quality control mechanisms for SUIs need to be developed which account for procurement, 
manufacturing and packaging. Evidence of this quality control must be clear, transparent 
and easily available to any individual using the SUIs 
 
• A central reporting mechanism is to be encouraged to share information regarding the 
quality of instruments and to publicise this information nationally. This could be formally 
done through the Royal College of Ophthalmologists or via a website where the quality of 
instruments is constantly updated 
 
• When considering the cost effectiveness of SUIs, appropriate costing is required not only for 
the purchase of the instruments but also their disposal. In addition, the potential cost 
savings of provision of reusable instruments and their subsequent decontamination and 
tracking should be taken into account 
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Appendix 5 
List of members of the ACDP TSE Working Group Ophthalmology 
subgroup 
Name Role 
Mr Ian Pearce (Chairman) Consultant Ophthalmologist, Royal Liverpool 
University Hospital 
Professor John Armitage Professorial Research Fellow and Director of 
Tissue Banking, Bristol Eye Hospital 
Professor Roger Buckley Professor of Ocular Medicine, Anglia Ruskin 
University 
Ms Pat Cattini Infection Control Specialist, Royal Brompton 
Hospital 
Ms Cecilia Fenerty Consultant Ophthalmologist, Manchester Royal Eye 
Hospital 
Mr Allan Hidderley Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory 
Agency 
Mr Ken Holmes Northumberland and Tyne and Wear Mental Health 
Trust 
Professor James Ironside Professor of Clinical Neuropathology, University of 
Edinburgh 
Head of the Neuropathology Laboratories, National 
CJD Surveillance Unit 
Professor Don Jeffries Chair of the ACDP TSE Working Group 
 
Mr Stephen Kaye Consultant Ophthalmologist, Royal Liverpool 
University Hospital 
Professor John Lawrenson Professor of Optometry, City University, London 
Mr Raymond Lobo Associate Specialist in Ophthalmology, University 
College Hospital, London 
Ms Gwyneth Morgan Member of the College of Optometry 
Mr Andrew Morrell Consultant Ophthalmologist, St. James's University 
Hospital, Leeds 
Mr Richard Newsom Consultant Ophthalmologist, Southampton 
University Hospital 
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Dr Mike Painter Chair, Engineering and Science Advisory 
Committee into the decontamination of surgical 
instruments including Prion Removal 
Mr David Pryer Chair, CJD Incidents Panel 
Professor Ian Rennie Consultant Ophthalmologist, Royal Hallamshire 
Hospital, Sheffield 
Dr Geoff Ridgway Consultant Microbiologist 
Department of Health Senior Medical Officer 
Professor Peter Shah Consultant Ophthalmologist, Birmingham and 
Midland Eye Centre 
Ms Jackie Shipley Senior Theatre Nurse, Royal Liverpool University 
Hospital 
Mr Alun Tomkinson Consultant ENT Surgeon, University Hospital of 
Wales 
Mr Barrie White Consultant Neurosurgeon, Queen’s Medical Centre, 
Nottingham 
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ANNEX M 
 
MANAGING vCJD RISK IN GENERAL SURGERY AND LIVER 
TRANSPLANTATION 
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Introduction 
 
M1. This guidance aims to provide practical advice for handling instruments that 
come into contact with medium infectivity tissues, involved in liver transplants 
and general surgical procedures, in order to reduce risk of vCJD transmission. It 
applies to all patients with or at increased risk of vCJD undergoing these 
procedures. The guidance has been produced by the Surgical Subgroup 
(membership list included as Appendix 1 of this document) of the ACDP TSE 
Risk Management Sub Group. It has been written in response to clinical 
concerns raised by both general and liver transplant surgeons. 
 
M2.  There is no evidence to suggest that vCJD is spread from person-to-person by 
close contact. However, it is known that transmission can occur, in specific 
situations, associated with medical interventions causing iatrogenic infections. 
Due to the possibility of iatrogenic transmission of vCJD, precautions need to be 
taken for certain procedures in healthcare to reduce the potential risk of 
transmission.  
 
M3. The scientific rationale underlying this guidance is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Scope of this guidance 
 
Type of tissue/surgery 
M4. The potential risk of iatrogenic transmission of vCJD during a surgical or invasive 
diagnostic procedure is dependent on the level of tissue infectivity and the nature 
of the procedure itself. This guidance applies to medium infectivity tissue likely to 
be encountered in general surgical procedures and liver transplantation. These 
include: 
 gut-associated lymphoid tissue 
 lymph nodes and other organised lymphoid tissues containing follicular 
structures 
 appendix 
 spleen 
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 thymus 
 tonsil 
 
This guidance applies to surgical procedures where instruments come into 
contact with the cut surface of such tissues, for example operations involving the 
large and small bowel, the porta hepatis and axillary or cervical lymph nodes. It 
does not apply to procedures where only lymphatic channels are cut. See Annex 
A1 for further information on tissue infectivity. 
 
M5. Olfactory epithelium and spinal ganglia are not included in this Annex as these 
tissues are not usually encountered in general or liver transplant surgery. Refer 
to Table 4d (Part 4) for guidance on the handling of instruments which may come 
into contact with these tissues. 
 
Patient groups 
M6. This guidance applies to: 
 Patients who have been identified as being at increased risk of vCJD as 
defined in Table 4a (Part 4);  
 Symptomatic patients with probable or definite vCJD.  
It does not relate to patients with or at increased risk of, other prion diseases 
such as familial CJD and sporadic or iatrogenic CJD. For guidance on handling 
instruments used on these patient groups see Table 4c (Part 4). 
 
M7. Annex J of the ACDP TSE Risk Management Sub Group guidance recommends 
that all patients about to undergo any surgery or endoscopy should be asked if 
they have ever been notified that they are at increased risk of vCJD. Annex J 
recommends that more detailed risk assessment questions should be asked of 
those patients who are undergoing high risk procedures. This Annex M applies to 
any patients presenting for general surgery and liver transplantation identified as 
at increased risk of vCJD through the initial question ‘have you ever been notified 
that you are at increased risk of CJD or vCJD for public health purposes’ only. 
These patients should not be asked any additional screening questions. 
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Surgical management  
 
Elective surgery 
M8. Any patient to whom this guidance applies should be identified at pre-surgical 
assessment. When any such patient has been identified, thought should be given 
to minimising the risks and costs involved in the planned surgical procedure. 
Communication with relevant individuals should be undertaken and this should 
include a discussion on the choice of instrumentation. For example, instruments 
could be streamed (see M9 for more detail) or single use (i.e. disposable) 
instruments could be procured. 
 
Note: The quality of any alternative instruments should, however, be no less 
than those which would normally be used. 
 
Streaming instruments 
M9. Instruments may be streamed into those for incineration/quarantine or those that 
may be reprocessed. Instruments that have been in direct contact with the cut 
surface of medium infectivity tissues (see M4 above) should be regarded as 
potentially contaminated with the TSE agent.  If possible, they should be 
separated from other instruments that have only come into contact with the 
external surface of medium or low infectivity tissues. Such instruments should 
either be incinerated after use or quarantined for re-use exclusively on the same 
patient. Instruments that have not been in direct contact with the cut surface 
of medium infectivity tissues may be reprocessed. Staff should liaise with the 
local sterile services provider to ensure that quarantined instruments are 
appropriately labelled and stored and also to ensure that destroyed instruments 
are replaced. The detail of how this is achieved will depend on local 
circumstances; the final decision rests with the local Infection Control Team. 
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Staffing levels 
M10. Consideration should be given to increasing staffing, for example having two 
scrub nurses present to help identify and manage instruments that have not 
come into contact with the cut surface of lymph nodes. The role of one of the 
scrub nurses would be to manage the instruments which have been in contact 
with the cut surface of lymph nodes. A local policy should be in place to clarify 
these roles. 
 
Emergency surgery 
M11. In emergency surgery performed on a patient who has been notified they are at 
increased risk of vCJD, single use disposable instruments should be employed 
where possible. It is important that these instruments are of appropriate quality to 
deliver safe care. If the instruments used were not designed for single use, they 
should be incinerated following use. 
 
General 
M12. All instruments should be kept moist prior to being sent for conventional 
decontamination and reprocessing. There are a variety of methods, for example 
gels, sprays and use of wet towels, that could be applied to keep instruments 
moist; the choice of the exact method used rests with the local Infection Control 
Team following local risk assessment. 
M13. Instruments quarantined may, following conventional decontamination, be made 
available for reuse exclusively on the same patient. The instrument set should be 
reprocessed through the sterile services provider in the usual manner. No special 
precautions are necessary because of the high dilution factor involved in the 
washer/disinfection process. 
 
Equipment 
M14. For high cost equipment (e.g. some complex retractors), where it is feasible, 
efforts should be taken to protect the retractor by using physical barriers, for 
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example sheaths and impervious drapes. In cases where only part of the 
instrument has come into contact with the cut surface of medium infectivity 
tissue, where possible, that specific instrument component should be discarded 
or quarantined for reuse exclusively on the same patient. 
M15. The risk from ultrasonic dissectors or division devices used during these 
procedures is negligible.  
 
Potential for the future 
M16. This Annex will be regularly reviewed in the light of new developments in the 
areas of TSEs. In particular, developments in decontamination, single instrument 
labelling to enable tracking, and the possibility of developing instruments using 
materials (e.g. glass and plastic) to which TSEs do not adhere well will be 
considered. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of members of the ACDP TSE Risk Management Sub Group’s Surgical 
subgroup 
 
Name Role 
Dr Adam Fraise (Chairman) Consultant Microbiologist, University Hospital 
Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust 
Professor James Ironside Professor of Clinical Neuropathology, 
University of Edinburgh 
Head of the Neuropathology Laboratories, 
National CJD Surveillance Unit 
Professor Don Jeffries The Late Chair of the ACDP TSE Risk 
Management Sub Group 
Mr Simon Bramhall Consultant Hepato-pancreato-biliary & Liver 
Transplant Surgeon, University Hospital 
Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust 
Mr John Forsythe Clinical director of the Transplant Unit at the 
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh  
Chair of the UK Advisory Committee on the 
Safety of Blood, Tissues & Organs 
Professor John Lumley General surgeon (retired) 
Member of the CJD Incidents Panel 
Mr Thomas Groot-Wassink Gastrointestinal surgeon, Ipswich Hospital NHS 
Trust 
Member of the Association of Surgeons of 
Great Britain and Ireland 
Dr Miles Allison Consultant Gastroenterologist, Royal Gwent 
Hospital, South Wales 
Member of the CJD Incidents Panel 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Scientific rationale 
 
A1. A number of current issues, including the epidemiology of vCJD and 
distribution of prion proteins in tissues, were considered whilst formulating 
these guidelines. These include:  
 The prevalence of asymptomatic infection with vCJD in the UK population is 
uncertain; however, a figure of around 1 in 2,000 is estimated on the basis of 
current evidence. The number of clinical cases of vCJD to date is relatively 
small and all probable and definite cases have occurred in individuals who 
have a MM genotype at codon 129 in the prion protein gene.  There is a 
possibility of further waves of cases in other genetic subgroups; it has been 
suggested that those patients with MV and VV PRNP codon 129 genotypes 
may have longer incubation periods than MM genotypes and that vCJD cases 
in these subgroups may yet be seen. 
 vCJD diagnostics are difficult. No antibody response occurs following 
infection and no PCR-based test is available. At present it is not possible to 
screen for vCJD in asymptomatic individuals, but this is an area of active 
research. 
 TSEs are resistant to conventional forms of decontamination. Procedures 
have been advocated in decontamination guidelines; however these are not 
completely suitable for use on all surgical instruments. Activity against prions 
has been claimed for some enzymes and detergents. These have been 
shown to work however they are difficult to implement in the NHS in a safe 
and practical way. 
 vCJD has a wider distribution of tissue infectivity than other human TSEs. 
Infectivity in lymphoid tissue is present before the onset of neurological 
symptoms, but without a reliable screening method it is impossible to identify 
asymptomatic infected individuals. The incubation period for vCJD is 
unknown, but is estimated to be a period of years. Thus, there is the potential 
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for individuals to be infective and transmit the infection to others (via blood or 
surgical instruments) before being diagnosed with clinical vCJD themselves. 
 It seems likely that exposure to vCJD infectivity will be greater from the cut 
surfaces of lymph nodes than the external surface or lymphatic channels. 
 There have been no known cases of vCJD transmission via surgical 
instruments and no proven transmission of vCJD has occurred via 
instruments used on gut or lymph nodes; however, there is difficulty in 
identifying if transmission has occurred by this route through epidemiological 
studies, primarily because of the long incubation period in vCJD. 
 
The Royal College of Ophthalmologists

In conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens 
TSE Working Group 
CJD Guidance for Ophthalmologists 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) is an invariably fatal human disease caused by a 
pathological accumulation in the brain of an aberrant form of prion protein (PrPSc). 
Sporadic CJD (sCJD) is the most commonly encountered form of the disease with an 
incidence of 1 case per million, thus giving approximately 60 new cases per year in 
the UK. Patients with sCJD are mainly over 60 years of age and as such come into 
contact with ophthalmologists through a range of unrelated ophthalmic conditions or 
because of visual symptoms caused by their condition. 
In 1996, a new form of CJD, now known as variant CJD, was identified in the UK. 
Epidemiological evidence linked the emergence of this disease with the large 
outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in UK cattle; subsequent 
experimental studies found that the transmissible agents in BSE and vCJD have very 
similar biological properties, distinct from those of sporadic CJD. Case control 
studies have found that the most likely route of human exposure to the BSE agent 
was the consumption of BSE-contaminated beef products. 
Although the majority of the human population of the UK may have been exposed to 
PrPSc by ingestion of contaminated beef products at some time until 1996, when 
controls were established, the precise prevalence of preclinical infection of vCJD in 
the UK is unknown. The most reliable evidence suggests a prevalence of up to 
approximately 1 in 4000 population (237 per million). Although the infective risk of 
these preclinical cases is uncertain there is the obvious potential for iatrogenic 
transmission in a significant number of cases. 
Iatrogenic vCJD has been associated with blood transfusion. Treatment with human 
pituitary hormones, dura mater transplantation, contaminated neurosurgical 
instruments/EEG needles, and a single case of corneal transplantation from the US 
in 1974 have been associated with iatrogenic sCJD. There are no other known cases 
of ophthalmic surgery or diagnostic procedure having resulted in CJD transmission 
between patients. 
Examination of ocular tissues from sCJD and vCJD cases have found high levels of 
PrPSc in the retina, comparable to levels with cerebral cortex, and lower levels in the 
optic nerve. However, no detectable levels of PrPSc have been found in cornea, 
RCOphth document reference 2010/PROF/100
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sclera, iris, lens, ciliary body vitreous or choroid. As prion proteins adhere strongly to 
materials including smooth metal surfaces and are not removed entirely by routine 
cleaning and autoclaving then there is the potential for iatrogenic transmission of 
PrPSc particularly during surgery involving the retina and optic nerve. Although the 
fact that PrPSc has not been found in other ocular tissues is reassuring, the most 
likely case of transmission of CJD through corneal transplantation suggests that 
practical precautions during diagnostic and surgical procedures are advisable to 
reduce the risk of iatrogenic transmission. 
Previously, several sources of guidance have been produced to reduce the risk of 
iatrogenic CJD transmission in ophthalmic care by the Medical Devices Agency, the 
College of Optometrists, the Association of British Dispensing Opticians, the Royal 
College of Ophthalmologists and the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE). 
The Advisory Committee for Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) set up a working sub-
group to specifically advise on CJD management in Ophthalmology. The 
membership of this working group consisted of ophthalmologists, optometrists, 
microbiologists, virologists and many other expert members reviewing and assessing 
the available evidence and existing guidance of CJD iatrogenic risk in 
ophthalmology. The purpose of this latest document is to consolidate and update the 
available guidance and offer pragmatic solutions to aid implementation of such 
guidance in a single source document. The guidance can be found at: 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@ab/documen 
ts/digitalasset/dh_104848.pdf ) 
A key aspect of the guidance was to assess the relative tissue infectivity risk status 
for anterior and posterior segment tissues. Previous guidance from ACDP had 
stratified tissue infectivity risk in to high (posterior eye), medium (cornea and anterior 
eye) and low (other ocular tissues). There is little controversy that posterior segment 
tissue should be considered as high risk tissue for CJD infectivity and robust 
adherence to advice on high risk tissue should be promoted. However, the working 
group agreed unanimously that anterior segment tissue should be effectively down 
graded to low infectivity risk. In essence, we now have only 2 infectivity risk states 
(high – for posterior segment tissue and low – for everything else). A similar down 
grading was recently introduced by the Australian Department of Health in December 
2007. This grading now accords with the WHO Guidelines on tissue infectivity 
distribution in transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (2010), which places retina 
and optic nerve in the high-infectivity category and groups cornea with the lower-
infectivity tissues. 
The latest guidance helps clarify some key issues as to which surgery constitutes 
anterior low risk surgery and which should be considered high risk posterior segment 
surgery for purposes of iatrogenic CJD transmission. In addition, there are sections 
covering pre-operative assessment, surgical management of known cases of CJD or 
patients with increased risk of CJD, ocular tissue transplantation and management of 
CJD incidents within an ophthalmic unit (approximately 10 ophthalmic units per year 
in UK). 
RCOphth document reference 2010/PROF/100
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A potential contentious area within the guidance is with respect to 
cleaning/disinfection of ophthalmic lenses and devices. The generic advice includes 
disinfection steps to reduce significantly the problem of cross infection by 
conventional organisms such as viruses and bacteria, and thorough washing steps 
to reduce the level of residual protein and possible prion infectivity. The proposed 
regime is much more involved than that presently practiced in the majority of UK 
ophthalmic units but is considered as an effective method for reducing iatrogenic 
transmission of these organisms and prion protein. Due to the complexity of the 
regime in busy outpatient clinics several pragmatic solutions are identified to aid its 
implementation. 
We hope that this latest guidance is accepted by colleagues as a document to clarify 
many confusing aspects of risk reduction of iatrogenic CJD transmission and aid 
local implementation. 
We would encourage ophthalmic units to work closely with local infection control and 
decontamination units to assess their practices to reduce the risk of iatrogenic 
transmission of CJD without compromising ophthalmic care to their patients. 
The guidance given in Annex L is a distillation of the views of a multidisciplinary 
expert advisory group. This guidance is however advisory. Should individual units 
take the view that the measures in Annex 3 are impractical for whatever reason, then 
they are strongly advised to seek the advice of their Infection Control Advisors and 
draw up a written local policy that is both practical and likely to be effective. The use 
of either Appendix 3 or the local policy should be audited on a regular basis to 
ensure compliance and hence safety, without compromising care of ophthalmic 
patients. 
Mr Ian Pearce 
Chair of ACDP TSE Ophthalmic Sub-Group 
Mr Graham Kirkby 
Chair of Professional Standards, RCOphth 
Prof Don Jeffries 
Chair of ACDP TSE Working Group 
December 2010 
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*This guidance is intended to apply to all forms of human transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy or prion disease 
Funeral arrangements after a CJD* death  
 
Answers to some commonly asked questions  
 
Are there any risks to relatives in viewing the body of a patient who has died with CJD?  
There is no evidence that CJD can be passed from one person to another by contact with the 
skin or hair. Therefore, the body bag can be opened to allow relatives to view the body, and, if 
they wish, have contact with the deceased. The Department of Health (DH) and the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) have both issued advice on this important matter (see link at the 
end of this guidance note). 
 
If an autopsy has been performed are there any additional risks to viewing the body of 
a patient who has died of CJD?  
No, as above, the body bag can be opened to allow relatives to view the body, and, if they 
wish, have contact with the deceased, with no additional risk to either staff or relatives.  
 
Are there any risks to relatives in dressing the body and washing the hair of a patient 
who has died of CJD? 
As above, there is no evidence that CJD can be passed from one person to another by 
contact with the skin or hair. Therefore, the body bag can be opened to allow relatives to 
dress the body and wash the hair.  
 
If an autopsy has been performed are there any additional risks to dressing the body 
and washing the hair of a patient who has died of CJD?  
If an autopsy has been performed, dressing of the body and washing of the hair may be 
performed by relatives under the supervision of mortuary staff or a funeral director, using 
standard infection control measures to minimise risk. 
 
Are there any risks involved in transporting the body of a patient who has died with 
CJD?  
Precautions are required for the transport of people who have died with CJD. The body should 
be transported in a body bag to protect against accidental seepage of body fluids following 
death.  
 
Following a CJD death, can the body be transported within the UK or abroad?  
No additional precautions are needed for transporting the body within the UK.  
 
However, if there is a need to transport the body internationally, it will be necessary to comply 
with the IATA Restricted Articles Regulations and any additional requirements of the individual 
carrier, which should be discussed on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Are special burial or cremation arrangements required for a patient who has died with 
CJD?  
No special arrangements are needed for burial or cremation of a patient with known or 
suspected CJD.  
 
What happens if I encounter problems with the funeral directors and others regarding 
funeral arrangements following a CJD death?  
We are aware that some problems have been encountered in the past with funeral directors 
and others misunderstanding the risks posed from a body of a patient who has died with CJD. 
We appreciate that this can be very upsetting and we hope the information here clarifies the 
situation. In addition, a joint effort has been made by the Health and Safety Executive, the 
CJD Support Network and the Department of Health’s ACDP TSE Working Group to raise 
awareness of the guidance issued by HSE and DH regarding funeral arrangements.  Funeral 
directors may find the following guidance document helpful: 
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/acdp/tseguidance/tseguidance_annexh.pdf
Final  
Alert to Urological Surgeons 
 
TRANSRECTAL PROSTATIC BIOPSY IN MEN AT RISK OF VARIANT CJD 
 
It has come to the attention of the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens’ TSE Working 
Group and the CJD Incidents Panel that some transrectal prostatic biopsies are undertaken by 
means of single use needles passed through the internal lumens of reusable ultrasound 
probes (e.g. BK Medical Triplane, Biplane or Endfire). 
 
The ACDP TSE Working Group categorises surgical and other invasive procedures according to 
their potential for onward transmission of tissue contaminated with abnormal prion protein, the 
putative infective agent in variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD)1. Lymphoid aggregates 
occur in rectal mucosa and submucosa, and have been shown to be contaminated with 
abnormal prion protein in cases of vCJD. There is therefore a potential risk of vCJD cross-
infection during transrectal prostatic biopsy if reusable equipment is employed for this procedure 
on patients at risk of vCJD, because there is no decontamination method that reliably eliminates 
or destroys abnormal prion protein. 
 
It is understood that most transrectal prostatic biopsies are undertaken by means of single use 
needle devices guided by an adjacent ultrasound probe.  As the biopsy instruments are single 
use, there is no reason why such procedures would carry a potential risk of cross-infection. 
 
Therefore the ACDP TSE Working Group and CJD Incidents Panel advise the following: 
 
Patients at risk of vCJD2 requiring transrectal prostatic biopsy should have the procedure 
performed by means of single use equipment that runs alongside (rather than through) 
the ultrasound probe.  Where a unit does not have such equipment and intends to carry 
out a biopsy procedure on a patient at risk of vCJD, their options are as follows: 
 To refer the patient to a unit offering the alternative technique that does not pose a 
risk of contaminating the internal channels with traces of biopsy tissue 
 To borrow the alternative equipment from another unit 
 To undertake the procedure with equipment that has internal biopsy channels and 
then quarantine the reusable components of that equipment after 
decontamination.  It must be accepted that this equipment would be unlikely to 
return to general use, except for dedicated re-use in the same patient. 
 
 
Dr Miles C Allison, Gastroenterology Representative, CJD Incidents Panel and ACDP TSE 
Working Group Endoscopy Subgroup 
Professor Don Jeffries, Chairman of the ACDP TSE Working Group 
Mr David Pryer, Chairman of the CJD Incidents Panel 
                                                 
1
http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/acdp/tseguidance/ 
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 The following patient groups have been notified of their increased risk of subclinical vCJD infection: 
 People who have received blood from someone who went on to develop vCJD  
 People who have given blood to someone who went on to develop vCJD  
 People who have received blood from someone who has also given blood to a patient who went on to develop vCJD  
 People who have had surgery using instruments that had been used on someone who developed vCJD 
 People who have received an organ or tissue from a donor infected with vCJD or at increased risk of vCJD  
 People who have been treated with certain UK sourced plasma products between 1980 and 2001  
It is important to note that new patient groups may be notified in the future of their increased risk of vCJD. 
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Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens 
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents: safe 
working and the prevention of infection 
 
Frequently asked questions 
 
Please note, in the following section the "Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy 
agents: safe working and the prevention of infection" guidelines will be referred to as 
the TSE guidance. 
 
My patient has a history of blood transfusion. Should my patient be considered 
at increased risk of CJD and/or vCJD? 
 
A number of patients have been identified as “at increased risk” of vCJD because of 
their transfusion history.  Around 140 individuals have a direct link/association with 
someone who developed vCJD, through the donation of blood to or receipt of blood 
from them; these individuals have been informed about this risk.  In addition, a larger 
group of individuals are defined as being at increased risk because they have 
received blood or blood components from a large number of blood donors during the 
course of their treatment.  Current risk assessments (1Department of Health, 2013) 
estimate that where an individual has been exposed to around 300 or more blood 
donors since January 1990, public health precautions, including those for surgical 
and endoscopic instruments, should be followed.  It is acknowledged that it may not 
be easy to establish from an individual’s records exactly how many donors have 
provided blood or blood products for an individual so the 300 figure should be used 
as a guide not an exact figure to indicate whether they should be considered at 
increased risk.    
 
My patient has told me that he/she has received large quantities of donated 
blood. Should my patient be considered at increased risk of CJD and/or vCJD? 
A number of patients have been identified as “at increased risk” of CJD or vCJD 
including people who have been designated because of their transfusion history.  
This definition only concerns those who have received blood or blood components 
from 300 or more donors since January 1990.  It is acknowledged that it may not be 
                                                 
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vcjd-and-transfusion-of-blood-components-updated-
risk-assessment 
2 
Revised: January 2014 
easy to establish from an individual’s records exactly how much blood an individual 
has received so the 300 figure should be used as a guide not an exact figure to 
indicate whether they should be considered at increased risk.    
 
My patient has told me that he/she has received hormone treatment. Should my 
patient be considered at increased risk of CJD and/or vCJD? 
Only recipients of human pituitary-derived hormone treatment, for example with 
growth hormone or gonadotrophin, should be regarded as at increased risk of 
sporadic CJD (see details in Table 4a of Part 4 of the TSE guidance). Recipients of 
synthetic hormone treatment are not at risk of either sporadic CJD or vCJD. 
 
The date and place of treatment is important in determining whether the hormone 
was human-derived or synthetic. In the UK, the use of human pituitary-derived 
gonadotrophin was discontinued in 1973 and the use of human pituitary-derived 
growth hormone was discontinued in 1985. However human-derived products may 
have continued to be used in other countries after these dates. 
 
As it is unlikely that human pituitary-derived growth hormone would have contained 
the vCJD infectious agent, recipients should not be considered at increased risk of 
vCJD. 
 
My patient received a human-derived dura mater graft – should he/she be 
considered at increased risk of all forms of CJD including vCJD? 
Patients who received a graft of human-derived dura mater before August 1992 
(when the use of these grafts was discontinued in the UK) are at increased risk of 
sporadic CJD, but not vCJD. 
 
This difference in risk has implications for patient management, in particular 
gastrointestinal endoscopy, due to the difference in tissue infectivities in the 
gastrointestinal tract in CJD and vCJD cases. Annex F of the TSE guidance gives 
advice on endoscopes and CJD/vCJD infection prevention and control. 
 
How can I ensure all my patients are effectively assessed before surgery to 
identify patients with, or at increased risk of, CJD/vCJD? 
Guidance on assessment to be carried before surgery or endoscopy, to identify 
patients with or at increased risk of CJD/vCJD, can be found in Annex J of the TSE 
guidance. 
3 
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This advises that all patients coming in for any surgery or endoscopy should be 
asked if they have been informed that they are at increased risk of CJD/vCJD. 
 
Additionally, those patients coming in for high risk surgical or endoscopy procedures 
(neurosurgery, neuroendoscopy or posterior ophthalmic surgery) should be asked 
specific questions to determine whether they are at increased risk of CJD/vCJD. 
 
Where can I find advice on endoscopes and CJD/vCJD infection prevention 
and control? 
Advice on endoscopes and CJD/vCJD infection prevention and control is given in 
Annex F of the TSE guidance and the accompanying Consensus Statement between 
the British Society of Gastroenterology Decontamination Working Group and the 
ACDP TSE Working Group Endoscopy and vCJD Subgroup. This Annex contains a 
list of endoscopic procedures and their categorisation as ‘invasive’ or ‘non-invasive’. 
This categorisation has implications for the consequent management of the 
instruments used during the procedure. 
 
Please note: if a patient has, or is at increased risk of, sporadic or genetic CJD, 
special precautions do not need to be taken for gastrointestinal endoscopy. Special 
precautions only need to be taken for gastrointestinal endoscopy for patients with, or 
at increased risk of, vCJD. This is because of the difference in tissue infectivities in 
the gastrointestinal tract in CJD and vCJD cases. 
 
Where can I find advice on dialysis and CJD/vCJD infection prevention and 
control? 
Guidance on dialysis and CJD/vCJD will be included in the updated Annex G of the 
TSE guidance that will be published in due course. Please check back to the TSE 
Guidelines webpage to see if the guidance has been published or alternatively 
contact the secretariat, asking for an email alert when this annex is published. If you 
have an urgent query then please contact the ACDP Secretariat. 
 
Where can I find advice on ophthalmology and CJD/vCJD infection prevention 
and control?  
There are a number of guidance documents issued by professional bodies that give 
advice on ophthalmology and CJD/vCJD. 
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Guidance from the ACDP TSE Working Group on ophthalmology and CJD/vCJD will 
be published later in 2009 as a new annex of the TSE guidance. Please check back 
to the TSE Guidelines webpage to see if the guidance has been published or 
alternatively contact the secretariat, asking for an email alert when this annex is 
published. If you have an urgent query then please contact the ACDP Secretariat. 
 
Where can I find advice on dentistry and CJD/vCJD infection prevention and 
control? 
The Chief Dental Officer has written twice to dentists on the issue of dental treatment 
of patients with, or at risk of, CJD. The key points are as follows: 
 
Letter from Chief Dental Officer to dentists in 2005: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Lettersandcirculars/Dearcolleaguel
etters/DH_4102752  
This letter states that the clinical care – including dental care – of patients with or at 
risk of CJD/vCJD, should not be compromised in any way, and that patients are not 
refused routine dental treatment.  
 
Letter from Chief Dental Officer to dentists in 2007: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Lettersandcirculars/Dearcolleaguel
etters/DH_074001  
This letter clarifies the situation with regard to decontamination and re-use of 
instruments, especially those used in endodontic treatment, in the context of vCJD. It 
contains revised advice that dentists are expected to follow. Dentists are advised to 
ensure that: 
 Endodontic reamers and files are treated as single use  
 The highest standards of decontamination are observed for all dental 
instruments  
 Manufacturers’ decontamination instructions are followed for all instruments, 
and where instruments are difficult to clean, single use instruments should be 
used wherever possible  
 
The CJD Incidents Panel also issued an advice note in 2006 on dental treatment on 
patients with, or at risk of, CJD/vCJD:  
http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAwebFile/HPAweb_C/1211788871050 
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Where can I find advice on anaesthesia and CJD/vCJD infection prevention and 
control? 
The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) have recently 
published an update to their 2002 guidance “Infection prevention and control in 
Anaesthesia” which includes a section on prion diseases. This guidance can be 
found here: 
http://www.aagbi.org/publications/guidelines/docs/infection_control_08.pdf   
 
Where can I find advice on decontamination and CJD/vCJD? 
Annex C of the TSE guidance provides advice on decontamination. This Annex is 
currently being updated by the ACDP TSE Working Group, and it is hoped that this 
updated Annex will be published shortly. 
 
The Engineering and Science Advisory Committee into the decontamination of 
surgical instruments including prion removal (ESAC-Pr) published a report in 2006 
entitled “The decontamination of surgical instruments with special attention to the 
removal of proteins: and inactivation of any contaminating human prions”. This can 
be found here:  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAnd
Guidance/DH_072443 
 
ESAC-Pr have also published a report on prion inactivating agents, written by their 
New Technologies Working Group. This can be found here: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAnd
Guidance/DH_086805  
 
It is important that, until the efficacy of products and technologies claiming to 
remove/inactivate prion protein from contaminated medical devices in laboratory and 
clinical practice is established fully against human prions, clinicians and laboratory 
managers should ensure that the current ACDP TSE guidelines are followed. 
 
 
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP)  
 
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy agents: safe 
working and the prevention of infection  
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